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Daily Report

Supplement

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-113-S

Tuesday

12 June 1990

Soviet Union SUPPLEMENT

FBIS-SOV-90-113-S

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Bloc Media Discuss Future of Socialism

90UF0194A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 May 90 Second Edition pp 5-6

[Report by M. Tretyakov and V. Sharov on the PRAVDA "Roundtable" Festival: "Thoughts on the Fate of Socialism"]

[Text] The "roundtable" assembled representatives of 18 newspapers and journals: the Bulgarian DUMA; the Hungarian NEPSZABADSAG and SZABADSAG; China's RENMIN RIBAO; the Vietnamese NHAN DAN; the newspaper NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (GDR); Cambodia's PRACHEACHON; the newspaper NODONG SINMUN (DPRK); Cuba's GRANMA; the Laotian PASASON; Mongolia's UNEN; the Polish TRYBUNA; Romania's ADEVARUL; the Czechoslovak RUDE PRAVO and PRAVDA; and Yugoslavia's KOMUNIST, SOTSIALIZAM, and BORBA.

The "roundtable" meeting was chaired by B.Ye. Averchenko, member of the editorial board and PRAVDA editor for the Socialist Countries Department.

Progress or a Return to Capitalism

Chairman: The Soviet public is following with great interest the events in the East European countries, in the Asian states friendly toward us, and in Cuba. We are receiving a mass of letters. The readers' reaction to the ongoing events is tumultuous and, I would say, contradictory. The authors of a number of letters manifestly fail to comprehend the changes and condemn them. There are letters which are full of joy and optimism. There are also, I confess, letters whose authors view the future with profound pessimism. Whatever, Soviet people's concern is understandable. It is, after all, a question of our closest neighbors, our allies, of countries with which we are linked by a common historical destiny.

I would like to start by putting to our guests the following questions: For us journalists, leaders of foremost newspapers and commentators, did events in East Europe come as a surprise? Is there any pattern to them? One Western observer has maintained that some astrologer predicted something of the sort. And what about your social scientists: Did they forecast such historic changes in the life of the East European countries?

Adjoining these questions are others put by the readers in their letters. Specifically, the readers ask: Were what happened in the East European countries popular revolutions in the true meaning of this word or processes in whose emergence and development the main part was played by street democracy and the explosion of the crowd?

Gyorgy Petrus, director of the "Szabadsag" Publishers (Hungarian Socialist Workers Party): I decided to take part in the "roundtable" because I consider this subject most topical and complex. With us in Hungary a change of system has occurred in a relatively short time, although we have been unable as yet to scientifically

define the essence of this change. I consider a particularly important task, therefore, an in-depth analysis of the group of factors which led to the liquidation or modification of the former system.

I consider also no less important the search for answers to the question of what our future will be like, what it will bring, because the biggest question mark hanging over us at the present time concerns precisely our future. When we analyze our past and make attempts to see the future, we turn primarily to the economic and political crisis in the country.

Hungary has at the present time embarked on the final stage of the creation of a new superstructure of society. A new parliament, which is working under multiparty conditions, is taking shape. Instead of the former ruling party—the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party—the Hungarian Socialist Party, as a component which separated off from the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, is represented in the present parliament. In addition, besides the traditional parties which existed up to 1948, entirely new parties are represented in parliament also. I believe that this situation confronts us with the question of what kind the new power superstructure in the country should be. I will concentrate on these questions by virtue of the fact that at the present time it is they that are the most pertinent for us.

Czeslaw Rowinski, first deputy chief editor of the newspaper TRYBUNA (Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland): I believe that we are not now in a position to make an in-depth analysis of all the events in East European countries at the proper political and philosophical level. Although such an analysis is necessary, of course, we still need a diagnosis of the phenomena which are occurring in our states.

I will touch only specific processes in Poland. The present system which is taking shape could, most likely, be defined as capitalism with the features which were characteristic of it in the 19th century. Instead of a pluralism and free expression of opinions on various issues in the political sphere, we now have, rather, monopolism and the absence of an opportunity to present views of the left. I do not wish to go into any more detail on this.

Wolfgang Spickerman, chief editor of the newspaper NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (Party of Democratic Socialism): The outward manifestations of the events which are occurring in our countries largely coincide with what was said by my Polish colleague; but there are in each of them, nonetheless, specific features also.

I would like to attempt to answer the questions which were put at the start. One was whether the events could have been foreseen. They were not unexpected, of course, but their subsequent development has brought much that is surprising. It had become obvious in the 1980's that Stalin's model of socialism could not solve many problems of social development, of industrial progress primarily. It was also ascertained that the

one-party system was incapable of responding rapidly to the difficulties which would arise. This was particularly apparent as of the mid-1980's, which was connected with the Soviet perestroika.

Perestroika led to the need for changes emerging in the GDR also. Events at the end of last year here were not a surprise in this sense. But when they began, it was revealed that our social sciences lacked a concept of further development. For several weeks and months even the country was in a state of anarchy—power, in fact, belonged to the street.

And it was in this phase that what no one could have foreseen occurred. The democratic forces of the left, which at the end of the year had initiated the changes in the GDR, now found themselves in the opposition. As a result of the elections conservative parties came to power with a substantial majority. As far as the GDR's future development is concerned, the question is now as follows: On what specific terms will the GDR unite with the FRG? It is thus no longer a question of the further development of socialism in the GDR.

To speak, however, of the socialist formation as such, I may say that I personally am convinced that socialism will develop and that now the task is to form a party and strengthen it. We need a party which under the new conditions is capable of correctly analyzing social processes and in the interests of the working people converting the results of this analysis into practical policy within the framework of the current parliamentary system.

Chairman: And what do our colleagues—friends in other parts of the world—think about the changes that are occurring?

Ha Dang, candidate of the Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee and chief editor of the newspaper NHAN DAN: I welcome the subject which PRAVDA has proposed to us for discussion—"The Fate of Socialism." Those who have spoken are right: Now, 45 years after World War II, socialism has embarked on a period of appreciable change and profound crisis.

The most diverse viewpoints on the processes which are occurring in the modern world exist at the present time. Imperialism is fiercely castigating socialism. It seems to me that the imperialist forces are afraid that socialism will enter the 21st century in a renewed state. But there are evaluations of another, opposite nature according to which all the changes which have now occurred in East Europe are contributing to the advance toward democratic and humane socialism. We do not accept these evaluations. Of either type.

Socialism is a noble ideal of mankind and necessary stage in its development. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have scored big successes which are of historic significance. These successes have changed the face of our planet for the better. They cannot be distorted or denied. Naturally, the process of the building of

socialism is not a smooth progression. A local crisis situation has come about—either within the framework of an individual socialist country or in a group of states.

The present crisis of the socialist countries, which began in the 1970's, has proven broader and deeper than all the preceding ones since it encompasses both the economic and social spheres and policies. Perestroika, reform, renewal, and the reorganization of society which are under way in our states currently pursue the goals of a surmounting of the crisis and an upsurge of socialism to a qualitatively new level. These processes are not producing the desired successes as yet. At the same time, on the other hand, it has to be said that negative phenomena are occurring also. Some communist and workers parties in a number of countries have found themselves in opposition and have lost the leading role in society. Power in these countries has fallen into the hands of the right and antisocialist forces even.

The deep-lying causes of the crisis are to be found in the mistakes which were made at the very start of the appearance of socialism. We may put in this category such phenomena as bureaucratism, usurpation, authoritarianism, abuse of privileges, detachment from the people's masses and so forth.

One further cause of the crisis is the spiteful hand of the imperialist and international reactionaries. They are taking full advantage of our difficulties in the struggle against us and endeavoring by way of peaceful changes to eliminate the socialist gains. A bitter struggle is being fought for the defense and development of socialism. The crisis will, possibly, last a long time and be manifested with varying strength depending on the conditions in each individual country.

Forecasting the future is a difficult business since the course of events is becoming increasingly complex. We would like to struggle together with you for a future in which in the Communists and working people of the countries in which the Communist Parties have lost the leading role restore by persevering and courageous struggle the gains of socialism. And where the Communist and workers parties are in power, it is necessary to learn lessons from the events that are taking place and find the correct solutions in order to gradually overcome the crisis; stabilize the situation; and move forward along the path of perestroika, reforms, and renewal.

Zdenek Porybny, chief editor of the newspaper RUDE PRAVO: We are living in a period of a certain retreat of internationalism. And this is not fortuitous. With us in Czechoslovakia the concept of internationalism has been discredited to a certain extent by the incessant interference of a bigger party in our affairs, in the affairs of society, and for the Communist Party, from the day it was founded, in fact.

The Czechoslovak Communist Party emerged as a party based on the deep democratic roots of the workers movement. But in time it changed and became a party for which democratic values were merely an empty

phrase. And we are now seeking a new policy and a new ideology and frequently also a new name, a new appellation, in order to express the change in our thinking and approaches to the solution of social problems.

As I see it, it is a question of our having lost that profound democratism or, it may be said even, having forsworn that profound democratism which we had. We exchanged it for social messianism. We wished to herd people into paradise and pushed them into this same paradise, although they did not even want to go. And when they showed their reluctance openly, we went against them with police nightsticks.

I believe that we need to constantly remember this. Remember it constantly in order that we might feel a certain penitence in this connection. We must correctly understand the wishes and interests of the people and treat their wisdom with respect. We cannot think that we have the patent on wisdom. We need to understand, finally, that unless we renew our understanding of social development and give absolute preference to the universal values of democracy, we will then be moving toward increasingly new defeats.

Mention was made also in the course of the discussion of the present situation in Romania. Attention was called to some particular features of recent events in this country. This was, as was noted, the shortest and bloodiest revolution. A pluralist society is arising from the wreckage of the totalitarian regime, and more than 80 political parties have been registered which reflects the diversity of opinion in the country. But there is a certain danger here, which the speakers noted. A bloc of forces of the right urging a return to a monarchical regime and the complete denationalization of the economy has taken shape in Romania.

A question concerning the Romanian public's reaction to such demands of the right was put. A number of specific examples was adduced at the meeting in this connection. Take the situation in agriculture. As of the present only seven percent of the agricultural cooperatives has been disbanded, and this mainly on mountainous terrain, what is more. Members of the other cooperatives are reluctant to break up their collective farms. And the workers have no intention of handing over the plants and factories to private capital. True, this does not mean that some small enterprises of industry and services in Romania may not be transferred to private ownership.

It was emphasized that currently the National Salvation Front headed by Iliescu is the biggest political force in Romania, expresses the opinion of a majority of the people, and advocates the country's progress. Various opinions were expressed about the future of Romania, including one which contained the following forecast: The country will opt for a democratic path of development according to the Swedish model.

Chairman: I have a written request. Colleagues would like to hear the opinion of the representative of people's, socialist China.

Zheng Mengxiong, deputy chief editor of the newspaper RENMIN RIBAO: The present discussion is of great significance. But it should be noted that it is necessary in the course of it to unfailingly consider the specific singularities of each country and not draw rash conclusions.

I would like here to express my viewpoint on three matters. First, socialism is the logical culmination and replacement of the capitalist system. Such is the scientific conclusion drawn by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. In our view, this objective scientific truth retains its relevance today also. All socialist countries are currently confronting various difficulties. There is nothing surprising in this. It is necessary only to analyze the situation which has taken shape in these countries dialectically, scientifically, and in a historical framework.

Socialism is a comparatively young social formation. Thus the Soviet Union is little more than 70 years old, the PRC, 40 years old. In a young society difficulties are entirely natural. Contradictions between the socialist and capitalist systems objectively exist here—these are the contradictions between the two modes of production. We cannot for this reason indiscriminately, on account of the present difficulties, deny socialism and call the socialist development path "a siding in mankind's development." No, on the contrary, socialism is the natural course of man's development and socialism has tremendous potential and great prospects. Chinese Communists believe that all the Communist Parties need to develop the socialist ideas—from the standpoints of historical materialism and with regard for the specifics of each country.

Second, when we speak about the development of socialism we mean, of course, the creative application of Marxism-Leninism and consideration of the salient features and specific situation in each country. There cannot be a dogmatic uniform model of socialism for all countries. Our leader, incidentally, Comrade Deng Xiaoping, has observed that proceeding from China's singularities we must build socialism with Chinese specifics. Thus each people seeks its own path, its own road to socialism. For example, in the PRC the reform began first of all in agriculture. The peasants switched to a contract, raised agricultural production, and fed the country.

As far as political reform is concerned we are, in implementing it, also taking specific features into account. As is known, China has a multiparty system. But, nonetheless, we are for preservation in the course of political reform of the leading role of the Communist Party. We see this as a guarantee of the PRC's assured and stable development along the socialist path.

And, finally, in order to see a socialist future, each country has to undergo reforms and perestroika.

Without perestroyka, without reforms, socialism has no future. Reforms are the self-perfection of socialism. In this respect we are considering and studying the best experience of each fraternal country. This is enriching our practice of the building of socialism with Chinese specifics.

Milivoje Tomasevic, chief editor of the weekly KOMUNIST (organ of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia): Socialism is currently encountering a number of difficulties. I shall point to one of them. Much trouble has been caused, I would say, by monopoly like-mindedness. It is now disappearing. But another intolerance of different views and viewpoints, which could destroy everything, is emerging in its place. For it is emerging on a basis of nationalism and chauvinism.

I would like to express three comments in connection with the discussion. First, the idea of a single party, a single movement, a single class as the creator of a new system and new social arrangement has not justified itself. The power of one party inevitably culminates in crisis. The second comment. The destruction by force of one untruth engenders another untruth. We have witnessed this many times. Ultimately the victors begin to move against the vanquished. And the third comment. Time, when it is a question of social development, is a relative category. A serious change in society and production does not take decades now. Today fundamental changes are occurring in years and less even. Yugoslavia may serve as an example. Inflation with us last year amounted to almost 3,000 percent, but this year we have in two months brought it down to zero.

Milija Komatina, chief editor of the Yugoslav journal SOTSIALIZAM: All those who have spoken here have been unanimous that new realities have taken shape in the East European countries. We cannot accurately describe what this means. This was affirmed by, inter alia, the colleagues from Hungary and Poland.

There are two extremes in an evaluation of what has happened. The supporters of one maintain that socialism has sustained a final defeat. It is possible to agree with such a conclusion if the reference is to the evolved model of socialism. The other extreme consists of the recognition of socialism as something which actually exists, as a system opposed to capitalism. The worse things are for capitalism, the supporters of this viewpoint believe, the better things are for socialism.

The truth, however, in my view, lies somewhere in between. In order to discover this truth not only are real changes in society needed but, speaking in philosophical language, a new category apparatus—in other words, a system of new concepts—is essential.

Further concerning the statements of representatives of the first of the above-mentioned groups. They proceed a priori in their opinions from a hatred of socialism. The people who have suffered fiascos as theorists very frequently switch to such a position.

It is essential to seek new definitions of socialism, and a different understanding of it is needed. Alas, we need to convince the masses that the communists came into this world not to do evil and practice terror. There was evil in the world before the Communists.

And, further, in order to understand more clearly what is meant by modern socialism we need to analyze social phenomena in the developed capitalist countries.

Does Socialism Have a Future?

Chairman: Speaking of the causes of the crisis in the East European countries, many people maintain that the main one is the bankruptcy of the command and bureaucratic system typical of the Stalin model of socialism. But there is another opinion also. Its proponents believe that the actual socialist idea as such has failed. They refer in this connection to the fact that the five-pointed red stars are in a number of countries being removed from the official symbols and that the words "socialism" and "socialist republic" are being withdrawn from circulation. Studies which are being conducted are showing that the majority of people do not want a return to capitalism but nor do they want socialism in the old understanding. What is your attitude toward the socialist idea and toward socialism as a historical formation?

M. Tomasevic: It is a mistake to believe that the idea of socialism is past its time. On the contrary, socialism is only now acquiring its opportunity. It was not Marx and not Lenin who thought up socialism. Socialism is a synthesis of all noble ideas from the start of man's existence. Liberty, equality, truth—this is what constitutes the essence of the socialist idea. These elements are present in all social movements—from antiquity through the present. They are present in religion, in culture, and in science.

We in the socialist countries are now at a stage where the idea of democratic socialism is acquiring its opportunity. It is to this goal very far and very near simultaneously. According to an analysis made by A. Sakharov, the USSR lags tenfold behind the United States in a number of fields in terms of the use of modern technology. A. Sakharov believed that we are simply living in another era.

It will be very difficult to realize the opportunity which has arisen. But as a snowflake forms an avalanche, like one spark ignites a blast furnace, so small progressive forces may inaugurate a new stage in human evolution. I emphasize evolution, not revolution. This opportunity means movement toward democratic socialism, this opportunity is being realized by M.S. Gorbachev. And the existing type of socialist society—both in the Soviet Union and in many other countries—has already been shaken to its very foundations.

So socialism has an opportunity to survive and exist only in character—as democratic socialism. The idea of democratic socialism incorporates respect for the positive processes in the civil society, consideration of the values

of the third world, and support for and movement onto the political scene of new public and social movements.

Pal Eotvos, chief editor of the newspaper NEPSZABAD-SAG: I would like to formulate several questions in connection with what has been heard here. In order primarily to direct our discussion onto the designated topic. And, second, to clear up the misunderstanding which is occurring.

So, my question is as follows: What is the fate of the socialist ideal? Should we and can we develop it further?

I would be extremely grateful to my colleagues were they to also answer the question: What elements and components of the socialist ideal are preserved as of the present? Which elements and components of the socialist ideal should we today be renouncing?

My opinion is as follows. We must today reject many elements of the socialist ideal—in its traditional understanding. In addition, we cannot speak about the socialist ideal since there is none. I believe that we cannot today rectify the system which we have attempted to preserve for 70 years or make changes to it. And if some of those present believe that this is possible, I would be extraordinarily grateful to them for, perhaps, citing the elements of the socialist ideal which should at this time be preserved.

Lodongiyn Tudev, member of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee and chief editor of the newspaper UNEN: The topic which has been offered us for discussion today is on the one hand new, but, on the other, old and of long standing. Particular importance, particular meaning are attached to it today. We are worried by the question of the fate of socialism. Much from our plans has not been accomplished. However, we should not especially, in my opinion, succumb to pessimism and consider that socialism has failed inasmuch as socialism has not yet appeared even. Premature anticipation is characteristic of all revolutionaries, all reformers. And since we are ardent revolutionaries, we are characterized of course by premature anticipation.

We revolutionaries always want to achieve good results as quickly as possible. We made many mistakes in the past in haste. As far as Mongolia is concerned, it is in a somewhat different position from the East European countries. Developed socialism had been built there, it was announced not that long since. But Mongolia has, as we believe, created merely the material-technical base of socialism.

The formation of the material-technical base of socialism was a veritable late-in-completion project in our country. There were reasons for this, of course. On the one hand Mongolia's backwardness in its development; but, on the other, we built this base by administrative-command methods. These methods were a serious impediment. We are now abandoning socialism

of the administrative-command type. We are accomplishing perestroika according to the Soviet Union's example.

We need a new concept of socialism. Perestroika has brought with it the stage of a renewal of thinking, not of ideals. The ideals of socialism remain with us, as before. Mongolian revolutionaries and reformers remain true to them. We recently declared at a special Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Congress that our party aspires to achieve humane democratic socialism through perestroika. The restructuring period is not, of course, infinite. We have been assigned a certain period of time. The time of reconstruction carries with it both positive and negative aspects. At times we race prematurely ahead.

Nonetheless, a child whom we will call humane, democratic socialism is expected. Broad democracy and a multiparty system are being developed with us. In such a country as Mongolia, where political culture is as yet relatively slight, democracy and a multiparty system could have undesirable consequences. Specifically, considerable damage could be done by street democracy. But we are not afraid of difficulties, not afraid of making mistakes. Only the person who does no work makes no mistakes. We have a serious reason for not fearing mistakes for we are, after all, marching hand-in-hand with brothers of various countries which aspire to new heights. It is too early to lament the fate of our socialism. A fine future lies ahead of us.

Z. Porybny: Socialism for us is not something that may be defined by some formulas. For us socialism is a process, a road, a way. It is not something about which we could say: We have finally reached the goal. And we are sure that it is necessary to subject the soundness of our path to constant, regular public plebiscite—that is, free elections—confer with the people, and see and know whether the people are with us or not.

Chairman: Let us cross the ocean. Gustavo Robrenio, first deputy chief editor of the Cuban newspaper GRANMA, seeks leave to speak.

G. Robrenio: Two months ago, on 15 March, the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee issued an appeal in connection with the Fourth Party Congress which will be held in the first half of next year. This is a directive document for the party's political and ideological work. It affords new prospects of the building of socialism in our country and describes the main problems which have to be resolved on this path. Some problems are internal, others of an external nature.

Of the entire complex of foreign problems, I would like to call attention to the fact that at the present time the imperialist government of the United States is attempting more than ever to turn us into a fortress under siege. American imperialism is counting on there soon being a suitable moment for, as they say in the United States, a final assault on Cuban socialism. It is dangerously deluded in its intentions. We are rebuffing

these attempts with tireless resolve. And should such a time come, we will answer blow for blow. We are ready to withstand all trials. Resisting American aggression is now the main task, the decisive task of our people and party. I believe that we are currently experiencing a most important stage in Cuba's history.

The prospect which the party offers the people is neither catastrophic nor pessimistic. Avoiding war and forcing the aggressor to retreat and agree to forced steps—this is the same as winning a war. Being prepared for the most unexpected and complex conditions—this means ensuring the country's survivability. We are moving toward our fourth congress with composure and optimism. The people and the Communist Party will never retreat from their goal and will never abandon the ideals of socialism.

The party must be the flesh and blood of the people to whom it belongs, and share with them its efforts and its needs. It will never tie itself to corruption and unwarranted privileges. The methods and style of its work will become increasingly democratic. It will win its authority in dialogue with the people by its capacity for persuasion, unity of word and deed, critical and systematic analysis of its own activity, and the selflessness and self-sacrificing nature of its cadres.

We have succeeded in substantiating our society's path toward socialism theoretically; describing the significance which is attached to our revolution in the general world process; and developing the theory of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The social sciences, earlier weakened by the absence of genuine discussion and a repetition of others' mistakes, are now called on to find their place and their role in the search for new social realities. In enhancing the effectiveness of ideological work we proceed from the fact that the younger generation is prepared to assume responsibility for the country's future.

M. Komatina: I will try to answer the question: What is the viability of socialism and its future? The answer to this question contains much optimism. Before coming to Moscow, I attended a meeting with journalists of A. Markovic, chairman of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Federal Executive Council. Not once did the head of government use the word "socialism." But if we do not retreat from the actual facts, from the actual positive changes in the Yugoslav economy (the rise in prices has been halted, the market is more saturated with merchandise than it ever was in the past, and so forth), it may with every justification be concluded that ultimately it is a socialist type of management which has taken shape with us.

If we really wish to struggle for socialism, we should ensure that the concept of "perestroika" be infused with specific reforms and results. The Soviet Union is currently in a state of economic stagnation. Everything is spinning as if in a vicious circle: Pay is not stimulating

high results—the low efficiency of labor is preventing an increase in remuneration. A society cannot remain long in a state of stagnation.

The solution, it seems to me, consists of a separation of economic and social issues. Enterprises should be thinking about the economy, about production. The state, on the other hand, about tackling social problems and creating the conditions for the enterprises' efficient work.

The profound and dramatic changes in the socialist world are the result of the communists' initiative. Speaking of this initiative, I refer primarily to M.S. Gorbachev. That the communists initiated perestroika affords me reason to believe that socialism is not played out.

Difficult Paths of Revival

Chairman. I would like the comrades to touch on the question of parties. Why, in fact, has the policy of ruling Marxist-Leninist parties proven bankrupt and has forfeited the trust of the masses in certain countries? A number of former parties now find themselves in the opposition. What, in your view, is their present role in society, what is their importance in parliament, in government? Do they have a chance of restoring their authority? It would be interesting if our colleagues were to express their attitude toward the multiparty problem.

Jozsef Hajdu, member of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Central Committee: I would like to touch on a question which has been heard here. It is connected with the situation in the Communist Parties of East European countries. I believe that those here present are well aware that there was in Hungary a party numbering 800,000 members and that in a relatively short space of time this political organization, which was a powerful one for the country, fell to pieces. In my opinion, one of the principal reasons for this was the fact that in the party in question there had long been the most diverse viewpoints and positions. These positions ultimately developed into platforms within the party.

I by no means consider tragic the fact that in Hungary there are currently two parties of the left. What is tragic, rather, is the fact that a unity of forces of the left failed to take shape in the election struggle. We believe that forces of the left will be defeated at this time in East European states. The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, which I represent, is not in parliament. In my view, the Hungarian Socialist Party, which is represented in parliament, cannot alone express the whole palette of views of the left.

The question is the kind of model we should follow. I believe that a popular democratic formation is the one which is appropriate to us under the present conditions. Of course, ownership relations should be specified here—this issue represents a big problem. Society as a whole has been characterized by inordinate politicization, on the eve of the elections particularly. There was

virtually no mention of the economy. And if questions of the economy were in fact raised, it was only for criticism of the economic policy of the former ruling party—the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. It should be mentioned that by renewal our party understands the following: It is essential to reject and condemn the former mistaken, flawed practice. With the results of the elections to hand, I may say that it is necessary to conduct a search for new values in keeping with the movement of forces of the left. We should impart greater impetus to cooperation between parties of a left persuasion. At the present time their interaction to keep the communist movement in the political arena is essential.

W. Spickerman: A few words about certain regularities in the development of the events about which we have been speaking. A question disturbing many people is why the parties are disintegrating so rapidly. I consider this natural because a party which has for decades alone been predominant in society contains within it much that brings about its disintegration. Our specific experience in the GDR bears this out.

Numerous careerists abandoned the party very quickly. And they very quickly found the way to the parties which now constitute a majority in parliament. There are many people, of course, who have become profoundly disenchanted with socialism. And it is for this reason that they are leaving the party.

Ha Dang: Distinctly aware of the threat to socialism in the country, our party formulated a policy of renewal of the economy, social life, and politics. It is mobilizing the whole people for the implementation of this policy. We have achieved pronounced specific results in the past three years. Last year alone rice exports amounted to 1.5 million tons (earlier we experienced a shortage of it) and inflation declined.

A climate of democracy and openness is being created. The decisions of our party Central Committee's Seventh Plenum said that renovation had achieved its first important results testifying to the soundness of the chosen course. Our party consistently advocates all-around and comprehensive renewal but, considering Vietnam's specific conditions, it believes that the primary step is economic reform. At the same time it is essential to gradually perfect the political system.

We are in our progress encountering numerous difficulties and making many mistakes. Our country has yet to emerge from the socioeconomic crisis. New contradictions, which it will be essential to rapidly ascertain and analyze and opportunely overcome, will arise here in the course of renewal. The Vietnam Communist Party is clearly aware that it must actively renew itself and that it is necessary to enhance the level of leadership. We believe in our country's future, we believe in the future of socialism.

C. Rowinski: I would like to dwell in more detail on the kind of specific goals which our party is setting itself. I do not know whether we are currently in a position to

somehow collate the processes which are occurring in our countries and ascertain some general trends because, unfortunately, we lack complete information. The sole thing we can do is map out the contours of the activity of parties of the left which should unite people around themselves.

Som Kim Suo, member of the Cambodian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee and chief editor of the newspaper PRACHEACHON: The problems of socialism which have been raised in our discussion are rightly considered a most urgent problem of the present contradictory world. A principal factor of the present situation in countries moving along the path of socialism is the fact that the Communist Parties are losing their members and their supporters. This is the case in our country also which, having embarked on the path of socialism, has abandoned the solution at the present time of the tasks of socialist revolution. Our readers are voicing various opinions which is reflected in the paper.

There is no multiparty system in our country as yet. This is explained by the fact that the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party enjoys the deserved popularity and support of the working people. But despite the generally stable situation in Cambodia, the events occurring in East Europe and shaking the whole socialist world are influencing members of our party also.

As a whole, this is giving rise to the natural question: By which path should our party proceed? The point being that immediately following the revolution, following the liberation in 1979, we declared that we would take the socialist path. We restored the country and tried to do this on socialist principles. But a meeting of party officials in 1989 declared a temporary abandonment of development by the socialist path and the building of a neutral, nonaligned, free Cambodia.

A chief principle of the country's development is the strengthening of mutually profitable relations with our neighbors and a struggle for the peace, stability, and prosperity of all of Southeast Asia. A principal political direction of the present day is struggle for implementation of a policy of national reconciliation. Our task is to lower the intensity of the civil war in the country.

In September 1989, all Vietnamese forces were finally withdrawn from Cambodia and we are now relying solely on our own forces. The government is pursuing a new economic policy. The fundamental change in the party's course, in both the political and economic spheres, is engendering confidence in the future among Cambodian workers. For this reason they are supporting the party in ever increasing strength.

We are following the events occurring in East Europe very closely. We see that the socialist idea and the Communist Parties or parties of a communist persuasion are losing supporters and losing influence in the masses. Democratization is leading to an ever increasing decline in the influence of the Communist Parties, which had earlier monopolized power in a number of countries.

The masses are becoming increasingly convinced that the Communist Parties have not always expressed their interests. They have faith in individual communists as individuals, but in parties to a lesser extent. Under such conditions it is necessary to take far more decisive steps and attempt to effect radical solutions lest the parties lose their supporters. The parties which are unable to very quickly restructure their work in the masses will most likely not restore their authority.

G. Petrus: It seems to me that a tragedy of Hungarian politics was the fact that the former ruling party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, was not only unseated but split into pieces and disintegrated. At the present time the forces of the left cannot exert even the minimal requisite influence on public opinion.

G. Robrenio: The report to the Third Cuban Communist Party Congress, when the process of rectification of the errors which were threatening the very foundations of our society had only just begun, made a serious analysis of the problems of paramount vital significance for the country's further development. These included the question of the role of the Communist Party as the driving social force. The above-mentioned Central Committee appeal formulates certain approaches to this question with regard for our experience and our specific conditions and tasks.

The party, which grew out of the people, has every opportunity to reorganize its ranks in order to accomplish the tasks of tremendous historic significance which currently confront society. Preparing for the next congress, we are analyzing in depth the processes occurring in the party ranks. The Central Committee is calling for a growth of the ranks of the Cuban Communist Party and a qualitative strengthening of its composition, which will ensure preservation of the experience acquired by our revolution. The consistent implementation of the principle of consultation of the people on the most important questions of social progress may be put among the most important tasks in this connection.

The Communist Party is the party of revolution, the party of socialism. But at the same time it is the party of the Cuban nation. The ideals of freedom and independence, for which patriots of all times have fought, are close to it. The Communist Party is the guarantee of the victory of our socialist cause and the revolutionary unity of the people.

The support of the people ensures us unity and stimulates the struggle against formalism capable of and actually leading to double standards. We take at its worth the existence of various viewpoints on one and the same question which may exist at a given moment. And consent is reached by the method of discussion in the party and society. This applies also to the search for possibilities of development and the accomplishment of the tasks en route to the improvement of the society in which we live. Reform in the party affects not only cadre

policy. We must rid ourselves of the automatic copying of other experience and of the formalism and verbiage hampering our work.

Who are we? Where are our roots? In what heritage should we take pride? What is our contribution to the world revolutionary process? These and similar questions are troubling our youth, and we are duty bound to answer them. The inexhaustible source of our struggle was and will remain the legacy of Jose Marti. He substantiated the theory of imperialist and colonialist aggression on the part of the United States. He substantiated the proposition that this country's policy is hostile toward our people.

Write the Truth and Only the Truth

Chairman: The rapid changes in the East European countries and other friendly states have posed anew, in an extraordinarily poignant form at times, the question of the place and role of the party press in society. Processes are occurring which we have yet to comprehend, and we must study the experience we are accumulating, applying it creatively. As is known, in a number of countries the fraternal newspapers are experiencing declining circulation, and last year PRAVDA also, let's face it, lost many subscribers. Persecution of party journalists has begun in places. Ambivalent processes. How do you, journalists and newsmen, see these complex processes?

C. Rowinski: As an illustration of the offensive of forces of the right on the leftwing press and one-sided pluralism, I shall cite an example from the life of the newspaper which I represent—TRYBUNA. It is not as yet finally decided whether it will be published at all. The right is constantly putting financial obstacles in our way and attempting to discredit us in every way possible. The role of us journalists is now very specific because a situation in which there is a newspaper without a party could be created. What opportunities such a paper would have it is hard to say. The task which confronts us, therefore, is to take account of the changing situation and hold on to people and personnel.

G. Petrus: A very big role will be performed by the press in the search for answers to the question of what the new political superstructure in Hungary should be like. It was with great pleasure in this sense that we received the invitation to take part in the PRAVDA festival and we would like to avail ourselves of the opportunity accorded us to establish bilateral relations. If such relations are established and regulated, it will be far easier for us to understand the conditions which have taken shape in our countries. For example, we wish to understand why it is now far more difficult to distribute this same PRAVDA in Hungary. It will be easier to understand also, possibly, the process within whose framework monuments to V.I. Lenin are in a number of regions being taken down. We believe that the transformations which are taking place in our countries have their negative aspects, their distorted versions, to so speak.

...The meeting also discussed the newspapers of forces of the left in the East European countries which under the present conditions have been able to raise their circulation and increase their influence in society. For example, the competitor of the press organs of forces of the right in Romania, the newspaper ADEVARUL, is now one of the most popular and large-circulation papers in the country. In February its daily circulation constituted 2.2 million copies. True, the circulation of ADEVARUL has now fallen to 1.5 million copies a day as a result of the paper crisis which has erupted in Romania.

Z. Porybny: In our view, the newspaper RUDE PRAVO should not be a collective propagandist, canvasser, and organizer. There are, of course, such party newspapers, and they are useful. But a big newspaper with a large circulation, a newspaper which appeals not only to the Communists but also the reading public at large, should be freer from party tutelage. Journalists for whom the principles of morality are more important than party discipline should be working there and writing for it. There are several lessons which we have learned from recent events in our country.

Som Kim Suo: In our publication we write actively about the main paths of the further transformation of socialism. The theory of socialism in today's world is in

need of reform. In our country the newspaper is a mirror of public opinion, reflects the interests of the working people, and attempts in the form of solutions and specific deeds to return them to the masses. People read our paper with interest insofar as it reflects actual concerns.

Generally, our opinion is such: Those who are taking a socialist path have a future. And I would like to say that although we have abandoned the socialist path, we will maintain close relations with all countries adhering to a democratic and socialist choice.

Chairman: Two days of discussion are behind us. We worked, it seems to me, profitably. The representatives of the fraternal newspapers spoke candidly about the problems and difficulties which the socialist world has recently been encountering in its development. We dealt with our professional concerns also. I believe that this discussion will be to everyone's benefit. The discussion as a whole was characterized by a tone of optimism. Yes, we are optimists, we believe in the future, we believe in socialism. I thank the participants in the "roundtable" on behalf of my PRAVDA colleagues. Until new meetings and discussions! And we invite our readers interested in the fate of socialism to continue the discussion.

Political & Social

Article Examines Informal Political Groups

WA0106193590 Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 20, May 90 pp 8-9

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Valentin Davydov: "The Informal Movement: More Questions Than Answers"]

[Text] Political life in the country is becoming increasingly turbulent. And not surprisingly, the deterioration in the socioeconomic situation, the exacerbation of interethnic tension against the background of the revocation of Article 6 of the Constitution, and the CPSU's renunciation of the monopoly of political power have sharply accelerated the process of politicization of the masses and the formation of a whole number of new political movements, organizations, and parties. This process actually began in 1988, gradually gaining momentum and scale. As of the start of 1990 its quantitative characteristics have begun to assume a qualitative nature. Even an incomplete newsreel of events testifies to this.

The constituent congress of the Social Democratic Association of the Soviet Union was held 13-14 January in Tallinn.

January 20-21—the constituent conference of the "Democratic Platform" association of Communists within the CPSU. The constituent conference of the "Democratic Russia" (Moscow) electoral bloc was held simultaneously.

The second conference of the Interregional Association of Democratic Organizations (MADO) was held in Vilnius 2-4 February.

February 13—the constituent conference of the Moscow Social Democratic Organization.

February 16—a conference of the "Democratic Platform" of Moscow and Moscow Oblast.

February 24—the constituent conference of the Leningrad "Democratic Platform" association of Communists.

The "Russian Democratic Forum" was formed in Moscow on 18 March. On 18-19 March there was also a meeting of the "Democratic Platform" Coordinating Council.

March 20—the second conference of the Moscow Social Democratic Organization.

The constituent congress of the Marxist Workers Party—Dictatorship of the Proletariat Party was held in Moscow on 25 March.

The "Greens" movement and the Federation of Marxist Party Clubs were formed in Moscow at the end of

March-start of April. The constituent congress of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement was held in Moscow on 8 April.

A conference was held 14-15 April in Bykovo of Moscow Oblast at which the "Marxist Platform" movement in the CPSU was formed.

The organizing congress of the Russian Communist Party, at the source of which are the United Workers Front, the Leningrad State Enterprise Directors Association, and a number of local party figures, was held in Leningrad 21-22 April. A meeting of the "Democratic Platform" Coordinating Council was held in Moscow at this time.

The constituent congress of the Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation was held in Moscow 4-6 May.

The constituent congress of the Orthodox Constitutional Monarchy Party of Russia, in which representatives of 60 cities and a number of regions have expressed a desire to participate, will be held there on 19 May.

A conference of the Russian Communist Party convened at the decision of the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau is to be held on 19 June.

And, finally, the 28th CPSU Congress will begin on 2 July.

So the multiparty situation is becoming increasingly manifest. What is the apportionment of political forces in society at the present time?

A recent event was the First Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union Congress, which was held on 31 March in Moscow. Present at it—as at a whole number of other congresses, conferences, assemblies, mass meetings, and such activities conducted by the new socioeconomic movements and organizations—one had an acute perception of the pulse of the political life of the country and of Moscow, people's mood, and their reaction to this event or the other. The maturing trends and possible prospects of socioeconomic development affecting each of us show through there in one way or another.

Thus at the Liberal Democratic Party Congress one clearly sensed the radicalization of the mood of the people representing the liberal democratic persuasion of society's political spectrum. And although the basic principles proclaimed at the congress—legality, a multiparty system, a multiple production mode, presidential rule, and deideologization—do not stand out all that strongly in the collection of slogans which are popular in society, the mood in the hall was, nonetheless, largely different. Heated debate was initiated on practically any pretext, and one clearly sensed in it impatience, bitterness, an aspiration to "freedom from the diktat of the CPSU," and indictment of the latter for all our troubles and the impossibility of emergence from the crisis. And the speech by V. Zhirinovskiy, chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party, testified that the propositions recorded in the party program, and their disclosure and

practical interpretation, were far from being one and the same thing. Thus the principle of a multiparty system and political freedom frequently amounts in practice to the actual removal of the CPSU from political power. Attempts are being made to reduce the principle of equal constitutional guarantees for all types of ownership down to the priority of free enterprise in the "Western version" and an economy "without politics" and the removal of all restrictions without exception from economic activity in the country—proclamation of the "everything is sold and everything is bought!" principle. So the Liberal Democrats' idea of themselves as a "center" party is hardly correct inasmuch as their position is not even "moderately conservative" but geared directly to the development of capitalist relations. And in the worst version of them, what is more, inasmuch as the emphasis on "complete freedom of entrepreneurial activity" would now result in nothing other than economic anarchy inevitably leading to society's demarcation into "rich" and "poor" and to political chaos.

Proclaiming themselves the ideological successors to the constitutional democrats and the Popular Freedom Party of the 1905-1917 period, in today's spectrum of political movements and organizations the Liberal Democrats are also finding their closest allies among the reviving Constitutional Democratic Party, the Christian Democrats, and the Russian Popular Front.

The Union of Constitutional Democrats was formed 21-22 October 1989 in Moscow and is in its aim very close to the Liberal Democrats: constitutional transition by way of radical reforms to a civilized society organized by the power of the people as well as freedom of the individual and economic activity, struggle against attempts to establish any dictatorship, and regulation by law of the entire activity of the state structures.

The Christian Democrats of Russia and the Russian Popular Front constituted at a joint conference on 18 March a new organization—the "Russian Democratic Forum." The main motto is "Revival of the Fatherland." The most diverse center-right organizations were represented at the conference. Testimony to this are, for example, the calls which were heard at it: "No connection with the CPSU," "Create an effective opposition and directly confront the authorities," "Resistance to Marxist ideology," "We do not want socialism," "Unite all noncommunist and anticommunist forces," "Communist ideology is destroying the people," "Soviets without Communists," and "We will raise up the people and sweep away the 'red plague.'" There is no mention, naturally, of any of this in the declaration adopted by the Russian Democratic Forum, it being sustained in quite sober tones. So where is the true face of these "democrats"? And how can they be described other than as opponents of the socialist idea as such, that is, as the right?

Close to the right of the above organizations are, in a sense, the formations which created at their conference on 21 March the "Popular Orthodox Movement of

Russia" which incorporates five anti-Semitic groupings which have proclaimed as their goal restoration of the monarchy and a struggle against "Zionism" and "masonry." There are such organizations as the Christian Patriotic Union, the Russian People's Party, the National Patriotic Front (Novosibirsk), the Union of Armed Forces of Russia, and a branch of "Pamyat" headed by A. Kulakov. Of course they are all quite diverse. Aside from these, there is a mass of more or less influential organizations and groupings which are close in terms of their views. I. Sychev, leader of the "Pamyat" Russian National Front, has declared that this movement supports "the unity of the two great forces of present-day Russia—national-patriotic and democratic." And the national-patriotic forces also incorporate such organizations as the "United Council of Russia," the "United Workers Front," the Scientific Communism Association, the "Russia" Deputies and Voters Club, and a number of others. Of course the views to which they adhere are not identical. Nonetheless, we cannot fail to be alerted by the position of, for example, N. Andreyevna who is calling for "the replacement as quickly as possible of the worthless crew of the ship," that is, "the bankrupt Gorbachev-Yakovlev-Shevardnadze" right-opportunist group. Such statements testify to nothing other than a transition to actions aimed at the accomplishment of an entirely particular change in the entire domestic and foreign policy of our country.

Changes in the methods of activity and tactics of a whole number of formations of the politicized type are being perceived also at their conferences, congresses, and other organizational activities and from their press and change in slogans.

This may be illustrated to a certain extent in the example of the "radical democrats." The biggest radical organization is the "Democratic Union" Party. With the completion of the elections its press organ, SVOBODNOYE SLOVO, proposes that the tactics be made more active, that it "come out of the wood" and that it "thumb its nose" and "act, act, act." "Without consigning to oblivion the method of demonstrations and mass meetings in the squares, the main emphasis at this stage should be transferred directly to the collectives—worker, office, educational, research." What is more, particular emphasis is being put precisely on the educational and research establishments. It is proposed creating immediately the parallel power and administration of self-management structures from Democratic Union members at the enterprises. On a broader plane, the Democratic Union advocates the "unification of all democratic forces" of Russia within the framework of a kind of civic forum based on "democratic values common to all mankind and the ideas of parliamentary democracy," and in the future a struggle for the convening of a constituent assembly on a multiparty basis. So the formation of quite a broad bloc of forces of the "center" and all organizations located, provisionally

speaking, "to the right" of it and setting essentially the goal of a "nonviolent change in the system" is being observed here.

As a counterweight to it, a bloc of forces adhering to positions—albeit to a varying degree and extent, provisionally speaking—of "democratic socialism" and "social democracy" is taking shape at the "other pole." This bloc which is taking shape encompasses the CPSU, the "Democratic Platform," the Marxist Platform, socialists, Social Democrats, and a number of organizations close to them.

Confrontation may be traced quite clearly here. In the course of the recent elections the Russian Popular Front, for example, expressed sharp discontent with the actions of the Social Democrats, socialists, Moscow Popular Front ("leftist liberals" in their terminology) and the Interregional Group of Deputies for the fact that "they wish to capture a monopoly in the democratic movement" and, "following the fall of the regime," to establish their dictatorship, accusing them of "neo-Bolshevism"—that is of totalitarian, monopoly tendencies.

A niche closer to the "center" and somewhat to the left of it is occupied by the anarcho-syndicalists. Its contemporary variety originates with the "Obshchina" Moscow students' club which united around itself the "Federalist Socialist Alliance." The Anarcho-Syndicalist Confederation (KAS), which today unites about 700 persons from approximately 40 cities, was formed 21-22 January 1989; it publishes up to a dozen newspapers. The KAS is of the nature of a movement and is an open organization, having no party discipline or directive central authorities. The anarchists advocate "stateless socialism," a "dispersal" of power and power functions coming not "from the top down" but, on the contrary, the lower structures delegating some of their rights "upward."

To the left of the anarcho-syndicalists are the Social Democrats. The social democratic movement has both in Russia, and in the country as a whole enjoyed certain development as of the end of the 1980's. It has gradually gained momentum and, following the constituent assembly of the Social Democratic Association in Tallinn, the association united as of the start of February 1990 approximately 200 groups and clubs of a social democratic persuasion from 90 cities and regions of the Union and almost all the Union republics. While declaring themselves "supporters of political, economic, and social democracy," the disciples of this ideology proclaim an aspiration to participate in a search for a way out of the crisis on the paths of the "formulation of alternative programs," offering the social democratic concept as one such alternative. It amounts to realization of "the principle of permanent reform... and democratic transformations in place of violent struggle for a monopoly of power."

The Social Democrats see as their social base not only the workers movement but also "cultured strata of the

civil society from all social groups aware of their responsibility for the fate of the country." There is, accordingly, a transformation also to a certain extent of specific aspects of economic and social policy. The main point in the political sphere, the Social Democratic Association's "Declaration of Principles" observes, is removal of the monopoly of power and the creation of assurances of the impermissibility of absolutism in policy; a development of the constitutional process which leads to the "creation of a democratic state based on the rule of law on the basis of parliamentary democracy, a multiparty system, and a real separation of powers."

The most important thing in the economic sphere is proclaimed "society's regulation of the commodity-money (market) economy," the equality of different forms of ownership (collective and private included), freedom of entrepreneurial initiative, and the establishment of a system of economic coordination: government-parliament-the unions-the proprietors of the means of production. "Consistent struggle for man's maximum social protection" and the close linkage of the "market" economy with a "nonmarket" social policy are proclaimed the basis of social policy.

Shortly after its formation, the Social Democratic Association was officially registered, acquired its own bank account and press, and became a "formal" organization. It incorporates as collective members a whole number of regional social democratic organizations (of Moscow and Leningrad and certain other important cities and areas) and parties of this persuasion (of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan).

Occupying a position left of center and viewing it as a kind of "pole of growth" of a bloc of national concord, the Social Democrats are propounding the idea of a national "roundtable." "The essence of the 'roundtable' idea," Yu. Rummyantsev, cochairman of the Social Democratic Association, said at a mass meeting in Moscow on 25 February, "is the achievement of provisional political concord. Such concord is the main condition of the transition to a multiparty system. Society needs this concord for the formulation of an adequate policy and for the restoration of confidence in the success of the transformations."

The idea of a "roundtable" has been actively supported by many other public movements and organizations of a center-left persuasion occupying an important place in the process of formation of a multiparty system, for example, by the supporters of the creation of a socialist party endeavoring to occupy the as yet vacant political space between the spheres of influence of the Social Democrats and the Communists. B. Kagarlitskiy formed in 1987 in Moscow the "Socialist Initiative" group which was the basis of the Moscow Popular Front. The front's heterogeneousness stimulated the separation of a group which in June 1989 created the "Moscow New Socialists Committee." The committee then established contacts with the strike committees of the Kuzbass, Karaganda, and Vorkuta. A conference of socialist

groups and organizations was held in December 1989 in Moscow at which the All-Union Committee for a Socialist Party was formed. This latter incorporated representatives of the strike committees of Vorkuta, the Donbass, Karaganda, and the Kuzbass and socialist groups of the popular fronts of Irkutsk, Kuybyshev, and Tolyatti as well as certain activists of the "Democratic Platform" association of Communists within the framework of the CPSU which had taken shape at that time (M.V. Malyutin, I.G. Yakovenko). The All-Union Committee for a Socialist Party also cooperates actively with the Socialist Youth Federation which has taken shape in the Communist Youth League on the basis of the "Surgut Initiative" movement. It plans holding a socialist party conference in a region of the country in the next few months.

The main thing distinguishing the Socialists from the Social Democrats is the orientation toward the mass support of the working people, the workers movement, and the independent trade unions. The Socialists set as an immediate task the shaping of a genuine political alternative with a different direction of the reforms—not at the working people's expense. A policy of solidarity with all democratic forces is pursued and actions geared to the formation of a bloc of the left for the purpose of realization of socialist ideals, and the principles of freedom, justice, and self-government are being implemented to this end.

It should be said that the Socialists and, to an even greater extent, the Social Democrats are pursuing increasingly actively also a policy of an expansion of their international ties to the social democracy of the West. Trips of their representatives to the East European countries are frequent also. Not all that far off, evidently, is the Social Democratic Association's entry into the Socialist International.

The Christian Democrats and Liberal Democrats, not to mention the republic popular fronts, also have active contacts with Western countries. And they are being established along various channels, through such a structure as the Interregional Association of Democratic Organizations (MADO) included. The association's first all-Union conference was held 28-29 October in Chelyabinsk, at which 80 organizations from 42 cities of the country were represented. A manifesto was adopted and the principles of the activity of the association determined. The manifesto proclaims an aspiration to a change in the Union arrangement, transition to confederative principles of the composition of the Union state, and a transformation of the social structure on the basis of democratization, self-government, and the separation of society and the state. The association advocates the equality of all forms of ownership (state, collective, private) and the granting of land for agricultural production to the peasants free of charge with the right of inheritance; the disbandment of the current and the creation of independent trade unions; an independent press; The democratization of the Army; alternative service; and cooperation with the soviets.

The MADO is stepping up its activity and expanding thanks to the incorporation in the association of new artistic, worker, youth, women's, and religious organizations. Some 120 organizations from 12 Union republics and seven autonomous entities were registered at the Second MADO Conference held 2-4 February 1990 in Vilnius. An increase in the antisocialist mood of the representatives of a number of ultraradical organizations (the Democratic Union primarily) and in the contradiction between them and the organizations endeavoring to operate by democratic methods was manifested at the conference. As a result the proposal concerning the organization and realization of a national "roundtable" was turned down and a decision on the intention of creating a political coalition of democratic forces and movements to win power functions at various levels was adopted. A decision on the convening in May- June of the Third MADO Conference for the purpose of formulation of a common position of the movements and organizations incorporated in it on the eve of the 28th CPSU Congress was adopted also.

I have reason to believe that behind all the organizations and parties of a left and center-left persuasion there are in one way or another representatives of the Interregional Group of deputies. Its most active members, the cochairmen included, have given advice to this extent or the other on the elaboration of documents and have participated and continue to participate actively in the main organizational activities of the Social Democrats, Socialists, the Democratic Platform, the MADO, and a number of other organizations.

Certain new processes have been observed in the Interregional Group recently. On the one hand internal differentiation based on the blocs which have emerged in it also is taking place. On the other, calls are being heard increasingly actively on the part of its cochairmen for the consolidation and peaceful coexistence of the various blocs, first, within the entire organization and, second, with the platforms and new structural formations within the USSR Supreme Soviet—agrarians, environmentalists, the Baltic Group, and the "Science" and "Union" groups.

In addition, the Interregional Group is advocating a "roundtable" of national proportions and the formation of an allied left bloc of all democratic forces. The process of the creation at various levels of "citizens' committees of forces of the left" has been initiated as the first step in this direction.

Inasmuch as many activists and rank-and-file participants in this new social and political organization or the other (of the center- left wing primarily) are members of the CPSU, the formation of a multiparty system will undoubtedly exert a direct influence on the processes occurring within this very party itself also. Various platforms (the Democratic Platform, Marxist Platform, and so forth) are taking shape, and a split has occurred or is maturing mainly along national lines in a number of republics; complex, contradictory processes are under

way in the plane of formation of the Russian Communist Party. This is an immense and entirely independent subject, and for this reason an analysis of the reform and renewal of the CPSU requires special study. At the same time it is perfectly clear that under the conditions that have taken shape currently its transformation into a modern-type party requires the in-depth comprehension of the political, economic, social, and spiritual-ideological renewal of the whole of Soviet society; and its emergence at a new level of democracy, a most important expression of which is the formation of a multiparty system.

Nikolskiy Previews Press Law Second Reading

PM0606125590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Jun 90 Second Edition p 1

[Interview with B.N. Nikolskiy, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Glasnost and Citizens' Rights and Appeals, by unnamed own correspondents, datelined the Kremlin, 5 June, under the rubric "At the USSR Supreme Soviet Session": "The Law on the Press: The Green Light at Last?"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] According to the work schedule of the USSR Supreme Soviet session, on 6 June parliamentarians must discuss and adopt on its second reading the draft Law on the Press and Other Mass Media. On the eve of the parliamentary debate, our correspondents interviewed B.N. Nikolskiy, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Glasnost and Citizens' Rights and Appeals.

[Correspondents] Boris Nikolayevich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers would be interested to hear about the results of work on the draft law.

[Nikolskiy] After the Supreme Soviet passed the draft law on its first reading, the Supreme Soviet Presidium set up a commission to finalize the draft law. People's Deputy K.D. Lubchenko was made head of the commission and I became his deputy.

I must say that initially we worked on the basis that, as the draft law had been passed on its first reading, i.e. the concept had been approved, no serious conceptual changes would have to be made. A whole series of fundamental questions arose, however, on the basis of proposals from people's deputies, voters, and, naturally, journalists.

Serious arguments arose over the relationship between the founder and the actual mass medium concerned. Who should be given preference in their rights? It is interesting that very respected people, professionals, clashed in their views during the discussion. Deputy F.M. Burlatskiy, for example, the present chief editor of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, believes that the draft law impinges on the rights of editorial boards and that the rights given founders are too great. But Deputy S.P.

Zalygin, chief editor of the journal NOVYY MIR, is convinced of the reverse. I feel that we have succeeded in finding a balanced solution to this situation. The law's merit is in the fact that it provides for a diversity of relations between the founder, the editorial board, and the publishing house and does not set them in a rigid framework. Of course, until recently the CPSU Central Committee was really the only founder in our country. It was impossible to set up any journal or newspaper without the authorization of the party's Central Committee. That is why these disputes arose. But now everything will be different. And, in my view, there is no reason to fear any excessive rights for founders.

There were also disputes over the articles protecting journalists' right to obtain information. The solution we found was this: We have enshrined the right to obtain information without any general formula (unlike the first version of the draft law). But, at the same time, we have decided that there must be a special law on citizens' right to information. The United States and several other countries have such a law.

Many deputies insisted that the law should offer greater protection for citizens and individuals against the mass media. So we have incorporated in the draft a provision on the right to reply and to refutation. In addition to this, we have included norms of liability for breaking the law. For interfering in the work of the mass media or putting pressure on journalists, for example. This provision also prompted discussions. But, in view of the fact that the "telephone law" still exists in our country, this article is necessary. The provision on the possibility of a citizen being materially compensated for moral damage caused him by the mass media has been left in the draft law.

[Correspondents] Just how democratic is the draft law, in your view?

[Nikolskiy] I believe it is really democratic. For two main reasons. First, it abolishes censorship, which is a very important achievement of democratic society. And, second, it enshrines the registration principle with regard to founding mass media. This will remove many problems.

Moscow Communists View Multiparty Issues

90UN1901A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian
12 May 90 p 2

[Roundup of views of Moscow Communists exchanged at PRAVDA Festival in the "Moscow" Pavilion at the All-Union Exhibition of National Economic Achievements on 6 May chaired by V. Lysenko, editor of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, reported by G. Drugov-eyko and A. Osinskiy: "On the Threshold of a Multiparty System"]

[Text] V. Kuznetsov, secretary of the Moscow Gorkom [City Party Committee]; V. Shostakovskiy, rector of the

Moscow Higher Party School and member of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" Coordinating Council; Yu. Vinogradov, people's deputy of the Moscow City Soviet; A. Smirnov, head of the Moscow Gorkom Ideology Department; G. Kozlov, secretary of the party committee of the USSR Academy of Sciences General Physics Institute; V. Sogrin, chief editor of the journal OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI; and A. Lisin, editor of the newspaper VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA, met at a "roundtable" with Muscovites and visitors to the capital. Many of the questions to the participants in the "roundtable" had arrived at the editorial office even prior to V. Lysenko, editor of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, who chaired the discussion, addressing brief opening remarks to those present. It is with these questions that we will begin our account, which is presented, naturally, in an abridged version.

Why are you oriented toward a parliamentary-type party and why does the platform you represent not seriously explain what is meant by this? Why do you support a narrowing of the party's functions and a winding down of the work of the party organizations on the shop floor? Is this really to the good, and if so, for whom? You reject the principle of democratic centralism. It is, understandably, discredited today. But, after all, the draft CPSU Rules provide for its fundamental democratization. Nonetheless, you still consider this principle unacceptable. Why? With what do you disagree in this document? There is a great deal of all kinds of talk about the "Democratic Platform"; that you are even now organizing an independent party, that you wish to do so after the congress. What does this mean—a policy of splitting the party?

These and many other similar questions were addressed to V. Shostakovskiy. The interest was understandable: Representatives of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" have given notice of themselves as the most progressive part of the party aspiring to its profound and all-around democratization and renewal on a contemporary basis. But at the same time the platform's program documents and the extensively publicized statements and actions of the members of its coordinating council have sometimes been simply puzzling.

V. Shostakovskiy: I believe that we are making a very big mistake in orienting both the draft party Central Committee documents and the pre-congress debate toward the past condition of our party, toward the type of party which once took shape under particular historical conditions. We are giving very little thought to what our immediate future will be like and how the party, living, effective, and operating, should be organized in this future.

Our actual immediate future is a multiparty system and the multistructural nature of the economy, which will provide the socioeconomic soil for a multiparty system. And under multiparty conditions a political market will take shape, just as tough as any other market, on which the laws of competitive struggle—struggle for the votes of the electorate—will operate. This is the meaning of

the existence of political parties. The party must offer a convincing strategy and action program, enthruse the electorate, and win its support and a certain package of seats in the soviets of various levels. And on this basis it is to form the executive organs of power or move onto the opposition benches or out of the political arena altogether. It is to such a political market that a vanguard party in the sense in which it has taken shape with us and in which it still exists will prove utterly unadapted.... If we preserve this type of party we will sustain defeat after defeat.

Concerning the primary organizations. We are not opposed to their being on the shop floor. We are opposed to the primary organizations interfering in the production and any other process without essentially bearing the least responsibility for this.

The present principle of democratic centralism. Read the draft rules closely: They have essentially substituted the permissive mood for the prohibitive. This is not the power of the party masses. It is not the power of the primary party organizations. After all, even in connection with the creation of horizontal structures it is said that this may be done where necessary. But who is to define this necessity—a superior committee or some official?

And concerning a split. I believe that an actual state of division emerged as a result of the organizing congress in Leningrad for the creation of a Russian Communist Party.

Speeches from the floor:

A. Sushchilina: Can there really be consolidation on a basis of principle between those who defend private property and those who are opposed to it?

V. Shostakovskiy also expressed his opinion in connection with the doubts as to where the "Democratic Platform" stands, for all that—in the CPSU or outside.

"I would like, incidentally, to call your attention to the fact," he said, *inter alia*, "that PRAVDA having set the ball rolling, this then being heard in the well-known CPSU Central Committee Open Letter, the words 'in the CPSU' were cast aside—and there remained simply the 'Democratic Platform.' But this is inaccurate. 'Democratic Platform'—in the CPSU. Such it remains."

This was said, let us specify to preserve the conventions, at the start of the speech. But incomparably more important in this case was something else: It transpires that all the doubts concerning the actual intentions of the "Democratic Platform" had been sown by PRAVDA and the CPSU Central Committee. Is this so?! Have the representatives of this platform's coordinating council not on a multitude of occasions spoken to the most diverse audiences about the most decided intention of dissociating from the present party, and have not the corresponding resolutions been recorded in documentary form?! Spoken, adopted, and recorded. This is no

secret to many communists. It was for this reason, evidently, that the hall greeted many of the speaker's words with such manifest distrust.

Let us, however, return to our audience. The next block of questions and answers addressed to representatives of the Moscow Gorkom was offered the attention of those present.

What is the gorkom's position in the present situation, when it is a question of a handover of power to the soviets? What, in your view, is the popularity of the draft party platforms? Why is more being said about the "Democratic Platform" than the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform and the "Marxist Platform"? What is your attitude toward them personally?

V. Kuznetsov: In the election period and since we advocated consolidation and unification of efforts for the solution of Moscow's most important problems. And there are a multitude of such problems in our city—housing, transport, the environment, the economy, and much else. All this formed the basis of the program which the gorkom intends to present in conjunction with the "Moscow" group in the Moscow City Soviet. In other words, the Moscow Gorkom will, as before, stand for the constructive solution of the problems which have accumulated in the city. And cannot conceive of doing otherwise. No questions which affect people's vitally important interests, like, say, protection of the needy strata of the population, may be anything other than a subject of the gorkom's close attention. Although, of course, they must be solved by political methods. We need to operate through the communists who will be working in the soviets of various levels and in the economic bodies.

As far as the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform is concerned, the general distrust of such documents has had an effect here, evidently. Unsatisfactory propaganda in the primary party organizations has taken its toll also. To speak of the platforms as a whole, there is much that is rational in all these documents. The gorkom's position is now being formulated. This is a document which will be discussed preliminarily in the primary party organizations, and the capital's communists will subsequently present it at their city party conference.

I have a negative attitude toward the organizing congress held in Leningrad. I believe that its decisions are geared not toward consolidation in the party but, on the contrary, could lead to a split.

What do you think about the "independent" press: where is there more truth—in a party or an independent newspaper? How to enhance the communists' propaganda skill?

A. Smirmov: Under the conditions of comprehensive, not only political, pluralism, when various social groups are recognizing their true interests, the corresponding

political movements are emerging also. And the corresponding press too. Therefore, speaking of some particular "independence" of any press organ is unscientific and insincere.

The communists now need the truth as they need air. It is another matter that what for the working people today is the truth is for some people absolutely intolerable. The truths which are to their liking reflect opposite views of interests and plans. That is all that "independence" amounts to.

The Moscow City Soviet, for example, merely by virtue of the social purpose of this structure, needs its own newspaper. This is natural, legitimate, and useful. The gorkom fully supports this and offers its assistance in the creation of a new newspaper. But until it has been created, VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA will preserve a dual founder—the Moscow Gorkom and the Moscow City Soviet.

As far as assistance on the part of the Moscow Gorkom to the propaganda activists is concerned, we are working actively in two directions here. First, we are constantly studying and analyzing the political situation in Moscow and preparing procedural recommendations in respect of ideological work in a specific period of time. Second, we are creating a political institute, where the communists will be able to obtain thorough support for subsequent work with Muscovites. In addition, in connection with the intensification of the parliamentary principle in the CPSU's activity we will stimulate the territorial principle of organization and political functioning.

Speeches from the floor:

N. Rodionova: The first thing that should not artificially disunite us are values common to all mankind and a class approach. Neither Marx, Engels, nor Lenin, in my opinion, ever relegated values common to all mankind to the secondary, tenth, and such like levels. However, there was undoubtedly a class approach to an evaluation of these undoubted values, of course.

Today, however, for some reason or other both "Democratic Russia" and the Interregional Group of People's Deputies and all who support their views are offering a highly original interpretation of this approach, declaring that values common to all mankind never existed for the founders and followers of Marxism and that they knowingly sacrificed them.

On 29 April MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA published V. Sogrin's article "Three Currents in the CPSU." This, evidently, determined the main interest in and the questions to our author.

The most progressive wing in the CPSU, as your article wrote, is the reformist wing. But much that is useful is, after all, contained in the views of the radical left also. Is a rigid ideological confrontation with them justified?

V. Sogrin: The possibility of the coexistence of three currents in a single party is extremely problematical.

The "right" (and this was confirmed by the attempt to conduct in Leningrad a constituent congress of a Russian Communist Party) is leading the party toward disintegration.

The most progressive political figures today, in my view, are M. Gorbachev, A. Yakovlev, and E. Shevardnadze. They have no equals. It is these politicians who are realizing the principal idea of socialism: The maximum satisfaction of man's requirements. For them socialism is one and indivisible, although features of originality are perfectly possible. But every conceivable kind of "model" by no means. And the proposition that the most accomplished model of socialism today is the Swedish model is in this sense groundless! Capitalism is not, after all, identical to socialism.

The radical left has been constantly evolving away from socialism. Particularly since the main association of the radical left, the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU," has come under the strong influence of the leaders of the Interregional Group of deputies. Since June 1989 the logic of the opposition faction in the USSR Supreme Soviet has been predominant in the "Democratic Platform" also. Remaining on socialist ideological positions has today become absolutely impossible for this opposition current.

Many communists are sympathetic toward the "Democratic Platform" merely because they are unaware of its ideological essence. It is a pity that the Open Letter of the Party Central Committee did not reveal the essence of the profound insurmountable contradictions between the CPSU and this implacable opposition faction. There will be no concord here.

Given the 59 percent communists in the present Moscow City Soviet, there are in the "Moscow" bloc approximately 100 deputies and only 12 workers. So who has come to power in Moscow and who will defend the interests of the capital's working masses? Is there a possibility of mutual understanding and cooperation between the 21st Moscow City Soviet and the gorkom? Will the "Moscow" bloc be making an evaluation of the May Day incident in Red Square, which was organized by the Moscow City Soviet?

Yu. Vinogradov: I believe that a shameful event occurred on May Day. We discussed the procedure of the "second" demonstration in the Moscow City Soviet. I, for example, warned the organizers that they would reap the whirlwind. The incident was, in my view, an ideological failure of the "Democratic Russia" bloc. It is not, of course, a question of alternative slogans. Would that there had been an alternative.... There was a dirty anti-Soviet escapade. How else can one evaluate the following kinds of posters: "USSR—State of Red Fascism," "We Will in 1990 Have Done With the Inhuman Experiment" and so forth. The leaders of "Democratic Russia" are now keeping quiet. I personally will without fail say all that I think about what happened.

Evaluating the present situation in the Moscow City Soviet is complex. The composition of the Moscow City Soviet reflects the situation in the party, and a demarcation is occurring there in respect of the main criterion—ideas. But the "Democratic Russia" bloc is heterogeneous also. There are not only antisocialist elements in it. There are intellectuals of a high level also. Those with whom one may not only argue but also tackle the city's problems.

Neither is the "Moscow" bloc a monolith. I am opposed—in principle!—to everything being reduced to subjective differences, to personalities.

The people's deputies are undoubtedly divided by profound philosophical contradictions. But we need to work together.

I am convinced that it is time for the gorkom to abandon its evasive position. The voice of the gorkom should be molding public support for the healthy forces of the Moscow City Soviet.

Why, in your view, has there been such a growth in the political assertiveness of scholars and scientific personnel? The proportion of them compared with what it was before in the corps of deputies, for example, has increased many times over. They occupy more decisive and frequently radical positions, as a rule. With what is this linked? What will this do for the party and society? What consequences of this politicization of scientific circles may be forecast?

G. Kozlov: Formerly, I believe, it would indeed hardly have occurred to physicists and other scientists to have developed an enthusiasm for social and political activity because these two principles—scientific and political—were in the majority of cases barely compatible. However, there is another phenomenon, which really thrived here and has even today not forfeited its positions: The social and political figures of former times were distinguished by the fact that they "knew" everything and were able, consequently, to involve themselves in what they pleased—today to direct industry, say, tomorrow, culture, the day after, agriculture, and so forth. The scholar, on the other hand, as distinct from such a figure, was clearly oriented by what he knew and what he did not know. The social and political stimulation of the world of science is, evidently, the corresponding reaction to such all-knowingness.

I am asked (I have just now received a written inquiry on this matter) where thanks belong for my success at the elections of delegates to the upcoming party congress. In short, thanks to a clear-cut position. I advocate primarily a reorganization of the party structure. We need to have the decisions not coming from above, and then everyone approving them in turn, but to have things the other way about. The ideas and decisions should come from below, from the party masses, then they will reflect the wishes of all communists.

The second point, which is very important, in my view, is that the party ultimately move beyond the framework of its internal problems. I am amazed. I must confess, at how patient our people are. It is time that the party really began to involve itself in statewide problems affecting all the people. There are a great deal of them. We should have a clear-cut position on each of them. The transition to market relations is being prepared currently, for example. The party, however, to speak plainly, does not have its own clear-cut position on this key issue. The communists have their whole life opposed private ownership. And today?

I repeat once again: We need to formulate a precise position. And we need to begin not from the top. This should be our day-to-day common concern. If this happens, the party will then be able, in my opinion, to lay claim to the role of vanguard in society. And the politicization of science is natural.

Do you not consider necessary the recertification of people working in the social sciences? What is your attitude toward a nationwide referendum, and is the CPSU a consolidating, vanguard force of our society? Are you counting on a renewal of the CPSU really being possible?

V. Shostakovskiy: People working in the social sciences really can and should be criticized for many things. But we should not forget the conditions under which the social scientists have worked. Strict limits were imposed on creative quest and debate. The ideological noose principle in fact operated: any fresh idea, any unusual work led to the "culprit" either being expelled from society or expelled from the party and losing his job. But to speak of recertification, it should, in my opinion, be extended not only to ideological workers. It is essential to pose the question of the recertification of all representatives of science inasmuch as we have for about 50 years lagged behind modern techniques in other spheres also.

I consider a nationwide referendum on the vanguard consolidating role of the CPSU expedient and necessary. I have not lost hope of a real renewal of the party. It undoubtedly has outdated structures, but it has millions of communists also. These are honest, high-minded people with a sincere interest in the organization being modern, really expressing the people's interests, meeting people half-way and working with them, not meeting somewhere in closed rooms, adopting unintelligible decisions.

What will the party organizations at the enterprises do under the new conditions of deideologization of the economy? Do you not think that under these conditions the main area of ideological work should be defense of the working people's interests? Are raykoms [rayon party committees] necessary?

A. Smirnov: I believe that in the situation in which we find ourselves currently party committees at the enterprises are necessary. But party activity needs to be cranked up simultaneously in the territorial formations also.

To speak of the tasks of the party organizations, I agree that under the conditions of transition to a market economy the party committees and the party as a whole must really involve themselves in questions of the defense of the working people.

But the question of whether the raykoms are necessary should be approached in differentiated manner, in my view. If there is no point to a raykom, such a raykom is indeed unnecessary. I believe that the party conferences, which will be held universally very soon, will determine what kind of raykoms and other party organizations we should have.

And additionally about party property, which has been discussed here. This property has been created by communists' labor over decades, and squandering it is simply impermissible.

Speeches from the floor:

V. Vernikov: My joining the party was a conscious decision. My father, a battalion commissar, died in 1943 for this party, for our motherland. Even today, when the party is being censured from left and right, I do not agree. The persons to blame are those who were in power from Stalin through Brezhnev. The conservative forces which do not want change even today are to blame. But the millions of communist rank and file, as they have come to be called, who have paid their party dues and have done their duty as communists and as prompted by their conscience, are not to blame. But many of them were given short shrift in the times of stagnation. They are being given short shrift now also, in the time of perestroika.

All is confused currently, but who, for all that, should be considered "right," and who, "left"?

V. Sogrin: There truly are with us today various opinions as to what is meant by "right" and "left." Nonetheless, historically, in the process of actual practice, a notion as to who's who has generally taken shape. With us the "right" are those who defend the administrative-command system, the "left," those who aspire to abolish it. But to stick to precise scientific definitions, the "left" are the destroyers of the existing social arrangement, and the "right," those trying with might and main to preserve it. For this reason the radical left in the socialist society are, by the logic of things, those who are opposed to this society. Correspondingly, the radical right under socialist conditions are those who support the preservation of outmoded socialist relations.

What is the difference between the radical wing of the "Moscow" group and other deputies? How do you explain the need for the presence in Red Square on May Day of a company of soldiers with submachine guns?

Yu. Vinogradov: First of all, I am not entirely happy with the interpretation of "right" and "left" offered by V. Sogrin. To adopt a more dialectical approach, a different definition could be provided. I understand by

"left" those who are loosening the existing foundations, endeavoring to offer society the building of a more progressive model of it ensuring for an absolute majority progress by the peaceful path. And the "right," whatever slogans they present, are not only trying to preserve the old but could also destroy the existing society in order to turn back the wheel of history.

Radical wing of the "Moscow" group is an incorrect definition: There is the radical left and radical right, radicalism in itself, without a particular nuance, does not exist. There is a difference between the radical right and radical left with us, and it concerns primarily the model of social and political development.

Concerning those with submachineguns. When large-scale activities are staged, not only political, in any country some operational subunits guard the safety of thousands of people against possible stunts on the part of armed antisocial or extremist elements and also other surprises. It would be better, of course, without such protection. But the situation is as yet such that insurance is necessary. As is known, there are currently in the country thousands of combat and home-made weapons "to hand." So this precautionary measure, which has always been employed in Moscow, incidentally, was entirely appropriate.

Speeches from the floor:

C. Chernyakhovskiy: To be honest, I fear that if our gorkom and the party Central Committee continue to operate as now, we will have to go underground. It has been said here that there are in the party three currents—three platforms. But I believe that there is today in the party not one really scientifically substantiated platform. And those that exist lack precise and clear answers to the questions of why such a situation has come about, what we want, and by what means we intend achieving what we desire. It is time the gorkom understood that people will vote for the communists only when the party is really with the people, when it has determined whose side it is really on—the 10 percent nouveaux riches with whom it is constantly flirting or with the workers and engineers, who are barely making ends meet from wage packet to wage packet.

The meeting lasted three hours. And although the scheduled time was up, people were reluctant to leave. The list of those wishing to have their say and to speak remained far from exhausted. Yes, there were undue displays of temper at times, and not all those who spoke displayed always sufficient politeness and a desire and ability to listen to a different opinion. There was name-calling also. In other words, there were debits typical of today's debate. But the main thing was the opinion which was expressed in the hall and to which, we are sure, the majority subscribed: There should be more of such meetings. In this way we will learn to understand one another better.

CPSU Adviser Assails MOLODAYA GVARDIYA

90UN1926A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 20, 19 May 90 p 3

[Article by Nikolay Proshunin, adviser to the CPSU Central Committee Department of Ethnic Relations, candidate of historical sciences: "Is MOLODAYA GVARDIYA Our Contemporary?"]

[Text] The magazine MOLODAYA GVARDIYA claims a prominent role in the upbringing of the young people. It has its own program, and it is in earnest. This is how it is worded: "The general line of the magazine MOLODAYA GVARDIYA has always called and will continue to call for bringing up its readers in the spirit of internationalism, high civic devotion, Soviet patriotism, love of their national motherland, the Leninist interpretation of socialism, and struggle against all kinds of anti-Sovietism and reaction." One might, perhaps, say that this day and age we could do without ringing slogans; however, this declaration is hard to reconcile with a string of publications in the past year.

The year 1989 was the year of Stalin's 110th anniversary—a prominent anniversary, as they say. The magazine handled the anniversary topic smartly and energetically. It also completed it in December, at the height of the celebration, with due pomp, so that the celebrant would not be offended.

Could it be that restoring old myths and the decrepit, but still extremely dangerous, falsehoods may still cause warm feelings to well up in some people? As far as the young souls are concerned, one is alarmed when black is passed off to them as white, and bloody things are passed off as holy.

When Christmas stories are supplanted for the bitter truth...

How the Leader Protected the Cadres [subhead] The publication of V. Litov's "I.A. Benediktov: On Stalin and Khrushchev" (No. 4) comprised the shock pages published in the anniversary year. In the words of the author of the publication, the material is based on conversations 10 years ago with the former people's commissar of agriculture under Stalin.

All of Litov's attempts to get this laudatory contribution about the leader accepted by some magazine were unsuccessful.

The interview would still be gathering dust had it not been for MOLODAYA GVARDIYA where it was greeted with joy and loudly glorified. In the December issue, it was glorified three times in a special leader written by deputy editor in chief Vyacheslav Gorbachev, in an article by Litov himself under the rubric "Following Up On What Has Been Printed," and in a letter from Bucharest (!) under a headline which is typical of the magazine: "To Stop Those Who Distort Our Ideals..."

The letter notes with particular gratitude "the interview with People's Commissar I.A. Benediktov by journalist V. Litov."

"The tremendous growth of industrialization, collectivization, science, culture, and the reinforcement of defense would have been impossible had the issue of cadres not been resolved brilliantly under the leadership of Comrade Stalin. With the energy and persistence characteristic of him, Comrade Stalin has raised and resolved the issues of the cadres, of the people." I am quoting here from the anniversary article "Our Dear Stalin" (PRAVDA, 21 December 1939). Litov also writes this in issue 12. "A system of finding, advancing, and promoting talented people to positions of responsibility is the most significant and valuable thing which can be borrowed from the past, a system that has been almost totally destroyed by the successors of Stalin...." This is the discourse of Litov about the times when the flower of the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia was mercilessly exterminated. He discourses about it under the irresistible influence of his interlocutor.

The lucky rise of Benediktov to the top echelons of power is impressive indeed. This happened in the notorious year 1937. At the time, he worked at the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Commissariat of State Farms. Suddenly, there was a summons on his table, a call to urgently report to the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs]. Initially, it was not found surprising or alarming; employees of the people's commissariat "had to give testimony frequently in the case of saboteur groups found in our office." However, it did not turn out well. An amiable, polite ("he offered me a seat") investigator showed a statement by two of Benediktov's best friends on his saboteur activities, which he had supposedly been involved in for a long time on orders of the German intelligence service. They had a conversation. Thereupon, the cultured investigator let him go and advised him not to despair.

However, our character was scared stiff (let us agree that we will not question the authenticity of the memoirs). He did not remember how he made it to his office. At this point, a new horrible blow followed: an invitation to the Central Committee of the party for the next morning. "It was clear that they would expel me from the party and then try me."

So Benediktov sat at a meeting, his feet cold, waiting for his name to be called. However, as is the case in Christmas stories, Santa Claus himself made an appearance. "Finally, Stalin... mentioned my name." (The ellipsis is by the author of artistic processing of the memoirs, for the purpose of greater shock.) Comrade Stalin said: I propose young specialist Comrade Benediktov for the position of people's commissar. Are there objections? No? Let us consider the issue resolved.

What talents did Benediktov, whom Stalin did not know, have that appealed to the latter? After all, he says that he did not have either knowledge or experience, which he in all honesty confessed to the leader when they stepped aside. He was also young—only 35. Stalin joked that youth is a shortcoming which does not last, and that experience and knowledge can be acquired. Encouraged by this wondrous indulgence, Benediktov told him about the NKVD summons. At this point even Stalin frowned and started thinking. (According to Benediktov, under Stalin there was no interference in the work of the people's commissariats. The NKVD was no exception. It is to be understood that Stalin "did not know" what transpired over there.) However, he promised to take care of this. In general, it was his good luck that the case of imaginary espionage was personally monitored. We read that Stalin had the reputation of a liberal in the then politburo on issues involving the fate of those accused of sabotage. As a rule, he took the side of the accused and sought their acquittal. Learning about arbitrary rule and lawlessness, he "suffered because of it and took measures to correct the excesses." From the latest, fourth issue of this year, we also learned about how Comrade Stalin "saved" S. Korolev from the Kolyma camps.... He taught that even the enemies of the people need to be combated within the framework of legality, without transcending them. To be sure, not without exceptions.... Beriia also had the reputation of a liberal, and initially reduced the extent of repressions. Later, having failed the test of power, he got somewhat worse.

V. Gorbachev added an idyllic scene delivered to the editorial office by M.A. Lipatov to the Christmas stories of I.A. Bendiktov about the cordiality of the leader. "On one occasion after the war, said Ivan Aleksandrovich (to M.A. Lipatov—note by Nikolay Proshunin), Comrade I.V. Stalin called him and said: 'Comrade Benediktov, Beriia brought me a list of the bourgeois government which was supposed to take power in the event of victory of Fascist Germany. You appear on this list as the minister of agriculture. I would ask you to explain this.'" Ivan Aleksandrovich responded: "Comrade Stalin, this is some kind of misunderstanding and even a provocation!" Stalin kept silent and then said: "I also think so, Comrade Benediktov. I am crossing your name off the list."

Vyacheslav Gorbachev inserted this fable into his leader without asking himself: What happened to those whom Stalin left on the list? The deputy editor in chief is wrapped up in combating "reaction" (see the declaration on the general line), the "pressure of the frantic press," and the publications "which are apprentices to the magazine OGONEK," and this is why he provides only one comment: "Stalin did cross it off, but V. Korotich would have hardly done that. He would have rather added a name." Anatoliy Ivanov's deputy considers this a causticity. I am curious to know how many editors he would have put on such a list himself? We will see below....

Benediktov is an ardent champion of "Lenin's brilliant commandments regarding the selection of cadres." He interspersed his conversation with Lenin's expressions, tying them to the "comprehensively thought-through" cadre policy of Stalin. "Drawing" in this manner on V.I. Lenin, he takes an excursion to the sphere of the stick which is instructive for the young people. "Indeed, this is the very stick without which it is impossible to beat out of some of our people (and quite a few at that) elementary barbarity, savagery, and lack of culture." The virtues of Stalin's stick are substantiated by practical considerations. Which ones? "Let us look at, say, the objectively imminent process of invigorating and rejuvenating the leadership." The rejuvenation of the cadres by murder does not cause either repugnance or terror in a man on whom Stalin bestowed his grace, all the more so because there was "no dearth" of "competitors" for key positions even after the 1937 repressions.

Meanwhile, as Benediktov and Litov try to convince us, the repressions played "a positive role." Indeed, thousands (?) of innocent people suffered but on the whole the large-scale purge of the party and state apparatuses and the army reinforced the country. To be sure, the fact that there was a good number of people fairly convicted for every innocent victim gives little solace to an individual whose father or mother were unlawfully shot. However, in this case—listen up!—"One has to overcome his pain and stop looking at history from the viewpoint of one's personal bitterness, at the very least for the sake of elementary objectivity, not to mention the party-and-class approach which for many of our 'intellectuals' is like a red rag for a bull...." This is it. They shot mother or father for no reason, and you fell apart because of such a trifle, and lost your class backbone.

The interview heaps abuse on N.S. Khrushchev. "Nikita" really catches it for being sentimental. When he, "Nikita" got drunk and sentimental, he shed tears "over heart-rending stories about suffering in Stalin's camps." Supposedly, this was no big deal to be sorrowful about.

You've got to hand it to MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, it does a wonderful job instilling "high civic devotion" in its readers (see the general line). Is indifference to the memory of prison camp martyrdom of "the notorious year 1937" really a trait of a patriot and a citizen, a trait of a Russian man? After all, the magazine casts itself as an advocate of "the honor of the Russian people," a fighter for restoring "spirituality" and "the commandments of the fathers of Rus." However, is scornful irony with regard to "lamentations about the disastrous state of rural areas in the 1930s and 1940s" and suffering in Stalin's camps really a manifestation of Russian spirituality? It seems to me that these taunts are too far removed from the spiritual make-up of the Russian people, of whom charity has always been characteristic, who even saw the most terrifying criminals as "the unfortunates" and took their gifts to them, to the prisons on holy days. No, all of this is not Russian, this is not human.

How Stalin Fought Stalin's Cult

The Christmas conversations take us to the world of daydreams about Stalin's art of collective leadership. Arguments and discussions frequently flared up at the meetings of the Politburo, to be sure, within the framework of the cornerstone planks of Stalin. "Such was the common attitude determined by Stalin and his entourage." To be sure, Stalin's point of view prevailed because he saw further and deeper. Unfortunately the people were only human—gradually they got used to this and stopped defending their point of view. Stalin realized how dangerous this was, and was angry, but he still did not manage to change the situation—having turned 70, he began to get noticeably weaker. On the other hand, in the late 1930s the collective nature of work was clearly seen. Tukhachevskiy, Yakir, and Blyukher were executed "on the basis of collective decisions of the Politburo."

Perhaps this is enough. From now on, it is firmly established that, as a democrat and a liberal, Stalin encouraged discussions and arguments and assiduously called the fire of criticism on himself. To be sure, until now I believed that as early as 1928 in his article "Against Trivializing the Slogan of Self-Criticism" he set the goal of choking off all dissent, and that he was the one to stamp out and eliminate discussions as a method of work in the life of the party, replacing them with work-overs with a stick. Being always ready, as he put it, "to crush a little" the dissident communists and "lay one on them lightly," he forced his opponents to tacitly admit who was the only infallible one. In his report to the 17th Congress he said: "At the 15th Congress we still had to prove the correctness of the party line and wage a struggle against certain anti-Lenin groupings, and at the 16th Congress to finish off the last adherents of these groupings, whereas at this congress there is nothing to prove and, perhaps, nobody to beat. Everyone can see that the party line has won (thunderous applause)." Indeed there was nobody to be routed in open discussions, but in dark basements there was more work for the torturers to do. Many of those who drowned out his words with applause were among the first victims. Incidentally, the delegates of the "congress of victors" who were exterminated were by and large young people.

Stalin turned criticism "regardless of person" into a method of destroying "the people," trampling on their human dignity, mangling their creative biographies and their very lives. It is a pleasure to find out now from the beneficent conversations with Benediktov that Stalin had absolutely no patience with substituting personal considerations for the merits of the issue, and that repressions against the geneticists "were used in view of specific saboteur activities rather than particular views."

About three years ago the deputy editor in chief in question was the first one to proclaim that the course of his magazine would be getting comprehensively personal, and was the first one to set an example. The signal for a witch hunt was packaged as a thesis: "In our literary

or, more broadly, spiritual life, we should have started long ago to talk about the possible danger which emerged with the arrival of the new management in publications such as OGONEK, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, and NEDEL'YA rather than the tendencies and contradictions of the process.... Do you remember "the list?" Fire on the "persons!" Well-fed horses are kicking. We will meet the enemy Stalin-style.... There is no need to strain yourself, analyze the arguments, or even quote your opponents for that. Acrimonious hints and a generous amount of curses would suffice. It is also beneficial to dig in one's biography and look at the entry. Vladimir Vysotskiy? Tender-hearted men and women maintain that he was Russian, "but he was Jewish and did not conceal this." Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov? It is known that he is an "honorary citizen of Israel." Director Yuriy Lyubimov? "Recently, he was given two citizenships at the same time: his restored Soviet citizenship and an honorary Israeli one. I will not be surprised if the word 'honorary' disappears from his documents soon." Writer Vladimir Nikolayevich Voynovich? Who has invited those like Voynovich to our country and why? "Is there a dearth of our own Voynoviches over here? To my mind, we have more of them than we need."

This is to say nothing about the editors of central publications. MOLODAYA GVARDIYA frequently has them stoned. But they deserve it. After all, in the words of Anatoliy Ivanov's deputy, "at present there is hardly any democratic press," except for two or three magazines—we know which ones.

The vocabulary of "personal criticism" is in line with its spirit. "Mediocre scribble," "unscrupulous pen," "slinging mud at," "foully work him over," "he is hardly so stupid".... When the magazine runs out of its own curses, it is not averse to borrowing some from friends, as does, for example, the editor in chief's deputy. Look, he says, at how "psychologically refined" is the observation of NASH SOVREMENNİK: "At present the name of Yev-tushenko is like a battering ram, a log with which the cosmopolitan horde smashes Russian fortresses while he personally runs in front of them screaming with delight." The name is a log. This is truly refined. There is one thing I cannot figure out: Given this elegance of style and thoughts, why surrender this noble yellow color to someone else?

In one of the reviews of its editorial mailbag (No. 10), the magazine refers contemptuously to the letters which are published in "perestroika publications" maintaining that they are prompted by the preordained thinking of these publications and their desire to humiliate and trample down the Stalinists. Meanwhile, letters to MOLODAYA GVARDIYA are "the voice of the people and a trove of popular wisdom. There is no prior assignment, there is no frightened deference to an unseen censor. There is the truth in its original form in which it travels the world—in its coarse-cloth garb, barefoot, and with its head not covered...."

Right away there are examples of this coarse-cloth truth and how it travels. A letter from Volgograd: "However, it cannot be believed that only the innocent were punished. After all, Stalin was against mass reprisals in general. However, the genie had already gotten out of the bottle. Stalin's statement about the exacerbation of the class struggle on approaches to communism did not influence the situation at all, all the more so because he was not the first one to propose this thesis (see 'The Great Beginning' by V.I. Lenin)." Apparently in the editorial office they got so carried away by "bringing up the readers in the spirit of Lenin's interpretation of socialism" (see that same statement on the general line) that they had no time to leaf through "The Great Beginning" which is barely several pages long.

The cult of Stalin, as the same folk ballad which "deeply moved" the commentator goes on to narrate, developed out of the cult of Hitler. "Hitler became the banner of reactionaries of the worst kind.... Under these conditions in our country the creation of the 'personality cult' of Stalin began in order to counterbalance the cult of Hitler." So it turns out that homegrown reactionaries of the worst kind became envious of the glory of the Fuehrer. Later, when Hitler was done for, Stalin declared at a politburo meeting that "accordingly, Stalin's personality cult should be ended, too." And, believe it or not, he embarked on a one-sided fight against it. Facts are as plentiful as can be. For example they showed him a model of the Exhibition of Accomplishments of the National Economy, and over there— isn't this surprising!—there was a statue of Stalin right at the entrance, and Stalin's busts in front of every exhibition hall. Could he fail "to be indignant?" And so he was, "even to the point of rudeness"; "Why are you plugging that Stalin of yours into every hole?" Here is another one. In 1952 it suddenly becomes known that Stalin is not going to attend a rally on the occasion of the opening of the Volga-Don canal. What is this? Why? It turns out that prior to coming to the canal he found out that there was a grandiose statue of Stalin there (the one for which he ordered the allocation of 33 tons of copper). Having learned about it unexpectedly, he got angry: "This is an imeni Lenin Canal, whereas you stuck this idiotic statue of Stalin there!" The chronicler of the magazine, drunk with his triumph over the critics of Stalin, exclaimed: "Wouldn't you say that a 'paranoid' striving for unlimited power behaved strangely?"

Such is the methodology of history of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA. The magazine also has its own sources which are sifted in a special manner. For example, in the article "Red Army on the Eve of the War" (No. 9) the joyous results of the purge of the Workers and Peasants Red Army command personnel are proven on the basis of the 1939 reports "addressed to Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, and Beria in which the reliability of data cannot (?) be doubted." The truth of our history is becoming more and more complete for the very reason that researchers have drawn a great number of new documents into scientific circulation. From these documents our society has learned about the incalculable

losses inflicted on the army by the Stalinist machine of repressions. Meanwhile the journal feeds the readers one-sided data from the purview of Voroshilov and Beriya. Such are their techniques.

Something About Style

In MOLODAYA GVARDIYA others are rebuked for writing deliberate political denunciations in the style of the "hottest times of Stalin and Beriya." I will attempt to show what kind of a style this is using the magazine itself as an example.

The Stalinist regime reared a system of denunciations. Perhaps it would have choked without them. The regime punished without mercy for failing to report on one's family and friends. It considered the very absence of denunciations to be a sign of evil intentions. The Ukase on the Forcible Resettlement of Soviet Germans signed by M. Kalinin maintained that there supposedly were tens of thousands of spies and saboteurs among them who, on a signal from Germany, were supposed to set off explosions where they lived. Hear what followed: "Nobody from among the Germans residing in the Volga rayons reported to the Soviet authorities the presence of this great number of saboteurs and spies among the Volga Germans; consequently (!), the German population of the Volga rayon conceals in its midst enemies of the Soviet people and Soviet power."

Demand for denunciations fell abruptly after the death of the individual who made beastly suspicion an instrument of splitting the people. However, by inertia offers continued to be made openly. Here is a self-portrait of a denunciator of the initial post-Stalin times who, whatever he might have happened to be talking about, never wasted an opportunity to sting in passing those he envied. From a speech by critic K.L. Zelinskiy at the writers' trial of Pasternak: "I am going to discuss one instance. Pasternak's entourage terrorized those who have embarked on the path of criticizing Pasternak. For example, when my article 'Poetry and the Feeling of Contemporaneity' appeared, I met Deputy Editor of the magazine VOPROSY YAZYKOZNANIYA V.V. Ivanov at the Academy of Sciences Presidium. He demonstratively failed to shake hands with me for my criticism of a Pasternak poem. This was a political demonstration on his part. I would like these words to reach his ears, and I would like him to summon up his courage to write in the press and state his attitude toward Pasternak.... Purifying work should be done.... This pseudo-academician ought to be debunked."

This was a long time ago. By now demand for denunciations has declined altogether. Anonymous letters are outlawed. Meanwhile, the style born in an era when all of us lived "brightly and merrily" continues to run wild—there is the same use of various "instances" and conversations of long ago, the same appeals to the official point of view aimed at applying proper measures to those who deviate from it, the same fondness for speaking on behalf

of the entire party and entire people, the same pinning of political labels. The itch does not go away.

A crystal-clear, and in our time altogether unique, example of this style is found in the telegram from MOLODAYA GVARDIYA to the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. Instead of disputing the opinion of their magazine in the telegram, the authors set upon OGONEK and SOVETSKAYA KULTURA: "It is known to all that these publications assiduously shelter Zionism from criticism, interpret many issues of morality, consciousness, social justice, civic attitudes, patriotism, culture, and art in a peculiar, bourgeois manner, continuously and purposefully defame our long-suffering but heroic history, ridicule and debunk the struggle of many millions of people for building a new society, revise our belief in the Leninist principles of socialism, and the triumph of these principles, while recognizing glasnost and pluralism for themselves alone; they immediately pin the label of nationalist, chauvinist, anti-Semite, all types of reactionaries, and even enemies of perestroika on their opponents, among whom is the magazine MOLODAYA GVARDIYA. This is how they interpret glasnost and democracy, these are the methods with which they fight for their ideals and goals. We take all of this more or less calmly because we understand that sooner or later the methods of work of these publications will ultimately discredit themselves in the eyes of Soviet society and the party." Further on: "For as long as Russia has existed there has not been an instance when a person acted so openly and brazenly in order to undermine the faith, the throne, love of the motherland, and all lore...." Pardon me, it seems that I have lapsed into Bulgarin's denunciation of Belinskiy entitled "On Censorship and Communism in Russia." Everything got confused in my notes. It is easy to confuse....

The magazine engages with particular eagerness in reading hearts. It does not take issue with what a person says but looks for the cause of his opinion in personal gain and investigates the perfidious intent concealed from the gaze of the people. It queries: "Was it at the urging of his heart or at someone's behest?" The magazine is aware of your "true goals and intent," and cannot "believe that these are misconceptions." It sorts people by the degree of their patriotic feeling. If you read the magazine you will find out that Lev Tolstoy himself cannot match it as far as patriotism is concerned.

The origins of the "style" are the same. It was he, "the faithful student of Lenin," who said "We are going to mercilessly destroy everyone who violates the unity of the socialist state by his deeds and thoughts, yes, also thoughts(?)" God only knows in what manner one person can steal himself into where he is not invited, into the thoughts and feelings of another man.

Of course, lies are the main equipment of the denunciation style. Let us look only at the labels pinned on other publications. The magazine DRUZHBA NARODOV sows enmity toward the Russian people; over there, the nationalists—Jews, Armenians, Estonians, "and so

on"—band together and insult the Russians. Ethnic conflicts flare up in different places increasingly often due to publications such as KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE. The deputy editor in chief says that if a rubric "Beware of Zionism!" is to be introduced in his magazine almost everything will have to be reprinted from OGONEK, as well as OKTYABR. In his opinion it would be better to crush OGONEK altogether: "In our society some people have developed a dangerous misconception that glasnost cannot exist, or cannot properly develop, in the absence of the current variant of OGONEK." The deputy editor is fierce, as fierce as Shchedrin's pompadour. Let him do what he wants, and he "will point the nozzle of the fire hose at the sun so that it will shine more moderately. I know that the sun cannot be reined in, but the press... smack—and it is not here anymore!"

Dear reader, are there any publications left in our motherland which MOLODAYA GVARDIYA has not yet managed to pillory? Perhaps there is NEVA? However, it is also "progressive." There is also LITERATURNAYE OBOZRENIYE, which is striving to become progressive. There is also ZVEZDA, which is hastily moving in that same direction under its new leadership. Also, some IZVESTIYA, YUNOST, NEDEL'YA, ZNAMYA, and SOVETSKAYA KULTURA have been heard from, but all of these worthless dregs are under the thumb of OGONEK.

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA and NOVYY MIR have also been counted among "the yellow press." The harbingers of "yellow science" follow—the magazines VOPROSY FILOSOFII, VOPROSY ISTORII, VOPROSY EKONOMIKI, and "yellow television" provides the overall ominous background.

Where will their hearts find contentment? "NASH SOVREMENNIIK, MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, and MOSKVA stand as lone rocks and take the battering of the waves of embittered slander. I foresee the malignant gossip of the wits, but still I cannot resist comparing them to the legendary three warriors." (MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, 1989, No. 8) As can be seen, the malignant gossip did not sober them up: The journal edited by A. Ivanov with the help of his deputy "engages in a one-sided struggle with a maximum of courage and self-sacrifice.... It is very fortunate that there are still patriots and, I would say, courageous people..."

In the first issue of this year it was even more trenchant: "It has somehow become accepted that we determine people of integrity on the basis of their attitude toward the magazines MOLODAYA GVARDIYA and NASH SOVREMENNIIK." Let me ask by what kind of attitude: favorable or unfavorable? Mesmerized by their self-adoration, the editors lost the capacity to see the double meaning of this statement which, perhaps, is not entirely unfounded.

They say that those who have not been maximalists in their youth have no heart. One would look in vain for

something akin to youth maximalism in the magazine. Whatever is touched upon, bureaucratic thinking shines through. For example, removing entries on one's ethnic background from all kinds of questionnaires and forms means "to ultimately turn the citizens of our country into people with no ethnic roots." We will perish if we are not patriotically reminded about our ethnic backgrounds in hotels, housing complex offices, and at ticket counters.... What about a discourse on schools? The calling of schools is to remain "nobly conservative;" they should not and "can never be revolutionary," "the concept that children should be better and more developed than their parents in all pursuits is definitely detrimental."

It turns out that the general line cannot replace either good prose, bright essays, or independent thinking. When you read these supposedly recent issues, you feel that you are beyond time and isolated from the lively movement of social thought and changes in the world.

The publication of a letter from Bucharest expressing outrage over our perestroika in the December issue, the month the Ceausescu dictatorship fell, did not surprise me. The letter states that "the progressive people of the entire world are shaken by what is going on in the Soviet Union" and tremble with fear for the future of the ideals of October. There also was a pleading: "Stop it!" These are the same fears of the magazine which suffered greatly as early as November because the spirit of our perestroika "is conveyed to other countries friendly to the USSR causing destructive processes there which injure the countries and the people." Even earlier, the magazine was quite as bitterly distressed over "negative processes beginning in the socialist countries friendly to us, and counterrevolutionary forces rearing their head" as a result of unmasking Stalin's cult at the 20th CPSU Congress (article by former Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee M.I. Malakhov, 1988, No. 4). According to this logic, we should now be crying because antipeople, barrack-like regimes were toppled in East Europe.

It is easy to prove one's virtues by referring to how spoiled other publications are, just as I.A. Benediktov proved the sanctity of Stalin's regime by the fall of Khrushchev's regime. At present it is very difficult for our country. Many things torment us, many things make us bitter.... The magazine puts current troubles, the unsettled state of the people, the gap between us and the developed countries, and ethnic conflicts together into one package and shows it to perestroika arguing how much better it was under Stalin....

The magazine which has denied that almost all of our press is patriotic or democratic is now sending one SOS signal after another to the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. The latest cry for help is entitled "Who Needs to Deal With the Magazine MOLODAYA GVARDIYA?" (1990, No. 4). Let all the world and all of

Christianity know that for several years now MOLODAYA Gvardiya "has been as under siege as Armenia." Let them know that in the negligible volume of the public life of the country there is still a phenomenon of tremendous importance: the striving of "antisocialist," "reactionary" forces "to strangle" and "rout" the magazine, "to reduce the editorial office to dust," and "destroy the truth." Of course, when one does not stand out for anything, except the Stalinist topic, which is worked on in a very particular manner, the publication of thunderous appeals to the highest echelons are helpful as a cheap and convenient vehicle for advertising oneself and attracting attention. With a view to popularity, it is useful to manufacture for yourself the cross of a persecuted martyr and, bending under its imaginary weight, make the skies reverberate with noise about one's significant personality.

Recently the magazine has been mainly held to shame, whereas it is desirable for it to have others take issue with it and, as the magazine puts it, lay on it "target artillery fire for effect." Immortal Shchedrin, you are still with us! After all, some journalists and press organs indeed "stick their necks out with the only purpose of somehow being beaten to a bloody pulp or cursed out so that feathers fly. They scream complacently: 'Just beat me, and I can handle the public myself somehow!' The main point is to provoke a row and become famous at whatever price."

No matter how difficult it is for the magazine to live and fight the reactionaries, no matter how much it is tormented by the pain of the people and its old aching pet corn, in its recent appeal to the echelons it did not deny itself the pleasure of taking swipes at a number of undesirable periodicals in the habitual style of "the hottest Stalin and Beriia times." Indeed, they have only one passion, but it is all-consuming.

Public Confidence, Expectations Revealed in Poll

PM0606184590 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 21, 3-10 Jun 90 p 9

[Opinion poll results prepared by Aleksey Grazhdankin:
"Whom Do We Trust? Opinion Poll by All-Union
Centre for the Study of Public Opinion."]

[Text] The percentage of those polled expressing their full trust in:

	Mar. 1989	Aug. 1989	Dec. 1989	Jan. 1990	Mar. 1990
USSR Supreme Soviet	43	32	45	39	34
USSR Council of Ministers	28	14	34	31	23
Their local Soviet	18	16	16	19	14
CPSU	38	22	27	19	16
Army	—	—	44	40	35
KGB	—	—	38	35	32
Law-enforcement bodies	15	100	22	21	18
Religious Organizations	13	22	30	35	37
News media	39	30	36	42	37

Question: To what extent do you trust the nation's leadership at present?

	Jan. 1990	Feb. 1990	Mar. 1990	Apr. 1990
Trust fully	12	12	17	16
Trust	53	44	45	43
Do not trust	22	31	26	29
Undecided	13	13	12	12

What Do We Expect?

Question: What changes in the country's economy do you believe are the most likely in the coming year?

	Jan. 1990	Feb. 1990	Mar. 1990	Apr. 1990
Considerable improvement of the situation	6	5	6	5
Stabilization of the situation	12	12	14	11
Mounting difficulties	62	63	63	62
Economic disaster	11	10	11	14
No opinion	9	10	6	8

Question: What changes in the country's political situation are the most likely in the coming year?

	Jan. 1990	Feb. 1990	Mar. 1990	Apr. 1990
Considerable improvement of the situation	10	7	9	6
Stabilization of the situation	13	10	17	14
Mounting tensions	57	59	53	57
Crisis, civil war	8	8	10	11
No opinion	12	16	11	12

Who Is To Blame?

Question: Today one often hears it said that the country is in a state of crisis. Who do you believe are primarily responsible for this?

The country's former leaders	37
The present-day Party leadership	29
The CPSU as a whole	17
Ministries and government departments	12
The people as a whole	11
Ideologues of socialism	11
Ideologues of the "shadow economy"	7
Extremists and nationalists	6
Others	1
Hard to say	6

Opinion Poll Tests Attitudes to Market Economy

PM2305175690 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 19, 20-27 May 90 p 10

[Center for Political and Sociological Studies Director Igor Mintusov article under the rubric "MN Sociological Service": "The Future of the Market: Our Worries, Expectations, And Hopes"]

[Text] What lies in store for this country, which has not known anything like normal commodity and money relations for years, when we make the transition to the market? This question is being discussed today at every level—by the Presidential Council and the government and by workers and their families.

At the request of MN, the Centre for Political and Sociological Studies run by the IMA-Press Agency has carried out a telephone poll among 662 Muscovites, putting the following questions:

1. How do you think the economic situation in the USSR will have changed in a year's time?

		M	W	18-29	30-49	over 50	workers	engin, techn
1. will improve	16.6	16	17	11	15	23	16	14
2. will not change	31.1	28	34	37	30	28	31	28
3. will deteriorate	43.7	49	39	47	50	35	40	48
4. hard to say	8.6	7	10	6	6	14	14	10

2. How do you think your own economic situation will have changed in a year's time?

		M	W	18-29	30-49	over 50	workers	engin, techn
1. will improve	18.4	22	16	28	16	16	24	16
2. will not change	36.1	35	37	39	38	32	29	30
3. will deteriorate	35.6	35	36	23	38	42	31	45
4. hard to say	9.8	9	11	10	9	11	16	9

3. How will the economic situation in the USSR have changed in five years' time?

		M	W	18-29	30-49	over 50	workers	engin, techn
1. will improve	50.9	51	51	48	53	50	44	56
2. will not change	8.2	7	9	6	8	10	5	8
3. will deteriorate	9.8	11	9	15	10	7	11	8
4. hard to say	31.1	31	31	32	29	34	40	28

4. How will your own economic situation have changed in five years' time?

		M	W	18-29	30-49	over 50	workers	engin, techn
1. will improve	37.2	42	33	48	41	25	42	39
2. will not change	19.9	17	23	21	17	23	13	18
3. will deteriorate	12.5	9	16	8	9	20	8	13
4. hard to say	30.4	33	28	23	33	32	38	30

Mention must be made of the relatively little connection between the population's expectations regarding the future of their country and their own future. People do not see the improvement of their own material condition as being directly dependent on the improvement (deterioration) of the economic condition of the USSR.

Though paradoxical, it's a fact that people "alienate" their own future from that of their country.

For example, among those who believe that the country's economy will start making headway in a year's time only about 40 per cent maintain that their own economic condition will improve too.

5. Accepting the view that the country's position is unstable, how do you see the future?

		M	W	18-29	30-49	over 50	workers	engin, techn
1. situation will stabilize in a year	2.7	4	2	1	2	4	2	3
2. situation will stabilize in three years	15.0	17	14	10	16	17	15	15
3. situation will not stabilize for a long time	50.9	49	53	56	55	42	42	51
4. country is heading towards catastrophe	15.7	17	15	16	16	16	22	16
5. hard to say	15.7	14	17	18	11	21	19	15

A high percentage of people maintain that the country is heading towards catastrophe. This group of people includes 24 per cent of workers (selective average 18 per cent) and 11 per cent of employees of state trade and

co-ops (selective average 4 per cent). It is interesting to note that many did not actually have economic catastrophe in mind, but rather political and moral catastrophe.

6. Do you trust the incumbent Council of Ministers?

		M	W	18-29	30-49	over 50	workers	engin, techn
1. Yes	27.8	24	31	14	21	45	26	21
2. Rather yes than no	16.3	16	17	16	17	17	13	22
3. Rather no than yes	18.6	22	16	24	22	11	14	13
4. No	27.2	33	22	36	30	19	36	36
5. Hard to say	10.1	6	14	11	12	8	11	8

The respondents' trust in the government has sharply dropped, especially among the young and middle aged. For comparison's sake let us note that according to Polish sociologists data, the level of trust in Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government among Poland's population was as high as 85 per cent.

It will also be recalled that Nikolay Ryzhkov's election to the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, according to the findings of our opinion poll in May of last year was approved by 60 per cent of respondents (20 per cent declared against).

It is self-evident that, in light of the government's declining popularity, the implementation of radical economic measures will create even more social problems.

Results of Economic Reform Poll Cited

PM2905100390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 May 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by V. Rutgayzer and S. Shpilko, deputy directors of the All-Union Public Opinion Research Center, under the "Public Opinion" rubric: "Poll and Sociologist's Commentary: Reform of Economy: For and Against"]

[Text] During the period 8-20 May 1990 the All-Union Public Opinion Research Center carried out a poll aimed at determining the attitude of the country's population to the possibility of switching to a market economy in the very near future. Some 1,440 urban and rural inhabitants of 11 regions of the country took part.

Supporters of the market route of economic development constitute more than half—56 percent—of respondents, twice the number of those who favor stepping up planning principles in the management of the national economy. At the same time among those who favor the market economy two-thirds consider that the switch should be carried out gradually, and only one-third think that it must be done as quickly as possible.

Despite the manifest support for the actual idea of switching to the market, the population's ideas about the society which could arise as a result of choosing the market route of development are very vague. This is shown by the fact that 36 percent of respondents found it altogether difficult to answer a question about the type of society which the development of market relations could lead to in our country. At the same time positive expectations predominate among those polled: 37 percent consider that the development of market principles will make it possible to create a society of renewed socialism or a society which combines the best features of socialism and capitalism. A further 9 percent expect that capitalism will arise in our country, and only 15 percent expressed fears that a society inheriting the worst features of both capitalism and socialism will arise as a result of the switch to a market economy.

Opinions were sharply divided over whether the switch to the market will make it possible to solve the existing economic problems. While 38 percent of respondents were fairly sure that the switch to the market will make it possible to solve the problem of shortages, 46 percent either hold the opposite view or voice serious misgivings on this score.

Still greater concern is caused among the population by the expectations of falling living standards associated with the switch to the market: 69 percent of respondents expressed fears that the switch to a market economy will worsen the situation of the majority of the population, and only 11 percent do not experience such fears.

This anxiety on the part of society is in many respects generated by a lack of faith in the government. Suffice it to say that only about one-fourth of respondents—23 percent—are sure that the government is doing all it can to prevent a fall in living standards and the spread of unemployment. Almost two-thirds of respondents—59 percent—were unsure of this.

In summing up the results of this it is essential to note the following. The population's attitude to the prospect of an accelerated switch to the market is contradictory in nature. While supporting this idea in principle, a large part of the population also voices serious misgivings regarding the possibility of carrying out this switch without major social losses.

It should also be borne in mind that support for the idea of switching to a market economy is based not so much on an understanding of the nature and advantages of market relations as on lack of faith in the possibility of solving the accumulated economic problems by the old methods.

Ensuring that the population gives extensive and consistent support to the program of switching to a market economy is a complex task for the government since it is not just how well-considered the actual program is but also the real positive results of the first measures carried out as part of it which are the decisive factor here.

Opinion Poll Views Impact of Market Relations

PM3005102390 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian 13 May 90 p 10

[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI Sociological Service report and commentary by Igor Mintusov, director of the Center for Political and Sociological Studies: "In Anticipation of the Market"]

[Text] "The market" is a bugbear to some, a panacea to others. In reality it is the usual, normal state of an economy. And that is why the desire to explain people's attitude toward the market would be regarded as abnormal in the absolute majority of countries. But for the time being we are not part of that majority, we are only planning to join it. At this point, on the threshold, we must ask people an unnatural but nonetheless topical question: What do you think of a normal economy?

Commissioned by MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, the Center for Political and Sociological Studies of the IMA Press Agency conducted a poll of 801 Muscovites 28 April-2 May.

I. Is it necessary to make the transition to market relations in our country?

1. Yes	58
2. No	26
3. Hard to say	16

II. If "yes," when must the transition to market relations be started?

1. Immediately	56
2. In a year	14
3. In 2-3 years	13
4. In 5 or more years	8
5. Hard to say	10

III. How will the following groups' position change on introduction of market relations? [in the following table column A represents "workers," column B "cooperative workers," column C "intelligentsia," column D "pensioners," and column E "the present administrative apparatus"]

	A	B	C	D	E
1. Will improve	16	53	18	6	26
2. Will not change	6	18	16	5	39
3. Will deteriorate	69	13	48	83	18
4. Hard to say	9	16	18	6	18

IV. Do you agree with the assertion that under market relations everybody will have:

	the chance to become rich	scope for creativity and initiative
1. Yes	33	66
2. No	58	23
3. Hard to say	9	11

V. A number of academics think that unemployment will occur on the introduction of market relations. What do you think, unemployment is:

1. Beneficial for society	4
2. Normal phenomenon	39
3. Abnormal phenomenon	27
4. Tragedy for society	25
5. Hard to say	5

VI. How likely are you to become unemployed in conditions of market relations?

1. Very likely	6
2. Likely	20
3. Not very likely	34
4. Unlikely	29
5. Hard to say	11

VII. If the market gave you the choice, where would you like to work?

1. In a state enterprise	35
2. In a joint enterprise with a foreign firm	33
3. In a private enterprise	13
4. Have my own business	13
5. In a cooperative	7
6. Hard to say	11

VIII. Do you agree that our country needs:

	private ownership of enterprises	private ownership of land
1. Yes	57	79
2. No	31	13
3. Hard to say	12	8

IX. What do you think of attracting Western capital to the Soviet economy?

1. Yes	70
2. No	23
3. Hard to say	7

X. If even greater stratification of society occurs:

	which group will you be in?	which group do you belong to now?
1. Badly-off	27	19
2. Lower than average income	17	12
3. Middle income	45	58
4. Higher than average income	5	8
5. Well-off	2	2
6. Hard to say	5	1

XI. What might hinder you from getting into the well-off group?

1. Insufficient enterprise or personal qualities	38
2. Age	29
3. Lack of initial capital	27
4. Lack of personal contacts	20
5. Insufficient qualifications or education	15
6. Society does not value my work highly	13

XII. What do you personally fear most on the introduction of market relations?

1. Price increases	47
2. Increase in crime rate	41
3. Chaos in society	39
4. Fall in real income	20
5. Loss of social guarantees	19
6. Loss of job	7
7. My profession will be superfluous	5

"Equation Full of Unknowns"

First of all let us note the rather foggy idea that many of those polled have about what market relations actually are. They were defined as "the freedom of enterprises to sell goods to the population," "the naturally forming relations between enterprises," etc.

Of those favoring the transition to market relations 37 percent were simultaneously against unemployment, 12 percent were against private ownership of land, and 23 percent were against private ownership of enterprises, justifying this, for example, with the argument that market relations are also possible between state enterprises. "Reverse logic" was also evident: Of those against market relations 38 percent favored private ownership of enterprises, explaining this as possible through state regulation of their activities.

On the whole the majority do not associate the appearance of market relations with the so-called "American dream" of everyone having the chance to become a millionaire. The population associate the positive complexion of market relations to a large degree with freedom, initiative, and hope for some degree of improvement of their economic position in the future, although in the short term they expect a deterioration of the situation in relation to this. Let us note that 54 percent of those favoring a transition to market relations are men and 46 percent women, and 34 percent of those against are men and 66 percent women.

Despite the significant preponderance of supporters of private ownership of enterprises, the question caused difficulties and the answers often meant different things. Positive answers were given both by supporters of private ownership of small enterprises on condition that the state limits their numbers and vigilantly controls them, and by supporters of ownership of private enterprises of any size without any sort of limits. By age groups, private ownership of enterprises was favored by 77 percent of those polled aged up to 30, 61 percent of those aged from 30 to 50, and 37 percent of those aged over 50. The question on private ownership of land resulted in by far the greatest unanimity among city-dwellers: "Of course, it has to happen."

The positive assessment regarding the attraction of Western capital to our country has already become a cliché. However, on closer acquaintance with the topic it turns out that attraction of capital is often taken to mean attraction of Western goods to our store shelves, which is approved of, and not the construction of Western enterprises in the USSR or, moreover, their leasing land, which is not approved of. Together with this, a job in joint enterprises with foreign firms is considered to be one of the most attractive and promising. And the social base for developing private enterprise proved pretty wide—together with those wishing to work in cooperatives, these people constitute one-third of those polled.

As hitherto, unemployment in society gains little acceptance from the majority although, according to our polls'

data, the proportion of people who accept unemployment has increased during the last two years (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI No. 17 1988). That said, the danger of unemployment frightens relatively few people. A quarter of those polled think there is a real possibility of becoming unemployed, while actual fear of it is engendered in less than one-tenth.

On the whole the majority's feelings regarding the future are rather pessimistic. The opinion prevails that the future differentiation of society into rich and poor will make their social and economic positions worse. Those polled associating themselves with the well-off group support a transition to market relations considerably more energetically compared with other groups. However, despite a certain contradictoriness in conceptions of market relations, those polled on the whole agree with the inevitability of a transition to the market.

Suspicion of Wealth Hampers Perestroika

PM0806100590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 4

["Viewpoint" article by Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Kiva: "Wealth Is Not a Vice. Thoughts About Whether Expropriation Could Happen Again"]

[Text] I will answer the question right away: Yes, it could well happen. In the broad sense of the word. In what conditions? As long as we have the unnatural social class structure in our society, in which the poor predominate. Moreover, a large proportion of them are contaminated by a lumpen mentality. As long as the war communist ideology continues to have a strong influence in society. As long as war communist structures remain. As long as we have chaos in our heads, as Bulgakov's hero put it.

The reader may be taken aback: What war communism is the author on about? War communism passed into oblivion back in the Lenin years. Yes, it vanished, only to return soon, after the elimination of the New Economic Policy. The administrative-edict system is a reflection of the war communist ideology. Kolkhozes' and sovkhoses' obligatory surrender of their output at prices fixed by the state is a variant on the food requisitioning of the war communism period.

A few words about the war communist ideology. I believe that it came into being in the heart of the Bolshevik underground, long before October. But it flourished in the years of war communism. It is hostile toward all property, it sees it as the source of all the evils in the world, and it wants to confiscate it. Even if it is not exploitative in nature and was acquired through the honest labor, sweat, and blood of several generations of working people. It is an antihistorical, sectarian approach to society and a division of it into "bad" and "good" classes. The "bad" are to die, albeit a political death, and the "good" are to establish their political supremacy in order to bring joy to the whole of society, according to the doctrine. The political vanguard of the

"good" classes arrogates to itself the right to decide the destiny of each individual class and society as a whole.

It is a gamble on forcing people to be "happy" while resolutely rejecting the right to independent political and social choice. The right to have one's own opinion, let alone publicly uphold it, is rejected equally resolutely. It is a fanatical pursuit of a goal, a confrontational type of thinking aimed at perpetually seeking "enemies" of the revolution, which inevitably leads to continuous civil war and to conflict in relations with other countries. It is a desire to perform a messianic role in the world, to export revolution.

Most of those who preach the ideology of war communism are characterized by an unceremonious attitude toward all property, including intellectual, a suspicious and even hostile attitude toward talent, high culture, and intelligence, a pronounced emphasis on lack of education and uncouthness, and defiant ignorance.

Many of us are now wondering how the idea of eliminating the most viable and productive section of the peasantry could have arisen at all. And how the most highly skilled and, in class terms, developed strata of the proletariat could have lost soon after the revolution much of what they had gained before the revolution in the course of a long struggle. This could only have happened because the social base of the new system was not the developed working class, but the lumpen. Lumpen socialism came into being in the country at the very outset. What happened then? The course of the creation of a classless society was doomed from the start, because the division of labor was not overcome in the way the classic writers supposed it would be, but deepened as technical progress continued.

But in a class society there has to be a ruling class. According to Marx, this class is a politically mature, numerous proletariat, which our country did not have. But the proletariat did not become the ruling class even in places where it constituted the majority of the population, for example, in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Everywhere in the countries of real socialism power was in the hands of the party elite, which was the foundation for the formation of the bureaucratic class. And this had tragic consequences for society, above all for its social class structure. The bureaucracy as a class and even an estate is the "illegitimate child" of socialism and it has to find some way of, first, safeguarding its power functions and, second, camouflaging them.

The first requires the lumpenization of society and prevention of the transformation of a class "in itself" into a "class for itself," whether this concerns the proletariat, the peasantry, or the intelligentsia. As far as the peasantry is concerned, the picture is clear—it was destroyed and reduced to servitude. But the working class too was placed in conditions where it was unable to develop politically. This class was transformed into an object of manipulation by the party and state apparatus, it did not have the opportunity to organize or express

itself, it was in the grimmest of material and social conditions, and it was effectively deprived of trade union rights and freedoms. The position of the intelligentsia is also well known.

A stratum of "tame" workers was created for camouflage. The bureaucracy used them to conceal its hegemony in society.

Society became very poor, much poorer than before the revolution. It is hard to say to what extent this was due to malice and to what extent it was the consequence of the rapid implementation of the massive task of industrializing the country and creating a mighty military potential. The important point is that the country began to cultivate poverty, a spirit of sacrifice, and hostility not only toward the rich, but also toward the prosperous.

The desire to escape from poverty and displays of initiative, zeal, and thrift were regarded as reprehensible. Remember the hero of one of our favorite stories of all time: "By Order of the Pike." While the other brothers slave away, Yemelyushka sits on the stove and waits for something to turn up. And fortune smiles on him. The philosophy of "purifying" poverty became an important element of mass consciousness.

Add to this the couldn't-care-less attitude toward labor and its results as a consequence of the triumph of the absurd in management. As a consequence of despair and the impossibility for working people of introducing rational principles into production relations.

The acquisition of unearned money, on the one hand, and irrational management, on the other, were bound to give rise to a desire for leveling, exaggerated social envy, social freeloading, and parasitism. And a desire to share out the benefits someone has created. Very fertile soil for the development of a war communist mentality!

The Stalinists did indeed manage to create a "new man," with a dependent, statist type of consciousness, without a clear civic stance, and ill-suited to conditions of highly efficient production.

And this is one of the serious crimes of the ideologists of barracks socialism against our people and their future. Thank goodness the people proved uncommonly tenacious and capable of self-regeneration. Many people still managed to retain their individuality.

The Stalinists were to blame for the fact that drunkenness became rife in the abnormal situation they had created in the country (grim material and housing conditions, lawlessness, tyranny, and so on). The lumpenization did not cease. At some point deprofessionalization became a mass phenomenon. We are still paying for this. Many of our citizens, primarily drinkers, who do not possess qualifications and established labor skills are frantically afraid of competition and independence; they have gotten used to freeloading, to being social parasites. They are lumpen in their social mentality. A lumpen is afraid not only of independence, but of democracy. He

hankers after an authoritarian power to protect, direct, and order him around. People of this kind are reminiscent of the serfs who felt confused and disorientated when serfdom was abolished. Do you think I am exaggerating? In fact, foreign visitors talk of an emerging alliance between the opponents of perestroika at the top and the lumpen down below.

Now imagine the following situation. On the one hand, various forms of ownership, including private ownership, are being rapidly developed in our country. On the other hand, our war communist conditioning prevents us from calling private property by its proper name. It is called individual, labor, and so on. We associate private with exploitative. Although the word "exploitation" has long since lost its scientific content and is used mainly for selfish purposes by people who are social parasites or social freeloaders.

In these conditions private property is neither "sacred" nor "inviolable," it is effectively not even protected. It is as if it did not exist at all in law. And what this means is well known from history. Eastern despots never sought official recognition of private ownership. They would use it (in particular for their own personal enrichment), but they could fleece private owners, crush them to a pulp, and set the mob on them. For a long time private property was not protected in the Orient. Is that not why it historically lagged behind the West? This is not the place to develop the theme of what the institution of private ownership means in history and how Marx and Engels viewed it. Let us just take note of this.

In any extreme situation, private property (which is in fact more public than state, since the latter is managed by the bureaucracy in an arbitrary way and often to the detriment of society) can come under attack from two directions. In the first place, from those who preach the war communist ideology at various levels of the power hierarchy and also the public organizations that preach this ideology... Second, from the masses afflicted by the lumpen mentality—leveling and the desire to have things shared out. But one must not associate Bulgakov's Sharikovs with the people, that is simply absurd. The Sharikovs are a product of the lumpen desire not to produce but to share out, to be a social parasite. The lumpen was esteemed only by the Stalinists. At all times he has been regarded as the dregs of society, the "product of the decay of society," to use Marxist terminology. The working people have never loved hoboos, idlers, and social parasites, whatever the reason for their condition.

Incidentally, a few words about extreme situations. Dozens of cases are possible today. First, there is the difficulty of switching to market relations. An exacerbation of social problems is practically inevitable. And if one adds to this the authorities' indecision, then you have a very bad situation. Second, there are major natural disasters. Say, harvest failures in the countries from whom we buy as much as 40 million tonnes of grain per year. Or a major harvest failure in our own country. Third, an extreme situation could be created artificially.

By the efforts of dealers in our very powerful shadow economy and of the bosses of the alliance between corrupt authority and the criminal world or by conservative authority at its various levels. You can "squeeze" a legally operating private owner so much that there is nothing left for him to do apart from increase the prices of his products in order to survive. But then he is caught: Society now regards him as a greedy parasite and merciless exploiter. The slogan: "Steal what has been stolen!" can now be applied to him. Do you remember whom the people's anger was directed against in Novyy Uzen, Dushanbe, and some other places? Against legally operating cooperative members and private owners. At the same time, people running illegal workshops and major speculators, protected by corrupt authority, are continuing to flourish. The shadow economy is growing. And what happens? Our "true" socialists, "protectors" of working people's interests and "staunch fighters" against private ownership and bourgeois ideology, and our "true" patriots, who oppose the "sell-off" of our dear fatherland, resolutely fight the little dog without noticing the elephant. The elephant is real, de facto, very powerful private ownership in the shadow economy sphere. Ownership whose turnover is even now hundreds of millions of rubles.

So what is better for society: legal private owners who pay taxes which benefit society and conduct themselves within the limits of the law, or underground millionaires, who often use everything that belongs to the state in their operations but pocket the profits, although sharing them with the corrupt authorities and thereby demoralizing the whole of society. The basis of many of our problems is anonymous state ownership, which gives rise to the "self-devouring" economy in which shortages are rife and creates conditions for massive corruption. If the question "Who will defeat whom?" arises, then if anonymous state ownership is preserved, the question will definitely be decided in favor of the shadow economy, the mafia, and corrupt authority. We will lose. We are losing already.

War communist ideology in any form must be discarded as reactionary and contrary to the interests of historical progress and as being at odds with the main directions of the development of social and political thought. It was the theoretical basis of Stalin's terrorist policy. It played the same role in China and in Cambodia under Pol Pot's regime. For instance, the PRC had barely healed the wounds of the long civil and national liberation war when the "course of red banners" aimed at "accelerating the building of socialism and making a direct transition to communism" was proclaimed in 1958. This was followed by the "Great Leap Forward" and then the "Cultural Revolution." The country was saved when the leading ideologists of war communism quit the political stage.

The forms of ownership that were established in our country really have little in common with socialist forms. What I see (leaving aside those who are deluded) behind the desire to preserve them against the fundamental

interests of the majority of the population is the mercenary interests of particular groups of our society. I believe in neither the devotion to socialism nor the patriotism of those who stand for preserving a totally bankrupt method of production, for autarky, and for confrontation with the West. This is the road to destruction.

We must finally separate the interests of working people, the working class, and society, on the one hand, from the interests of the antiperestroyka-minded bureaucracy and lumpen, on the other. We have allowed ourselves to be fooled for too long. So we must continue to expose the Stalin-Brezhnev myths.

In the interests of the whole of society and of our future both as an acknowledged member of the world community and as a world power, we have to overcome in ourselves many of the things which we used to see as socialist values but which were in fact the values of a poor, backward society. To take pride today in our poverty, disorganization, grayness, homogeneity, and wretched uniformity is a kind of atavism, a sign of spiritual and social degradation. Today one can and must take pride in the wealth of our fellow citizens, well organized everyday life, and the enormous diversity of all aspects of life. But we will not create this life without private ownership as a very important component of a mixed economy. Unfortunately, the choice is very limited: Either we end up totally ruined, go bankrupt, and strangle one another when we are starving while continuing to be proud of our specialness and uniqueness, or we stop reinventing the wheel and embark on the road of worldwide progress. Many people are still clinging to the idea of building a new road to a "bright future"—the building of communism in a single country. But is it not another and possibly the last utopia in our country's centuries-long path of development? The consequences of all the previous utopias have been very tragic indeed. Do we have the strength for another?

One must clearly appreciate that a considerable section of the population is unable to understand such a radical shift in social development as the one that is taking place at the moment. Therefore, it is necessary to "go to the people," but it is equally necessary to do away with the myth that the majority is always right. That is very rarely the case.

"The fundamental change in our entire view of socialism" is proving much more difficult than the transition from war communism to the New Economic Policy: One way or another, three generations of people have grown up in conditions of barracks socialism. What was the socialist world outlook built on? On a rejection of ownership, on the absolute priority of collectivist principles, which literally kill the individual, on a distorted understanding of social justice, which gave rise to deadly leveling, collective free-loading, and parasitism, on the struggle against world capitalism, and so forth. And what came of it? Our crude philosophical positions and the propaganda that grew out of them did colossal damage to

us, not to capitalism. We deceived ourselves, fooled ourselves, hid our social ills instead of treating them, and concealed our moral ugliness. Now everything has hit us at once—as if “Pandora’s box” had been opened. But, according to Greek mythology, the lid of the box slammed shut only when hope alone remained.

It is necessary to give as many people as possible, very vigorous and dynamic people from among the workers, employees, peasants, and intelligentsia, an interest in the success of perestroika. Lenin, who did not have even a hundredth of our grim experience, never tired of stressing that the new power must demonstrate that it is better than the old and must make people’s lot easier. There are many impossible things at the moment. But much that is entirely feasible is not being done. Why?

It is necessary to speed up the creation of normal working conditions for workers and peasants and sales of shares and real estate. But here too paralysis of will has manifested itself. It is deplorable that the government has not heeded the people’s deputies who convincingly asserted that the measures it had mapped out cannot change the course of negative trends in economic development. But this does not do honor to our body of deputies either! Much time has again been lost as a result. The impression is that incompetence and mediocrity still call the shots here.

No matter what differences of opinion the various political and social forces might have regarding ways, methods, and means of resolving the crisis, is it necessary to seek accord and consensus on the main question

of perestroika at the present stage—the transition to market relations. The leaders of the right and left and all the other forces must realize that there is no alternative to market relations if we really love our country and are concerned about its future. How, in what sequence, and at what cost to particular groups of the population, that is another matter. It should be debated, in my view.

But it would be dishonest, cowardly, and shortsighted to conceal the fact that there is no easy way out of the crisis. We have been following the wrong path for several decades. We are not only losing time—we have also lost skills and experience we had acquired before. Where are the positive results going to come from? Our current situation is similar to that of someone who is gravely ill: Recovery begins once the peak of the crisis has passed.

I can understand the conservatism of the right, whose careers can only exist in conditions of an administrative-edict system. But I am surprised by the often unrealistic demands of the left-wing radicals, who cannot see the purpose of the transitional stages and steps, who are reluctant to reckon with the nature of mass consciousness. It seems to me that it is crazy to fight now with Gorbachev, whose whole purpose in life, as I see it, is bound up with the success of perestroika. Which, of course, does not mean kowtowing to the leader all the time or banning criticism of him.

One way or another, we must do all we can to ensure that all our economically active people, who will roll up their sleeves and start pulling our economy out of the mire, are not afraid of another de-kulakization.

Baltic Republics**Independent Latvian Central Committee Members Named**

90UN1797A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 19 Apr 90 p 2

[List of Central Committee members of the Independent Latvian Communist Party]

[Text] A. Baumanis—chairman of the board of the Latvian Writers Union;

N. Biryukova—senior seminar leader of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] "Znaniye" Society;

Ya. Blazhevich—chairman of the Soviet of People's Deputies of Ventspilsskiy Rayon;

V. Blinov—department head at the Latvian SSR Economics Ministry;

E. Bukele—secretary of the Bauskiy Raykom [rayon committee], Latvian Communist Party;

A. Brigmanis—first secretary of the Salduskiy Raykom, Latvian Communist Party;

V. Bresis—chairman of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers;

Ya. Vasermanis—former assistant to the first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee;

I. Vedin—director of the Department of Social Sciences of the Riga branch of the Higher School of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs;

I. Veynberg—department head of Dobelskiy Raykom, Latvian Communist Party;

O. Vinokurov—head of the Information and Computer Technology Center of the "Lode" Production Combine;

E. Gaylitis—first secretary of the Valksiy Raykom, Latvian Communist Party;

Yu. Goldmanis—deputy director of the Ideology Department of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee;

Ya. Gudrikis—instructor in the Liepayskiy Raykom, Latvian Communist Party;

A. Gutmanis—deputy economics minister of the Latvian SSR;

V. Dzerveniyeys—ispolkom [executive committee] chairman of the Ludza City Soviet of People's Deputies;

V. Zemniyeys—sociologist, Production Association of the Riga State Electrotechnical Plant;

L. Zile—former director of the Institute of Party History of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee;

U. Ivans—senior instructor, Latvian Academy of Agriculture;

V. Kononov—director of Rezekne Road Construction and Repair Administration No. 6;

V. Kruminsh—director of the Nature Museum;

A. Kursitis—first secretary of the Stuchkinskiy Raykom, Latvian Communist Party;

R. Labanovskis—editor in chief, Main Editorial Office for Ideology and Economics of Latvian Radio;

A. Leyniyeys—senior laboratory assistant, Riga Medical Institute;

A. Livalentals—ward supervisor, Riga Clinical Hospital No. 7;

K. Maknya—editor of the Kraslavskiy Rayon newspaper EZERZEME;

M. Naglis—party committee secretary of "Lachplesis" Agricultural Firm;

A. Ozers—department head at "Teploelektroproyekt" Institute;

Kh. Plauks—deputy director of the "Baltiia" Timber Processing Combine, Liyepaya;

K. Podniyeys—laboratory director, University of Latvia;

O. Rijekstinsh—assistant to the general director of the "Daylrade" Production Association;

Yu. Rozenvald—department director, University of Latvia;

M. Rukmane—secretary of the Central Committee of the Independent Latvian Communist Party;

I. Samite—secretary of the Talsinskiy Raykom, Latvian Communist Party;

N. Sapozhnikov—secretary of the Ogrskiy Raykom, Latvian Communist Party;

A. Sedvalds—director of Livany Experimental Biochemical Plant;

R. Skudra—party committee secretary of the Latvian Academy of Sciences;

D. Skulte—secretary of the Central Committee of the Independent Latvian Communist Party;

Yu. Spridzans—department head, "Vodpolimer" Institute;

A. Chepanis—deputy chairman of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers;

A. Chishchakov—first secretary of the Rizhskiy Raykom, Latvian Communist Party;

A. Endzinsh—party committee secretary, University of Latvia;

V. Abolinsh—head of the Organizational Department, Rihzskiy Raykom, Latvian Communist Party;

A. Burmeystars—deputy chairman of "Rende" Kolkhoz [collective farm], Kuldigskiy Rayon;

V. Vitola—chief of the Production Department, Kegums Mobile Motorized Equipment Pool;

A. Galvinsh—director of Kandavskaya High School;

M. Zhvigure—teacher, Riga High School No. 69;

V. Kokalis—deputy department head, Latvian Communist Party Central Committee;

E. Laugalis—party committee secretary of "Kursa" Fish Kolkhoz;

R. Olekhno—teaching methods specialist, Rezekne Public Education Department;

A. Puysitis—teacher, Yurmala High School No. 4;

Ya. Rijekstinsh—lawyer, Yelgava Legal Advice Office;

Ya. Sotniks—first secretary of the Limbzhskiy Raykom, Latvian Communist Party;

B. Tabors—director of the Scientific Organization of Labor Center;

M. Tralmaks—party control commission chairman, Kirovskiy Raykom, Latvian Communist Party.

Independent Latvian Control Commission Members

90UN1797B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 19 Apr 90 p 2

[List of members of the Control Commission of the Independent Latvian Communist Party]

[Text] V. Abolinsk—head of the Organization Department of the Rihzskiy Raykom [rayon committee], Latvian Communist Party;

A. Burmeystars—deputy chairman of "Rende" Kolkhoz [collective farm], Kuldigskiy Rayon;

V. Vitola—head of the Production Department of Kegums Mobile Motorized Equipment Pool;

A. Galvinsh—director of Kandavskaya High School;

M. Zhvigure—teacher, Riga High School No. 69;

V. Kokalis—deputy department head, Latvian Communist Party Central Committee;

E. Laugalis—party committee secretary of "Kursa" Fish Kolkhoz;

R. Olekhno—teaching methods specialist, Rezekne Public Education Department;

A. Puysitis—teacher, Yurmala High School No. 4;

Ya. Rijekstinsh—lawyer, Yelgava Legal Advice Office;

Ya. Sotniks—first secretary of Limbzhskiy Raykom, Latvian Communist Party;

B. Tabors—director of the Scientific Organization of Labor Center;

M. Tralmaks—party control commission chairman, Kirovskiy Raykom, Latvian Communist Party.

Address on Independent Latvian Communist Party

90UN1797C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 19 Apr 90 p 2

[Address by A. Chishchakov, chairman of the Credentials Commission of the Independent Latvian Communist Party; date not specified: "Credentials Commission Report to the Congress of Independent Latvian Communist Party Supporters"]

[Text] Five hundred seventy-nine delegates were elected to the Congress of Supporters of the Independent Latvian Communist Party. They represent the 28,950 supporters of the independent Communist Party registered as of 27 March of this year.

For your information, registration continues. The total number of Independent Latvian Communist Party supporters exceeded 32,000 the day the congress opened. The number of Independent Latvian Communist Party supporters in the city of Riga has increased by 1,252 individuals over the past two weeks; 6,147 Independent Latvian Communist Party supporters in all are registered in the capital. Included among these, the number of supporters in Proletarskiy Rayon has actually doubled since the end of March, reaching 1,100 individuals. The number of Independent Latvian Communist Party supporters in Tsentralnyy Rayon increased by 700 people and now comprises 2,747 individuals. The number of supporters in Oktyabrskiy Rayon exceeds 600, the increase here amounting to more than 140. On the eve of the congress, 224 party members and 98 nonparty members registered in the Coordinating Center. Over 600 nonparty members are registered in the republic overall.

Of the delegates elected to the congress, 199 were also delegates to the 25th Congress. In addition, 18 25th Congress delegates not elected to the present congress are participating in its work. Party organizations of all rayons and cities of the republic are represented at the congress.

Verifying delegate credentials, the Credentials Commission reached the conclusion that delegate elections took place in accordance with the resolution adopted by the organizational committee and under the established representational norm.

One hundred sixty-four delegates, or 27.3 percent, represent workers in agriculture, industry, construction, transportation, communications, and services. One hundred eighty delegates, or 31.1 percent, represent workers in science, culture, public health, and public education.

Thirty-three individuals, or 5.7 percent of the delegates, work in the soviets; 96 delegates, or 16.6 percent, are party workers.

Ninety-seven persons, or 16.8 percent of the delegates, are enterprise and institution leaders. One hundred twenty women (20.7 percent) were elected as delegates to the congress.

Latvians comprise 89.8 percent of congress delegates. Representatives of other nationalities comprise 10.2 percent.

Delegate distribution by age group is as follows: The greatest percentage, 56.3 percent (326 individuals) are from 30 to 50 years old; 246 delegates are over 50 years old; and only 6 delegates are younger than 30.

The average age of congress delegates is 47.3. The oldest delegates are Indrikis Kelle, from Oktyabrskiy Rayon, born in 1914; Zheniya Reveniyetse, representing the Liyepaya city party organization, born in 1917; and Vilis Kruminsh, from the Center party organization, born in 1919. The youngest congress delegate, Mayya Yansone, a lady from Liyepayskiy Rayon, is 26 years old.

Congress delegates include 68 Yanis's, 20 Ayvar's, 20 Andris's, and 20 Yuris's.

Our honorable lady delegates to the congress are basically maintaining their individuality. Using the computer we were able to find only 20 Marite's and Mara's. We think this makes sense.

With respect to time served in the party, delegate composition may be characterized as follows:

Less than 5 years of party service—32 delegates (5.5 percent);
From 5 to 10 years party service—73 delegates (12.6 percent);
From 10 to 20 years—188 delegates (32.8 percent);
From 20 to 30 years—210 delegates (36.7 percent);
From 30 to 40 years—63 delegates (11.0 percent);
From 40 to 50 years—6 delegates.

The party members with greatest time of service are Vilis Kruminsh (since 1942), Indrikis Kelle (since 1947), and Lyubov Zile (since 1948).

The Credentials Commission makes special note of the fact that, of the registered supporters of the independent party, Mariya Shumane has 73 years of party service, Yekaterina Ripa has 63 years, and Lidiya Kruskopa has 60 years.

Four hundred five delegates (69.9 percent) have attained higher education. This number includes four professors.

One hundred four delegates (17.9 percent) have high school or specialized secondary education.

Congress delegates include seven USSR people's deputies, 11 Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputies, and 123 deputies of local soviets.

The Credentials Commission approves the credentials of all elected delegates and requests that the congress ratify the Credentials Commission report, allow delegates to exchange their temporary identification for credentials, and also issue credentials to 25th Congress delegates who were not elected as deputies to this congress.

Principles of Independent Latvian Party Cited

90UN1797D Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 19 Apr 90 p 2

[Address by Yu. Rozenvald, associate professor of the University of Latvia, to Congress of Independent Latvian Communist Party Supporters; date not specified: "Basic Principles of Activity of the Independent Latvian Communist Party"]

[Text] My task today is eased to a great extent by the fact that the "Draft Basic Principles of Activity of the Independent Latvian Communist Party" presented to you was examined 24 February in general outline form at the Independent Latvian Communist Party Conference. I think that over the two months which have passed since the draft was published in the press, anyone who so desired had the opportunity to become familiar with it. It seems apparent to me, therefore, that I need not delve into details of the text.

At the same time, I would like to make some observations in connection with the just concluded 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress, from which more than 260 delegates departed the moment the conservative majority refused to even discuss the compromise draft "Program Principles of the Latvian Communist Party" proposed by the Central Committee. This draft was drawn up to a great extent on the basis of ours—in my opinion, this is apparent to the naked eye. At the same time, as was already noted at the 25th Congress, this draft requires significant improvement and development in four main areas of principle.

I would like to recall these for you now:

1. The party's political goal is a socially just, open, and democratic society in a free, independent, rule-of-law Latvian state, which must become an entity of international law;
2. In order to achieve this goal, the Latvian Communist Party must become an independent sociopolitical organization, which will structure its relations with other democratic movements and organizations on the basis of

principles of mutual respect, parity, and political partnership; the party disavows the organizational subordination of any political organization whatsoever, whether in Latvia or beyond its borders;

3. The Latvian Communist Party repudiates the goal of building a utopia of a communist or any other artificially constructed society which has lost contact with real everyday needs, the contradictions and opportunities life presents;

4. The Latvian Communist Party considers as a necessary condition for the normal development of society legal guarantees of diversity in forms of ownership, including the development of private ownership of the land and means of production.

It must be stated that since the 24 February conference, the group assigned to draw up documents has received many proposals and supplements. Many of these were taken into consideration when we reexamined the basic principles draft. The group assigned to draw up program documents wishes to thank all those who facilitated our work by their proposals. Changes affected almost all sections of the draft. First of all we considered it necessary to draw up a small preamble to the draft of basic principles, delving into the history of the Latvian Communist Party and stressing that it is a successor to the traditions established in 1904 of the Latvian Social-Democratic Party and Social Democracy of Latvia. It was necessary to state succinctly in the preamble the basic purpose and status of the party: "This is an independent sociopolitical party, whose purpose is to create a socially just, democratic society in a free, independent, rule-of-law Latvian state. The Independent Latvian Communist Party builds its relations with other democratic movements and organizations on the basis of principles of mutual respect, parity, and political partnership. It disavows the organizational subordination of any political organization whatsoever, whether in Latvia or beyond its borders." Substantive corrections were made to the section entitled "Ideological Platform." Here I am not going to devote attention to small changes, of which there are many. I will note only the most significant aspects. The draft emphasizes the concept that it is not a strategic goal of the party to build an artificially constructed society to be foisted on people, no matter how attractive and alluring this may be designed. Time spent in experimentation has cost us too dearly. "As a result, a totalitarian-administrative, bureaucratic system took shape in society."

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that our draft avoids the use of the word "socialism" to denote the state attained by our society, since this social appraisal has been over-idealized, too indeterminate are the criteria for distinguishing it from a so-called "capitalistic" society, and the term "socialist-capitalist" has itself become an ideological cliché. For precisely this reason we emphasize in the program that **democratic socialism** in our understanding is not some kind of finished- product society, but rather a **path taken in the**

development of society, which is based on two major principles—freedom and social protection. Freedom in the political and ideological spheres denotes the observance of internationally recognized human rights, protection of citizens from the arbitrariness of state power, a constitutionally recognized multiparty system, and free expression of the will of the people in the exercise of state authority and self-government. Freedom in the economics sphere denotes diversity in forms of ownership, the right of free initiative, and legal guarantees for the development of private ownership. Economic regulation of the national economy and healthy competition among producers must replace the administrative- bureaucratic system. Democratic socialism envisages the harmonization of interests of the individual and of society, including the guarantee of social justice in accordance with each person's contribution to producing the gross national product, and the establishment of a system of taxation and social services which would provide each member of society with a quality of life and development of culture worthy of the human individual.

In the section on "National Policy" I would like to draw your attention to the fact that we refine our representation of the reasons for aggravation of the ethnic issue, allowing us to more accurately formulate the basic aims of the section.

In the section "Restructuring of the Political System," we have formulated the major ideas which would allow us to completely repudiate former claims of the Communist Party to lead the people, and become the party that moves together with the people and acts in the interests of the people of Latvia and the working man, rejecting claims of any class to a directive role in society. We want to function as a civilized parliamentary party, defending a concept and not an easy-chair, a concept which consistently promotes the realization of democratic principles in society. There is pressure on us—coming from the womb of that party which thrust its domination upon society for decades, creating in it a totalitarian-bureaucratic system. And now a special responsibility weighs upon us in the disassembling of this system. We must consistently push for a constitutionally guaranteed system of popular government and self-government; we must consistently observe the principle of separation of powers and consistent separation of legislative from executive power. This means, for example, that a parliament deputy cannot be a minister and, realizing the harm failure to observe this principle brought us in the past, we must consistently cut off any and every attempt to violate it again, even if it is founded on noble intentions.

The draft also envisages that our party must consistently oppose the existence of political party organizations in the organs of state power and government, in the mass media, the armed forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Committee for State Security, and other law enforcement organs.

Two new sections replace the former Section IV: "IV. The National Economy" and "V. Social Policy." I would like to note at the same time that in formulating basic principles of economic social policy in this general document, we formulated near-term tasks in the socio-economic sphere. Development of such a near-term program will be one of the first tasks for members of a board which will be elected today, and especially for its economics committee.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the draft text includes two completely new sections. The first of these, Section VI, is titled "Quality of Life and the Use of Natural Resources."

And I would like to draw special attention to the new eighth section, which defines new political tasks for the Independent Latvian Communist Party in accomplishing the party's basic principles. I will treat this section more in detail, keeping in mind its special significance. We believe the course proposed in this section will enable tension to be relieved to a great degree with regard to both the internal and external politics of our difficult movement forward toward the restoration of state independence.

I will now stop to discuss several important points, bearing in mind that the working group proposes to formulate certain points in the program documents differently from what appears in the draft presented to you.

Thus, Article 1:

1. The Independent Latvian Communist Party proposes that the newly elected Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet adopt at its first session a resolution on restoration of the state independence of Latvia based on the principles of the 1922 Latvian Republic Constitution, while maintaining the validity of the Latvian SSR Constitution and USSR Constitution to the extent that they do not contradict Articles 1, 2, 3, and 6 of this Constitution, and that it confer with the USSR Government to coordinate the political, economic, military, and other questions proceeding from this resolution.

2. We propose that, following conclusion of an agreement on the restoration of independence, which must take place under consistent observance of the principles of the "Treaty of Peace Between Russia and Latvia (1920)," the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet announce elections of a Constituent Assembly of Latvia based on the principles of the 1922 Latvian Republic Constitution and resign its authority following this election.

3. We believe that elections of the Constituent Assembly must be conducted in accordance with a new Law on Elections, which must foresee the functioning of a multiparty system and radically democratize the nomination of candidates and organization of elections.

It is necessary to set elections of the organs of authority at all levels for every three years.

4. The Constituent Assembly of Latvia will establish a second Latvian Republic and adopt its temporary constitution.

5. During the transition period prior to the restoration of real independence, the Independent Latvian Communist Party will promote such further legislative principles in the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet as will reduce social and ethnic tensions and facilitate the safeguarding of civil accord in Latvia.

5.1 The status of citizenship in the independent Latvian state is obtained by all citizens of the Latvian republic and their descendants.

All other permanent residents in the republic who desire to bind their lives with the Latvian state will also be able to obtain citizenship.

After the Law on Latvian Citizenship is adopted, only those individuals who have resided in the republic the past five years will be able to become Latvian citizens.

5.2 All citizens of the Latvian Republic have equal rights and bear equal responsibility before the law regardless of sex, ethnicity, party affiliation, and religious or political convictions.

5.3 Foreign citizens have the same rights and obligations as citizens of the Latvian Republic, with the following exceptions:

1) they cannot participate in elections or be elected to institutions of Latvian state authority;

2) they cannot organize their own political parties or be members of Latvian political parties;

3) they are not called up for service in the armed forces.

5.4 We believe that the independent Latvian state will not be able to assume the asset liabilities of the first Latvian Republic with respect to private individuals, joint-stock and other companies.

At the same time this provision envisages, as formulated in Article 9 of Section IV, that in accomplishing comprehensive agrarian reform "it is necessary to observe the interests of both the agrarian landowners and the real proprietors."

5.5 Previous legislative acts of the Latvian Republic in the sphere of labor and social questions will not be resurrected; pension and social legislation will be developed on the contemporary level which has been achieved.

5.6 In accordance with the possible release of a certain contingent of laborers in certain spheres of the economy along with the gradual transition to a market economy, it is declared that the state will undertake responsibility,

jointly with enterprises and institutions, for retraining these workers, providing their social security, and creating new job positions.

Regarding the name of the party, I believe that no one sitting here now has any doubt that we will have to replace the old name. At the same time, in creating our party based on the Latvian territorial organization of the CPSU and desiring that the assets which have fallen into the hands of the Communist Party be used in the interests of the people of Latvia, we are interested during the initial period in maintaining a certain link with the old name. Nonetheless, we must assert our unequivocal desire to resolve this question in as rapid and democratic a fashion as possible.

We therefore believe that the optimal decision would be:

1. To assume the temporary name of "Independent Latvian Communist Party—Social Democracy of Latvia."

The second part of the name will enable us to emphasize our ties with the party's history, since we thereby return to the old name which appeared in 1906 and which links us with the revolution of 1905 in Latvia, a time of which our party can truly be proud. This name would confirm our adherence to social-democratic tradition, which is nearest in spirit to our program.

2. To conduct an immediate referendum in the party on the question of the party's name.

And now I will make a final comment. The people are rapidly attributing their own names to political parties. You have probably heard that they call us the Easter Party. I would like to congratulate the residents of Latvia on the occasion of this holiday which has such great significance for Christianity and for all human culture. The fact that our Congress is taking place at such a time obligates us to focus our words and activities not on negation, but rather on the search for new and constructive ventures enabling our Latvia to once again occupy a position of equal rights among civilized states.

I am proud of the popular desire to call our party the Easter Party. After all, Easter is a symbol of rebirth. And we hope that some particle of this force of rebirth will reach us and provide us the opportunity to revive in Latvia the traditions of the left democratic movement.

Landsbergis Comments on 12 May Tallinn Meeting

*90UN1997A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
18 May 90 pp 1, 2*

[Report by V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, at 15 May Supreme Council meeting: "On the Results of the Meeting in Tallinn"]

[Text] Esteemed colleagues! As you know, three days ago there was a meeting of the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the three Baltic states. Its goal was to unite our

positions, strengthen them, and achieve a new level of political activity. After the discussions, the foundations of which were prepared in advance, we signed several important documents on 12 May which will be published. One of them, it is true, may not be published immediately. It is a letter signed by all of us and addressed to the two presidents—M. Gorbachev and G. Bush. But of the principal documents we signed the most important was a declaration reestablishing and extending a 1934 treaty of agreement between Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Its deadline had not expired when the existence of our state was ended, and as a result this treaty may still be considered in effect. We affirmed its continued existence and simultaneously broadened the structure of the mechanism for implementing this treaty inasmuch as according to chapter 2 of the 1934 treaty the mechanism consisted of continual communication between the ministries of foreign affairs of the three countries and fixed periodical meetings to resolve general political questions or issues arising between the parties. Now, within the framework of our agreement, a Council of Baltic States has been created which will consist of the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the three countries and other persons of high rank who will be designated by the contracting parties. As the 1934 treaty stipulates, the council will permanently be made up of the ministers of foreign affairs and of course the prime ministers. In this manner the political foundation is laid for further communication between Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which supplements the treaty on economic cooperation and mutual aid which was signed by the aforementioned chairmen. The foundation for a common policy is also laid inasmuch as it was said that we will unite our political efforts while maintaining the principle of independence and simultaneously trying to resolve the Baltic region's problems in an international context and in relations with the Soviet Union. One of our practical steps was a telegram we signed that we sent to President M. Gorbachev with a proposal that we four meet together to discuss the problems which already exist and which are being brought to the fore by life under conditions of the increasing tension that is being stoked by our eastern neighbors. We have not yet received an answer to the telegram. I propose that the Edicts of President M. Gorbachev, by which the Soviet Union cancels the acts adopted by the Supreme Soviets of Latvia and Estonia, should not be considered a direct response. Instead these are actions which coincide in time and not in sense. As a result we, of course, are still awaiting a constructive response from President M. Gorbachev.

The most comprehensive document is the communique, prepared in all the languages, which will be published immediately.

One of the important aspects of international policy discussed at the meeting in Tallinn is the extension of the 1934 treaty of the three independent states and the assignment of analogous status to today's Republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—to all three and to each

separately. Inasmuch as the document was an official document of the League of Nations, the question now arises of its registration with the United Nations. Our declaration also stresses the desire of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to occupy their legitimate seats in the United Nations and in other international organizations. Thus we have taken a step in this direction which may not be suppressed. There are already political responses from the countries of the West which welcome and show approval for the agreement of the Baltic republics aspiring to freedom.

Landsbergis Discusses Relations With West

90UN1995A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
17 May 90 p 2

[ELTA report: "Press Conference in the Supreme Council"]

[Text] The traditional press conference took place after the end of the plenary meeting of the 15 May session in the Supreme Council. Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council, and Kazimieras Motieka, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, took part.

Vytautas Landsbergis emphasized two events which were important for the life of the republic. They were Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene's successful, in the political sense, meetings with U.S. President George Bush and the heads of other Western countries, and the meeting that took place in Tallinn of the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the three Baltic countries. In the capital of Estonia they signed a declaration reinstituting the 1934 treaty on agreement and cooperation between the Baltic states. A number of other very important documents were adopted, however the near future will tell us what significance the letters to Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush will have. Commenting on the reaction of the leader of the USSR to Latvia's and Estonia's constitutional acts restoring independence as well as the actions undertaken here to destabilize the political and economic situation, V. Landsbergis noted that Lithuania may be subjected to similar danger. In addition he expressed the hope that by presenting specific proposals to the leadership of the USSR there might be greater political opportunity for negotiations with the Kremlin.

Answering questions, the leaders of the parliament reported on measures which should help us withstand the blockade, and they talked about the work of Lithuania's organs of law and order. It was emphasized that in the future Lithuania can have a positive influence on the new democratic political structures that are being created in the Soviet Union. At the journalists' request, K. Motieka shared his impressions on his trip to Italy where he met with representatives of influential political parties of that country. He also met with representatives of the Vatican, and he noted that they understand the situation and will support Lithuania's aspiration for freedom in a practical manner if it is needed.

One of the Soviet journalists asked whether the criminals who operated during the war years in the Lithuanian legion of the SS would be rehabilitated. But there never was such a legion! The fact that such a question was raised is itself of interest....

The press conference was conducted by Povilas Pau-paras, head of the Supreme Council information department.

RSFSR

Runoff Election Results in Russian Federation

90UN1855A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 12 May 90 Second Edition p 1

["Report of the Central Election Commission on the results of elections of RSFSR people's deputies during runoff elections conducted 28 April, 4-6 May 1990"]

[Text] Having examined the documentation presented by district election commissions on the results of elections of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies in the runoff elections, the Central Election Commission reports that:

In accordance with Article 52 of the RSFSR Law "On the Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies," runoff elections were conducted 28 April, 4, 5, and 6 May 1990 in 21 territorial and two national-territorial electoral districts.

The list of eligible voters for the runoff elections comprised 2,649,358 individuals, of which 1,871,132 (70.6 percent) participated in the balloting; 18,729 ballots were declared invalid.

As a result of the runoff elections, RSFSR people's deputies were elected in all 23 electoral districts.

A report on the results of the runoff elections in each territorial and national-territorial electoral district was published by district election commissions in the local press.

On the basis of Article 49 of the RSFSR Law "On Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies," the Central Election Commission has registered all people's deputies elected in the runoff voting.

Runoff Returns Published

90UN1855B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 12 May 90 Second Edition p 1

["List of RSFSR people's deputies elected from territorial and national-territorial electoral districts in repeat elections"]

[Text] Aziratali Nokhovich Akhmetov, general director of the "Elkor" Production Association, CPSU member, city of Nalchik. Urvanskiy National-Territorial District No. 99, Kabardino-Balkar ASSR.

Rail Zakareyevich **Bagautdinov**, manager of "Bashneftpromstroy" Trust, CPSU member, city of Neftekamsk. Yanaulskiy Territorial District No. 802, Bashkir ASSR.

Rim Sagitovich **Bakiyev**, director of "Stepanovskiy" Sovkhoz [state farm], Blagoveshchenskiy Rayon, CPSU member, village of Ilina Polyana. Mishkinskiy Territorial District No. 796, Bashkir ASSR.

Nikolay Aleksandrovich **Bezrodnny**, director of Sebyakovskiy Cement Plant, CPSU member, city of Mikhaylovka. Mikhaylovskiy Territorial District No. 320, Volgograd Oblast.

Ivan Antonovich **Bolotov**, director of the public education administration of the ispolkom [executive committee] of the Kursk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, city of Kursk. Fatezhskiy Territorial District No. 494, Kursk Oblast.

Anatoliy Nikolayevich **Zakopyrin**, deputy director of Mechanization Administration No. 2 of "Bratskspetsstroy" Trust, CPSU member, city of Bratsk. Padunskiy Territorial District No. 390, Irkutsk Oblast.

Vladimir Sergeyevich **Zakharov**, department head at the Moscow CPSU Obkom [oblast committee], CPSU member, city of Moscow. Mozhayskiy Territorial District No. 77, Moscow Oblast.

Fedor Nikolayevich **Inshakov**, section chief in the permanent-facility association of the Armavir City Territorial Medical Association, CPSU member, city of Armavir. Armavirskiy Territorial District No. 169, Krasnodar Kray.

Rafail Zakharovich **Kadyrov**, secretary of the Perm CPSU Obkom, CPSU member, city of Perm. Karagayskiy Territorial District No. 588, Perm Oblast.

Vladimir Gennadyevich **Kapustyanskiy**, director of the Orel Special Police High School of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], CPSU member, city of Orel. Sovetskiiy Territorial District No. 561, Orel Oblast.

Yuriy Mikhaylovich **Kachurin**, director of the "Pallasovskiy" Breeding Sovkhoz, Pallasovskiy Rayon, CPSU member, settlement of Zavolzhskiy. Nikolayevskiy Territorial District No. 321, Volgograd Oblast.

Yuriy Borisovich **Kitov**, general director of the "Saratovskoye" Poultry Production Association, CPSU member, city of Saratov. Zavodskoy Territorial District No. 634, Saratov Oblast.

Anatoliy Sergeyevich **Kozhin**, board chairman of the Saratov Oblast Consumers Union, CPSU member, city of Saratov. Pugachevskiy Territorial District No. 644, Saratov Oblast.

Nikolay Danilovich **Kozlov**, director of "Voskresenskiy" Sovkhoz. Voskresenskiy Rayon, CPSU member, settlement of Fedino. Voskresenskiy Territorial District No. 62, Moscow Oblast.

Asker Makhmudovich **Nekhay**, manager of the "Krasnodaragropromremstroy-montazh" Trust, CPSU member, city of Krasnodar. Teuchezhskiy Territorial District No. 193, Adygey Autonomous Oblast, Krasnodar Kray.

Sherig-Oll Dizizhikovich **Oorzhak**, chairman of the Tuvin ASSR Council of Ministers, CPSU member, city of Kyzyl. Kyzylskiy Territorial District No. 870, Tuvin ASSR.

Nikolay Ivanovich **Polevoy**, machine operator at the "Path to Communism" Kolkhoz [collective farm], Kosikhinskiy Rayon, CPSU member, village of Losikha. Zarinskiy Territorial District No. 154, Altay Kray.

Viktor Yakovlevich **Prokhorov**, foreman at the Skopin Glass Works, CPSU member, city of Skopin. Skopinskiy Territorial District No. 630, Ryazan Oblast.

Anatoliy Alekseyevich **Simonov**, director of Chernogorsk Motor Vehicle Repair Plant, CPSU member, city of Chernogorsk. Askizskiy National District No. 158, Khakass Autonomous Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Kray.

Viktor Vladimirovich **Sitkov**, agglomeration worker at the Agglomeration Factory of the Norilsk Mining Metallurgical Combine imeni A.P. Zavenyagin, CPSU member, city of Norilsk. Norilskiy Territorial District No. 210, Krasnoyarsk Kray.

Vladimir Arkadyevich **Skudnov**, deputy chief engineer at the "Krasnaya Etna" Plant in Gorkiy, "Metiz" Production Association, CPSU member, city of Gorkiy. Leninskiy Territorial District No. 349, Gorkiy Oblast.

Mariya Ivanovna **Sorokina**, correspondent for the Lipetsk Oblast newspaper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, CPSU member, city of Lipetsk. Sovetskiiy Territorial District No. 497, Lipetsk Oblast.

Nikolay Semenovich **Yusnikov**, first deputy ispolkom chairman of the Omsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, chairman of the Oblast Agroindustrial Committee, CPSU member, city of Omsk. Moskalenskiy Territorial District No. 541, Omsk Oblast.

Case for Founding RSFSR Party Now Viewed

PM1106142590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
9 Jun 90 Second Edition p 4

["Subjective Notes" by Dr. of Historical Sciences Prof. I. Osadchiy, member of the All-Russian CPSU Conference Preparatory Committee, in "Discussion Sheet No 43": "What the RSFSR Communist Party Is To Be Like"]

[Text] Just 10 days remain until the start of the first conference of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] communists, but much still has to be done to prepare for it.

We already appear to have in our blood unwarranted slow starts and last-minute rushes. And it is true in this case too.

The first joint session of the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau and the All-Russian Party Conference Preparatory Committee, whose members were elected at plenums of the republic's kray and oblast party committees, was held 3 April. Working commissions and groups were formed there. It was necessary to set to work at once. However, a different situation took shape—an unwarranted lull: Many members of the Preparatory Committee found themselves doomed to a long period of inaction.

It seems to me that there was just one reason for this: There was no unity among the CPSU leadership with regard to the question of creating an RSFSR Communist Party. And this vagueness did, of course, affect the preparatory work. Only 3 May did the CPSU Central Committee Politburo advocate including the question of creating the RSFSR Communist Party on the conference agenda.

By this time the initiative from the provinces was already in full swing. As is known, a number of action groups were organized and even held an initiative congress in Leningrad in the second half of April, whose participants advocated recreating the Russian Federation Communist Party within the CPSU. An organizing bureau was formed at that congress to prepare for a second initiative congress.

Meanwhile, the "vacation" for many members of the Preparatory Committee dragged on for almost six weeks, until mid-May.

The Preparatory Committee has not met in full session for more than two months now.

However, the actions of all the working groups and all the committee members need to be constantly coordinated and agreed.

To be fair, it should be said that even during their enforced "vacation" the bulk of the Preparatory Committee's members did find an application for their efforts and energy. While seldom meeting together within the working groups, they worked actively "in all directions" in their own party organizations and studied communists' opinions in order to reflect them in the draft documents of the upcoming conference. They appeared in the local mass media and in party clubs, endeavoring to explain their understanding of the situation and to perceive the mood of the party masses.

It is also appropriate to say here that until very recently the central newspapers, radio, and television, with the possible exception of PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, virtually ignored questions of preparing for the All-Russian Conference and setting up the RSFSR Communist Party and failed to conduct the necessary targeted discussion of these very important events in the life of the CPSU, the republic, and the country. The point is that Russia's party organizations contain 58 percent of the country's communists—more than 10 million people.

Meanwhile, there are very many questions and problems of concern to the republic's communists and the whole CPSU (and not only to communists). Questions of constituting the All-Russian Conference now being prepared as a founding congress, of creating the RSFSR Communist Party, of naming it, and of electing its leading organs are being discussed particularly sharply in the party milieu today. There are also arguments over what the party should be like in terms of type, structural principles, and program aims and tasks and what its place within the CPSU and its relations with the communist parties of other union republics should be. It is necessary to determine the status of the party organizations of RSFSR autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs and to agree on the Russian Communists' tactics in respect of other public movements and organizations (because not just political pluralism but also a multiparty system are becoming a reality of life in Soviet society). Collective thought must also be given to the question of communist groups and factions in the soviets, in other state and public organizations, etc.

I will give my opinion of some of these problems.

First, on constituting the All-Russian Party Conference as the founding congress of RSFSR communists. I consider this not only possible but also necessary in the very complex situation in which the CPSU and the republic party organizations find themselves today. Particularly with regard to the sharply increasing political and socio-economic crisis, the social tension, and the acute interethnic relations. The sooner RSFSR communists are consolidated on a principled basis, the better. This will enable them to master the situation more quickly and to have a decisive impact on determining ways out of it.

In my opinion, the 28th congress delegates who are also delegates to the All-Russian CPSU Conference must come to it empowered by their territorial party organizations to decide the question of creating the RSFSR Communist Party and forming its Central Committee and Central Control and Auditing Commissions. Possible candidacies for these elected organs should be discussed with communists.

It seems to me that it would be most correct to call Russia's unified republic party organization the **Communist Party of the RSFSR** by analogy with the communist parties of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, etc. This indicates not the national but the international nature of the republic communist party. Of course, I am unequivocally in favor of creating the RSFSR Communist Party within the CPSU, equal among equals with the other union republic communist parties. At the same time all USSR communists must have a unified party card, unified Statutes and Program, and a unified central organ—the party Council (Politburo or Presidium)—with obligatory representation for all the union republic communist parties and, preferably, an alternating chairmanship.

I would like to see the future RSFSR Communist Party as a party of a Leninist type, as a force capable of being the political vanguard of the republic's working people, organized along production-territorial and territorial lines, and operating on the basis of democratic centralism, ideological and organizational unity, high conscious discipline, and broad party democracy. Its program aims must be socialism's Leninist aspect and communist prospect. It seems to me that all this will help to consolidate all socialist forces in the CPSU, in the republic, and in the country as a whole on a principled basis.

Under conditions of political pluralism and the multi-party system that is taking shape, the tactics of communists must, in my view, consist in seeking ways to rally all public movements and associations which remain loyal to the ideals of October, to socialism, and to a creative approach to Marxism-Leninism and which are ready to join in resolving the difficult problems of both the RSFSR and the country as a whole. It is also necessary to cooperate with general democratic movements which aim at resolving global problems of concern to our society and to all mankind.

It is my conviction that there must also be complete clarity with regard to all sorts of antisocialist, anticommunist forces: communists consider it their duty to reveal to the people in every possible way the truth about those forces' true intentions, which are dangerous for the country's destiny and alien to the working masses.

I wish particularly to dwell on the role of communists within soviets and other state and public organizations. This is a most urgent and fundamental question which must be examined and resolved both at the upcoming conference of Russian communists and at the 28th CPSU Congress.

News has recently been coming in from various places that deputies of a particular soviet have opposed the formation of party groups (party factions) of communist deputies. It is a paradox: Various kinds of deputies' groups, factions, and associations are being set up under any signboard, but communist deputies cannot be convened to elaborate unified proposals or a unified platform. This is to be seen as direct discrimination against the CPSU. The absurdity of such an approach is obvious. Because, in the final analysis, any political party sets the task of attaining political power or influence over organs of state power and pursuing its own policy in them and in public organizations through its representatives elected to them. It is known that various party factions operate in parliaments or other state organs (central and local) in any civilized state.

The absurdity of discriminatory actions against communists is all the more obvious because the soviets are, as a rule, dominated by communist deputies. And, paradoxical though it may seem, in a number of places they themselves oppose the creation of party groups or the holding of meetings of communist deputies. Such actions

naturally in no way conform to the statutory and program principles of the CPSU, which were laid down back in the early years of Soviet power. At the present time, under conditions of the democratization of Soviet society, political pluralism, and the formation of various political parties, movements, and associations, communist groups (factions) must operate actively in soviets, executive committees, and all other state and public organizations, establishments, and cooperatives. It is through them that the CPSU can implement its policy and its program aims.

In this connection it is necessary, I believe, to state very definitely in both the CPSU Platform and the Statutes: **"The most important duty of a communist elected to state organs of power or to elected organs of public organizations (trade union, youth, cooperative, women's, and others) is to implement the CPSU's policy, its strategic line, and its program tasks. To these ends communist factions (groups) are created within elected state and public organs and are to coordinate their work with the corresponding party committees and be accountable to the party."**

Unless communists working in soviets, executive committees, and other state and public organizations are placed within the framework of statutory party discipline and responsibility, the CPSU will be unable to realize the set goal of preserving its role as the political vanguard of Soviet society. This is the first point. Second, there will be many Travkins, Afanasyevs, and others like them who for the time being, hiding behind a CPSU member's card, will "win the trust of the masses" and the party, realize their careerist, adventurist aims, and then use their official (or public) position against the CPSU for the purpose of destroying it, undermining its prestige, and weakening its influence among the masses. If communist deputies on soviets and communists in trade unions, the All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League, and other state and public organizations act contrary to the CPSU's policy, program documents, and Statutes, the need for the party itself is lost.

These are my views and thoughts on certain questions that have become the object of sharp debate on the threshold of the first conference of RSFSR communists.

Western Republics

Moldavian First Secretary Congress Speech

90UN1993A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA
MOLDAVIYA in Russian 18 May 90 pp 2-4

[Report by P.K. Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, at the 17th Moldavian Communist Party Congress: "Central Committee Political Report on the Activity of the Moldavian Communist Party and the Program of its Renewal"]

[Text] Dear Comrade Delegates! For the first time, perhaps, in the history of the Moldavian Communist

Party democratically elected delegates, who are entrusted with particular responsibility for the fate of their party, have assembled for their congress. For this reason the Central Committee deemed it necessary to depart from the traditional presentation to the congress of a report containing, as in former years, accounts of what has been done and an enumeration of what has not been done, with the usual detailed description of the development of all sectors and spheres of social and spiritual life and an evaluation of the work of the personnel, but instead to present a political report and in it, proceeding from an analysis of the social and political situation and the active politicization of the masses, to answer in concert the serious questions troubling communists and all people: How to evaluate history, what to emphatically abandon and from what to dissociate ourselves and what to take with us into the future. How to be the political force in society in which the people believe and which they follow? Believe without fear and compulsion, consciously and profoundly.

How the Moldavian Communist Party restructures and reforms itself will depend on our wisdom and sense of responsibility. We must show the communists and the people of the republic that we are capable of becoming a modern political party. This is why an honest, direct and, I would say, ruthless analysis of both the past and the present activity of the Moldavian Communist Party is necessary. And however much we might like to confine ourselves merely to the framework of the present day, the logic of events invariably returns us to the recent historical past. And history has so disposed matters that many of us grew up and were molded under the conditions of a unitary state, in which a monopolist-party was built into the administrative-command system. It passed through the tragedies and crimes of the era of Stalinism and through the time of the stagnation and total bureaucratization of society. The fate of the republic and the Moldavian Communist Party, which has experienced the press of the administrative-command system, pseudo-internationalism, bureaucratism, and other negative phenomena, has taken shape in truly dramatic fashion.

As you know, an enlarged Central Committee plenum on 1 March this year analyzed the activity of the Moldavian Communist Party since the war and made a scrupulous political assessment of the distortions and deformations which had occurred in the past. The names of the persons who, as the exponents of the administrative-command and voluntarist system of power, contributed to a varying extent to the accumulation in the republic of the present most complex socioeconomic and political problems were given.

Why is it of such fundamental importance for us to analyze history and the past in detail? First, because the people have not known the truth. And even in the years of perestroika it was concealed from people in every possible way by the former leadership, which was devoted to dogmatism. Second, and this is the main reason, in order to learn lessons for the future through historical truth. We must declare with all firmness: Yes,

our history has been difficult, complex, dramatic and tragic, but there will never again be a repetition of the mistakes and crimes perpetrated before the party and the people.

We draw a clear line here between the mistakes of the party leadership and the role of the absolute majority of its rank and file, which toiled honestly and suffered also, but who remained devoted patriots of the republic. It was not their fault that the system itself excluded the communist rank and file from the process of formulating party policy and that the party leaders, to blame for the deformations, were beyond the control of the masses. And we communists of the 1990's have to answer today, albeit morally, for the work of our predecessors.

The years of perestroika have been difficult and contradictory for the Moldavian Communist Party. All these years, essentially, its leadership clung tightly to the outmoded methods and dogmatic ideological cliches, stubbornly rejected the new trends and political realities, and impeded the processes of democratization and glasnost.

Big responsibility for this period is borne by the present Central Committee also. Many people were perfectly satisfied with such leadership, regardless of the actual situation in the republic. In addition, when the situation became particularly exacerbated and it was necessary to display collective wisdom, adherence to principle, and decisiveness, the Central Committee demonstrated once again "monolithic unity," so to speak, and gave the former first secretary a political vote of confidence. This was, I believe, the apotheosis of the detachment of the Central Committee leadership from the masses and from the reality which prevailed outside the walls of the Central Committee.

This entire burden of past mistakes was such that the authority of the Moldavian Communist Party diminished considerably under the pressure. Ultimately, however, obviously greatly delayed, this led to a change in the leadership of the republic party organization and a number of members of the Central Committee Bureau. It is thus against the background of such political events that the party organizations of the republic have begun to seek new methods to solve accumulated problems.

The Current Political Moment

How to briefly and concisely evaluate the political atmosphere in Moldavia in recent years? It is necessary primarily to distinguish the sharp upsurge in national self-awareness. The inhabitants of the republic have come increasingly to feel themselves to be in control of their lives and the creators of their own history. New political forces in the shape of more than 20 movements of varying political persuasion have come to the fore.

How should we be building relations with these political realities? There can be only one answer today: dialogue, a search for reasonable compromise and cooperation on a constructive basis, in joint specific work and on the

basis of truth and the law. A "roundtable" was held in April on the initiative of the Central Committee Bureau with the participation of the leaders of all public formations, which culminated in the adoption of a joint declaration. We are far from thinking of exaggerating the significance of this action. But the mere fact that leaders of different currents sat down at the negotiating table testifies not only to the fact that the first step toward constructive dialogue has been taken but also that social consensus is not simply a one-time result, it must be a kind of tactic and strategy of the party.

In consenting to a dialogue with political currents and future parties of a socialist orientation we will at the same time dissociate ourselves decisively from those who reject this path of development, operate from anti-socialist positions and manipulate public opinion for their own ambitious ends. There should, of course, be compromise, but not at the expense of concessions on the most important matters, on principles; not at the expense of the interests of the party and the people. Such a phenomenon of our present-day social life as populism, which is living as a parasite on criticism of shortcomings, is good at promises and is barren when it comes to action, should be shown in its true light.

We need to see something else also. The representatives of certain public formations of an extreme left and right persuasion are frequently expressing in their appeals, and particularly in interviews generously given to Western correspondents, virtual nostalgia for a king and are advocating irresponsibly, on behalf of the people, a recarving of borders. This is at odds with the realities which have taken shape in Europe and the world and is contrary to the new political thinking. And, what is most important, this runs counter to the interests of the ordinary people, the inhabitants of the cities and villages of the republic.

A striking reflection of the political atmosphere in the republic were the elections to the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet and the local soviets. They showed that the party's human potential is high, as before. And it is not fortuitous that the electorate finds the most authoritative people primarily among the communists. Members of the CPSU constitute more than 83 percent of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet, over 67 percent of the city and rayon soviets, and approximately 45 percent of the village and community soviets. Although, to speak plainly, we are not fooling ourselves on this score—political character is not adequate to the status of communist in every one of them.

The wide political spectrum of the republic's social life has been reflected in the alignment of forces in the soviets also. Leaders of the People's Front have been elected to the leadership of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet and a number of its standing commissions. Representatives of the People's Front have been elected leaders of the local soviets in Kishinev and Feleshtskiy, Teleneshtskiy, Nisporenskiy, Dondushenskiy, Chimishliyskiy and Yalovenskiy Rayons; representatives of the

United Council of Labor Collectives and the Association of Directors, in Tiraspol and Bendery and Rybnitskiy and Dubesarskiy Rayons. In Komrat the legislature and executive are composed of supporters of "Gagauz khalky."

The situation is complex because the candidates are not officially running in accordance with the principle of affiliation to parties and movements. This will be the case, evidently, when this principle is reflected in the new election act. For this reason nominations for the title of people's deputy have been made on the basis of the personality of this candidate or the other and his election program. And there have been drawbacks here. For some people sweeping criticism of the party itself has been a kind of pass into the soviets. National aspects have played their part also. The party committees, and the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee also, perhaps, conducted the election campaign insufficiently aggressively, although they aspired to convergence with other public forces. At the same time, however, certain opponents developed an unconcealed political struggle against party candidates, actively opposed any rapprochement, and rejected the party committees' attempts to formulate a common platform in the interests of the electorate. Another stage, when the numerous, frequently frivolous, promises to the electorate need to be transferred to the plane of practical action, has now arrived. It is now that the communists in the present renewed soviets need to preserve and even strengthen the consolidating thrust in work, seek points of contact, jointly tackle practical questions, and implement the electorate's instructions.

In uniting the efforts of the communist deputies and jointly formulating political forms of influence on the soviets we are not, of course, speaking about foisting party solutions on the soviets or of some party diktat over the communist deputies. The Central Committee believes that each of them is accountable only to his electorate and responsible only before Soviet laws. At the same time, the common platform and rules of the party enable them to operate in the soviets in organized manner and to join efforts in the preparation and realization of laws. Under the republic's conditions the unity of the communists working in the soviets is an important factor for the consolidation of the deputies and the achievement of the necessary cooperation in the interests of the electorate and the whole population.

Relations between the party and the Komsomol [Communist Youth League] are an urgent political problem for us. It has to be acknowledged that in the years of perestroika the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee has not once analyzed, in accordance with the strictest demands, work with the youth and the Komsomol of the republic. The political reform is forcing us to determine anew their place and role in the alignment of political forces. Practice shows that the Komsomol today cannot lay claim to a monopoly in the youth movement and represent the entire youth. Nonetheless, there are within the latter over 450,000 members

of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] or almost 50 percent of the republic's youth, who have to be reckoned with.

It is expedient in this connection to pose the question of the elaboration in the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet of a "Youth Act." On the basis of such an act the Council of Ministers could implement a whole set of official measures pertaining to realization of a youth policy in the republic. It is necessary to create conditions which ensure that the young men and women and adolescents may earn money, particularly in the summertime, organize their recreation better, develop more physically and morally, and assimilate the cultural, spiritual, and historical values of their people.

Veterans, of whom there are over 600,000 in the republic, require great concern and attention. Many of them are participating actively in political activity and the education of the younger generation. The party should facilitate the creation for them of the necessary conditions for living and the realization of their wealth of experience. The 45th anniversary of the Victory reminded us once again that participants in and invalids of the Great Patriotic War and the USSR Armed Forces are in need of special attention on the part of the party and the state.

Summing up, it should be emphasized that the complex social and political background in the republic cannot be regarded in isolation from the situation in the country as a whole. We have a positive view of the political measures being implemented by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR President M.S. Gorbachev pertaining to an intensification of the restructuring processes and, for our part, support them. The aspirations of the Communists and all inhabitants of the republic are consonant with the consolidating efforts of the CPSU in this difficult period of its activity.

For the Renewal of the Moldavian Communist Party

The Moldavian Communist Party is now having to operate under qualitatively new conditions. Having renounced the monopoly of power, it took the initiative to exclude the corresponding articles from the constitution. The former "directive," command style is becoming a thing of the past. It is now necessary to struggle for power only by political means and by specific, actual deeds for the good of the people. But a number of party committees proved to be unprepared for this. Half of the secretaries of the gorkoms and raykoms [city and rayon party committees] and one out of every three primary party organization secretaries have been replaced in the current year alone.

A comprehensive analysis of the situation shows that some party organizations have lost their militancy and that party discipline has weakened. Considerable numbers of communists have become markedly more passive in defense of the party's ideological foundations and have sharply stepped up criticism of its activity. A demarcation of CPSU members along national lines has

emerged. A trend toward departure from the party at one's own request has appeared. This year more than 800 members of the CPSU, or as many as in all of last year, have handed in their party cards. There has been a marked reduction in the influx into the party, primarily of workers and the youth.

In speaking about the renewal of the Moldavian Communist Party we should be thinking primarily of its action program and choice of path by which it will proceed. Obviously, this is a fundamental issue, which is of concern to all Communists of the republic, and it must be answered by the congress also. Different approaches and currents within the Communist Party itself are emerging distinctly today. What are these currents?

Some of them—conservative—while sometimes appearing under slogans of perestroika, essentially do not accept the changes. They are calling for a "strengthening of socialism" and "preservation of the principles of Marxism-Leninism." However, what is understood by socialism here is the image of it which is deformed, but which is familiar and has been canonized in works of art and our consciousness. Others are proposing the path of slow, gradual reforms from above in the direction of the creation of a flexible, efficient economy and the measured democratization of society.

Ultra-radicals, whose credo has become the words "...let us raze to the ground, then....," have emerged recently. The people are not accepting the one, the other or the third. It is not extremes but actual, specific results which are needed, and the way to them lies through persevering labor. Naturally, such a process does not preclude but presupposes even the application of radical measures also.

Many people are asking: What kind of socialism are we building? There are many arguments on this score. This was the argument which took place at the Seventh Party Congress. N.I. Bukharin had proposed that the theoretical part of the program be supplemented by a comprehensive description of socialism and communism. V.I. Lenin emphatically disagreed with this amendment, noting here: "...there is nothing to be thought up here other than the fact that the principle—from each according to his capabilities, to each according to his needs—will then be implemented. But... to say this is to say nothing.... What kind of socialism it will be when it achieves finished form—this we do not know..." ("Complete Works," Vol 36, p 65).

After all the distorted ideas concerning socialism, we need to return to its Leninist understanding and remember constantly that Lenin spoke about an entire era of transition, a long succession of years, and about the fact that we do not as yet know what communism will be like. But we now wish to solve all problems inherited from the past in a stroke. We have, I believe, finally, clearly formulated intermediate goals and clearly understood and concretized problems. Their solution will take time, forces, and resources. The concept of

democratic, humane socialism or socialism with a human face—this is what attracts people. And for the party to become a consolidating, vanguard force it must be the core of a society of national concord and public consensus. The party must overcome extremes and a one-sided class approach and consider the interests of the working people, that is, the people of labor, both in the sphere of industry and the agro-industrial complex and of science, culture, and education. But it is important to proceed here not only from the social categories and strata of society which the party unites but to make paramount primarily the unifying socialist idea. This is particularly important today, when we are at a difficult stage of the restructuring process.

There arises in this connection the question: In what way may the party become a vanguard force uniting society?

Its conversion into a really popular independently operating political organization and its emergence from the present crisis condition are largely connected with the completion of the process of separation of the legislature, executive, and judiciary which has begun. Comrades, today we are witnesses to and participants in a process of the transfer of power from the party directly to the soviets at all levels. We have been speaking about this for decades, but only today is this a reality. The separation of functions is a principal goal of the party, set in the course of perestroika. Under these conditions the party has to change from being a directive, command party into a political force operating, like all others, solely within the framework of the constitution. And it is necessary not simply to operate but to set an example of respect for the principles of a state based on the rule of law. The Communist Party, as a political party, is obliged primarily to contribute to the execution of laws enacted on behalf of the people.

All these processes should be facilitated by a democratic mechanism presupposing the primacy of the masses in the shaping and realization of political decisions. Unfortunately, this is not happening in the party, where the primary organizations are only just beginning to be aware of their role and their power. This is not happening in the soviets, where the electorate has voted for its candidates, but has not yet created an instrument of real control of the actions of its elect. This is not happening in the public organizations, where the leadership is frequently divorced from its members and does not express their opinions.

In a word, the entire meaning of perestroika will be lost unless the ramified structure, created in society even on democratic foundations, is constantly under the supervision of the masses and constantly expresses that of which the masses are aware. Here is the main key to the further development of the entire democratic process in the republic.

We reject monopolism in any sphere—the economy, policy, theory, ideology, and the activity of parties—and recognize only the monopoly of the law. Society should

be governed not by individuals but laws. Whence the tactics: The Communists exercise supervision of the activity of the party authorities and their staffs, and the electorate regularly receives reports from its deputies and formulates the demands on them.

In presenting the constitutional initiative, the Moldavian Communist Party thereby broke emphatically with the old political model of a one-party society and relinquished the mission of being "responsible for each and everything." It is currently experiencing a complex, but inevitable process of conversion from a strictly centralized party into one based on truly democratic principles. Materialization of the idea of perestroika here has run into a party structure which has over the decades become ossified and frozen methods and forms of work. The directive style continues, as before, but a creative, impulsive, mobilizing style is needed.

To put it briefly, the party should be freeing itself more energetically from the omnipotence syndrome and decisively switching to methods of the advancement of ideas and initiatives with the subsequent organization of their implementation. This requires a fundamental break with the style of work. This is difficult, but only such a path will help us enhance the party's authority today. Nothing will be shaken up or changed for the better of its own accord. Each Communist must today recognize this, emerge from the trenches, and understand that the fate of our party and the fate of perestroika as a whole will depend on his personal position.

The new approaches may be realized through a strengthening of the ties to the masses and the profound democratization of intra-party life and personnel policy. And the first steps in this direction have already been taken. The schedule of positions of officials approved by the Central Committee Bureau has been abolished. It now incorporates merely party officials and party activists.

The multiple-choice approach when nominating Communists for elective bodies is becoming habitual. During the last campaign almost two-thirds of primary party organization secretaries and one-third of gorkom and raykom secretaries were elected from two and more candidates by the entire meeting or conference. This approach makes it possible to emphatically change the earlier practice of "pushing through" leaders from above, frequently without regard for local particularities, national included.

It is now obvious to everyone that the apparatus-hierarchical diktat, which had become firmly established in the past, led to the incapacity of many cadres to perform the role of authoritative political leader demanded by perestroika. It is largely for this reason that 56 first secretaries have been replaced in 49 gorkoms and raykoms in the past five years.

And what an enduring administrative cliché the practice of the endless "hearings" in the party committees had become! Their passive and, at times, formal examination diverted people from actual reality and real problems

and substituted for specific action, and the decisions which were adopted created the semblance of work. It is sufficient to say that hundreds of decisions had been adopted up to the recent past in the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, and up to 200 of them were under supervision annually. They frequently duplicated one another and were in some cases even contrary to the spirit of the times. This January the Central Committee Bureau removed the bulk of them from supervision. And canceled some decisions adopted in previous years pertaining to the Moldavian SSR Ministry of Health, the Polytechnical Institute, and the chief editorial office of the Short Soviet Encyclopedia as unwarranted.

It will be difficult to speak of democratization in the party without broadening the rights of the basis of the CPSU—the primary party organization. Unless there are fundamental changes here, the upper echelons will be powerless to implement this process in practice.

The primary party organization is at the source of the formation of the party ranks. This is a question of exceptional importance. The present devaluation of membership in the party is largely the result of the formal-bureaucratic approach to admission, which had become rooted over decades. More than 25,000 persons joined the CPSU following the 16th Moldavian Communist Party Congress, but over 10,000 have been expelled or have quit. Currently one out of every eight persons employed in the republic is a communist, yet we see at the same time that the level of party influence on the social and economic situation has declined. Hence the problem is not so much one of the quantity as of the quality of the party replenishment.

The primary party organization itself must decide which people it needs to accomplish political work in the labor collective. We must have both every opportunity for self-cleansing and freedom to leave the party for ideological and other reasons. In the recent past the mere formulation of this question would have shocked each of us. The fraudulent notion of complete party unity led to various forms of suppression of the minority. Party unity is achieved in the process of the constant concordance of different opinions and positions. But settled, organizationally structured groupings and factions should be excluded by statute. At the same time, however, the right of initiative, opinion, and defense of the minority, given its indisputable recognition of the CPSU Program and Rules, should be guaranteed.

The congress should have its say with all certainty apropos the opinions concerning the composition of the party purely according to the territorial principle. For a parliamentary party this is justified, but for a political vanguard party like the CPSU the aspiration to preserve its influence in the industrial outfits and other organizations is natural.

But we must forecast the future also. We sense the mood in society, after all, and it amounts to the fact that, given

a multiparty system, a political party should operate according to the place of residence. The first steps toward the creation of such organizations are being taken here. Party organizations uniting collective farm, teacher, and other party organizations located on the territory of a given soviet are being formed in the villages. Similar work has begun in the cities also. Neighborhood secretary councils have been organized in places, dual registration of CPSU members—in the industrial outfits and according to the place of residence—is being conducted and the structure of the apparatus of the raykoms, with party officials being sent to work according to their place of residence, is being changed.

We are inclined to support the proposal of a number of party committees concerning the formation of a republic primary party organization secretary council. We believe that it could be a collective democratic body expressing the opinion of the party masses. The council would present specific proposals to republic party authorities of all levels, perform coordinating functions, and participate in the social protection of the party organization secretaries. Such a proposal could be realized at republic city and rayon level also. We see the council as a specific mechanism eliminating the gap between the Communists and the party leadership and the party committee apparatus.

A time of change strictly and unambiguously dictates the need for fundamental changes in the role and place of the gorkoms and raykoms, which are closest to the party masses and which perform political work directly among the population. The Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has granted them complete financial independence upon determination of the structure of the apparatus and the strength of units of staff. We consider unacceptable the proposals concerning the abolition of the raykoms as a superfluous component between the Central Committee and the primary party organizations. We should preserve party influence in the administrative regions and coordinate the actions of the Communists of the city or rayon.

Now concerning the elective party authorities and the place of the apparatus. In the eyes of public opinion it is the apparatus which is, as before, the exponent of power, not the elective authorities. This is why restructuring in the party may be conducted only by reducing the apparatus and seeking a real transfer of power to the elective bodies.

The process of electivity at the time of the formation of the directive party components is intensifying in the Moldavian Communist Party. In the course of the recent reports and elections the Communists directly determined the composition of the gorkoms and raykoms. If, however, we are speaking of the personal composition of the Central Committee which we are to elect, the preliminary proposals on this score were formulated by the corresponding commission with regard for the opinion of the party organizations and the delegates to rayon and

city party conferences. I believe that granting the party organizations the right to directly elect delegates to congresses and conferences is insufficient. We should supplement this provision by the right to directly elect the directive bodies of the city and rayon party organizations also.

It would seem necessary also to develop a mechanism to form the composition of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission directly at congresses of the union republic communist parties and conferences of kray and oblast party organizations. For example, thought could be given to the establishment of a certain number of members of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission for the party organizations of a national republic, kray, and oblast. In this case we would elect them here at home and, if necessary, recall them.

Practice demands insistently that the process of democratization fully encompass the formation of the party apparatus. It is a question of open discussion in the primary party organizations and the work force and in the press of the nominations for promotion to party work. The competitive filling of vacant positions and collective fitness reports on officials of the apparatus should become habitual practice.

It might, possibly, be necessary to move toward a greater rotation of the apparatus and the transfer of some members of the Central Committee and the gorkoms and raykoms to full-time work. The party committee, for example, will be elected, and some of its members will become full-time party officials with certain assurances of a return, when their specified term has expired, to their former place of work. Such approaches will force the staff of the apparatus not to divorce itself from the party masses, to answer to the communist rank and file for its activity and to always be within its view.

It is necessary to emphatically abandon the former stereotypes of selecting communists for party work—by occupation, specialty, position, obligatory attainment of official grades and other questionnaire pointers. The intellectual potential of the party should be shaped and should grow thanks to the replenishment of the party apparatus by people of new, free, independent thinking and a new style of action.

With regard for impending discussion at a congress, a new Central Committee Bureau could study and submit at a Central Committee plenum proposals pertaining to the structure and list of personnel of the apparatus. Currently it is difficult in practice for an instructor, for example, to address the secretary directly: There are before him the head of the division, the deputy head of the department, the head of the department and so forth. It is easy for a bright idea to get lost in this hierarchy on the way up. Why not, for example, have in the Central Committee a group of secretaries for the main areas of party work with their own advisers, temporary artistic groups, and public commissions? Some things we are

already doing. Groups of scientists, specialists and representatives of the artistic intelligentsia and public movements, which will render qualified assistance at the time of the elaboration of one strategic question or another, are being formed under the auspices of Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee departments. But none of this, of course, should substitute for what is most important—the need to constantly be among people and check one's practical actions against them.

The guarantee of the inner moral renewal of the party should be the formation of a new authority for monitoring the activity of all components of it and the communists—auditing commissions. They have already been created locally. It will be necessary to clearly determine the functions, rights, and duties for these authorities in the structure of the Moldavian Communist Party.

Political leadership will be successful given its assured collegiality. I would like in this connection to express certain thoughts pertaining to the work of the future Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and Secretariat. It would seem expedient to enlarge the Bureau to 21 persons, say, in order that it might represent various categories of communists. Within the sphere of its activity is the organization of fulfillment of the program of renewal of the Moldavian Communist Party, coordination of the actions of the Central Committee commissions, work with the local party authorities, and interaction with the organs of state power and the public organizations. The composition of the Secretariat also could be increased, concentrating it on work with the apparatus and the supervision of performance.

One further point, which was not touched on at our congresses earlier—party economic activity. It is not fortuitous that we are focusing on this question. A political organization cannot be strong without a robust material base. Today's realities suggest to us a new approach: Owning property in whose growth each communist would have an interest. It would in time, obviously, be perfectly possible to create on the basis of party resources share capital, acquire credit from the state bank, purchase plants, and build new enterprises. All this would constitute the party's collective property. Some practical steps in this direction are already being taken. The creation, on a contractual basis in conjunction with an alliance of scientific and technological firms, of an enterprise for the production of consumer goods; the publication by the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Publishing House of a profitable printed product in increased demand; and the use of the hotel complex for services for overseas tourist organizations for the purpose of attracting currency proceeds are planned.

The party committees locally could be accorded the right to act as founders of public and state associations and societies and enterprises and to finance them from their own resources. A real opportunity would emerge for

disposal of a social fund for material assistance to pensioner party members and for organization of the recreation of communists' families and for acts of charity. In a word, the idea would seem very fruitful and promising.

Ideology of Renewal for Perestroika

Comrades! Our congress is called upon to formulate the main directions of the Moldavian Communist Party's ideological work. For this we must answer the main question: What should the ideology of perestroika be? We will not extricate ourselves from ideological impasses until we understand that society is capable of developing only in a struggle of ideas, given the comparison and mutual enrichment of different views, positions, and outlooks precluding a return to the past and the times of stagnation. Renunciation of the monopoly claim to the truth, not only the permissibility but also the necessity of dissidence, and the priority of values common to all mankind—this is the alpha and omega of the ideology of perestroika.

At recent Central Committee plenums and also in the draft program of renewal of the republic Communist Party we have plainly stated that we are not renouncing the socialist choice and, consequently, Marxist-Leninist teaching. The simple truth of Marxism, that ideology should grow from an analysis of practice and not from some people's contrived dogma, was, unfortunately, swept aside until recently. Somewhere in the center theories were concocted, and political leaders locally quickly caught up with them.

In this sense perestroika has taught us a historic lesson, having proclaimed the categorical rejection of all that is unscientific, fraudulent, and dogmatized. But it is not the socialist idea itself which is being rejected, as our opponents are trying to portray, but all that is obsolete and outmoded. We see now more than ever an extensive field of activity for scholarship, for the social scientists particularly. In the years of stagnation scholarship was under particular political supervision and came within a strict framework of ideologization. But today, when all the barriers have been cleared away from the path of scientific cognition, some social scientists are having difficulty parting with the myths and cliches of the past. For example, the vulgar ideologization of questions of ownership, which we have yet to overcome, is merely intimidating people and holding back their transition to the new forms of management. All this is objectively harming perestroika. At the same time, however, we say "no" to the eclectic theories of latter-day "radical reformers," those who, worshipping Marx yesterday, are today beginning to abuse him and reject the socialist idea itself.

It needs to be said plainly that our historians are still being slow to involve themselves in cognition of the "blanks" of the past. At the same time, however, there are many superficial, opportunist attacks, unworthy of

serious scholarship, in the attempts to reexamine time-tested assessments. The Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee has already pronounced on the need for an objective and cogent illustration of the events of 1812, 1917, 1918 and 1940. Until recently these events were presented tendentiously, in obeisance to political diktat and prevailing conditions. History does not need to be either corrected or improved, it needs to be presented truthfully. And the mass-meeting approach to awareness of our history contains a serious danger for emotions; militant dilettantism, bias, and a facile approach are predominant here in the evaluation of events. We are sure that the time of see-sawing and extremes will pass and that people will calmly try to grasp history and give thought to our heroic and tragic past and will then understand the present.

Specific steps have been taken in the plane of restructuring our party institutions. Thus by a decision of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau, the Party History Institute has been converted into the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Social and Political Studies Institute. The main aspect of its work should be an in-depth analysis of social and political phenomena and processes and the disclosure from scientific standpoints of the political activity of the republic Communist Party. This, in our view, will help reorient the institute's work from historical verification toward urgent problems of perestroika.

We have conferred with the raykoms and deem it expedient to convert the University of Marxism-Leninism; the party, soviet, and ideological personnel improvement courses; and the Political Education Center into a single Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee political culture center. The center's main functions will be to train professional party and ideological personnel and a reserve of them; scientific and methods assistance to communists receiving instruction; the organization of briefing, mass-political, and educational work with various categories of the population; the development of cooperation with future parties and public organizations. We hope that the congress delegates will suggest the type of main political center of the Moldavian Communist Party that this should be.

Particular emphasis, in our view, should be put on the development of dialogue, enrichment of the content, and improvement in the practice of the activity of the social and political centers and the staging of political debate.

The party committees need to assimilate new formulas of political influence on the masses and create various centers in the neighborhoods and at facilities for spreading culture among the masses. In other words, political canvassing should be geared to imparting new impetus to the restructuring processes, switching them to a constructive channel and filling in the vacuum which has emerged in our ideological influence on the masses.

The Party Press

Before reporting to the congress on the concept of a restructuring of the party press, I would like to set forth the viewpoint of the Central Committee on this matter. There is no doubt that the press, television, and radio have done much for the development of democratization and glasnost, criticism of the shortcomings and mistakes of the past, and ascertainment of the factors impeding the restructuring processes. At the same time individual mass media have embarked on the path of clamorous editorial fratricide and are permitting publications of a dubious nature.

Our policy in this field cannot fail to take account of actual political realities and the emergence in the near future of an alternative and, to a certain extent, opposition press and various "independent," commercial, and cooperative publications. The process of separation of the party and soviet press at rayon and city level and the creation of independent publications has now already begun. Under these conditions the party committees need to interact better with the press organs of the new state and public formations, not renouncing powerful levers of influence on public opinion.

An entirely new situation for the party committees will be created by the enactment of the law on the press and other mass media. However, it should be considered that it will affect only the legal aspects of the relations of the mass media and the party authorities. The party's political influence on the activity of the press, on the other hand, is not regulated by legislative enactments. And here it is a question primarily of the formulation of entirely different forms of relations between the party committees and their press organs, based on complete trust and mutual understanding. That which is financed by the party and is its property is at our disposal. We do not, of course, have the right to hand it over to anyone else.

It ensues from all that has been said that there is today an urgent need to strengthen the party press and change its structure in accordance with the demands of the times. To avoid disagreement in newspapers' evaluation of one and the same event it is proposed to create as an intermediate step an editorial council headed by a Central Committee secretary. Subsequently, as of the new year, having a single organ—the newspaper MOLDOVA SOCHIALISTE—in Moldavian and Russian and a weekly based on SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian.

It is planned to convert the rayon and city press: In the cities of Kishinev, Beltsy, Bendery, and Rybnitsa the party organs will have their own papers independently. It is deemed expedient, with regard for the experience of a number of communist parties of the union republics and foreign countries, to create 12 party zonal publications—newspapers of the Central Committee covering the territory of several rayons financed from the party budget.

In other instances the raykoms may continue the publication of newspapers in conjunction with the soviets on a share basis or create their own publications, provided they are profitable. For the fuller satisfaction of the cultural requirements of the Gagauz and the Bulgarians, the SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA supplements ANA SOZU and RODNO SLOVO will become newspapers of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee with their conversion into a weekly publication. It is essential that the Central Committee also give thought to its own information agency and the effective use of the ideological potential of television and radio. These questions require additional study.

The Intelligentsia and Perestroika

Effective work on the utmost stimulation of society's intellectual and spiritual potential and reliance on the intelligentsia is a most important condition of the party's retention of the role of leading political force. The mistakes and deformations permitted on a countrywide scale in the party's attitude toward the intelligentsia have been mentioned repeatedly from a high political platform. Many people in our republic are inclined to place the blame for the complex situation which has come about on representatives of the intelligentsia. Let us attempt to investigate as to whether this is the case or not.

Back in 1968 Academician A.P. Lupan, elder statesman of Moldavian writers, wrote to I.I. Bodyul, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee: "...I declare, and am prepared to answer for my words, that ideological scandals, particularly in connection with national culture and the intelligentsia, have been blown up artificially in the republic in recent years.... Unless this is discussed with party-minded candor, the party's best efforts in the business of cultural building in Moldavia will be ruined." With the same candor and boldness Andrey Lupan wrote to the CPSU Central Committee about the campaign which had been whipped up in the republic "to combat" nationalism, in the course of which honest writers had been defamed and Romanian and Moldavian classics destroyed.

In the swampy mire of the years of stagnation the writer's concern for his native language and culture was not, nor could it have been, heard. But even in the years of perestroika the republic's party leadership remained for a long time just as deaf to the distress of representatives of the artistic intelligentsia over the fate of their people. The fruitlessness of their attempts to convey their distress to the party leaders brought about a crisis of confidence, which, it needs to be said plainly, has still not been overcome.

Effective party influence on all spheres of the life of society may be secured only to the extent that the party, by virtue of the incontrovertible soundness of its position, is able in practice to capture people's hearts and minds. In formulating this position we proceed from the fact that it is essential to heed and take account of all

healthy arguments, from whomever they emanate, but that this should not lead to lack of principle and opportunism. We have a right to expect this from the intelligentsia also.

Society's increased interest in its past, present, and future has also immediately been latched onto by those whose highly middling artistic product has always been created in accordance with the "demand determines supply" formula. Please understand me correctly—I am not calling for prohibition. We had enough prohibition when, quite recently even, the raykom, say, would assume leadership of the republic Writers Union. What came of this we can all see for ourselves. But turning the stage into a rostrum, a concert into a mass meeting, and a story into a political manifesto, is assuming the nature of a mass phenomenon, about which we simply cannot remain silent.

The trend toward the commercialization of culture is giving rise to serious concern also. The aspiration to profitability at all costs could do irreparable damage to society's spiritual potential. Without denying the need for the introduction of certain elements of financial autonomy, we advocate state financial support for culture and art and the creation of the conditions for the development of the culture of all the nationalities residing on the territory of the republic and a reorientation of cultural and educational activity from quantitative to qualitative indicators.

The full-fledged development of society is inconceivable without an intelligentsia trained to the level of the demands of the times. A fundamental improvement in the entire system, education, and the training of personnel for the republic is essential.

To this end thought should be given, possibly, to the creation of a fundamentally new type of schools for gifted children in the main, base sectors of science and technology and the concentration of the best scientists and teachers here. The same training could also be practiced in the best educational institutions of the country and the most developed countries.

Particular attention should be paid to such a leading stratum of the people's intelligentsia as the teachers. The teacher is called upon to preserve and transmit from generation to generation the traditions, honor, conscience, and spiritual wealth of the people.

Unfortunately, the events of recent years and the situation in which the teachers have found themselves today show as clearly as could be our miscalculations and flagrant mistakes in work with this detachment of the intelligentsia. Work with the teachers was conducted by command methods, and party influence in the teacher collectives degenerated into a system of clichés and unthinking activities for activities' sake. Outstanding personalities were chopped off from innovative teaching and active public activity. The school party organizations were weakened. A negative part was also played by

the unsolved nature of many of the teachers' social problems (housing, wages, conditions of work, and recreation).

Today, when it is a question of the creation of a new model of the modern school—the national school, which should be based on the entirety of the cultural and historical heritage of the people—rejecting the methods of the past, we advocate the direct and daily contact of the party committees and the teacher collectives, their close interaction and the communists' active participation in the renewal of the school.

The Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee proceeds from the fact that the school and the educational system are efficient only provided that the teacher recognizes himself not as a simple executor of instructions coming from above but a full-fledged, convinced fighter for our ideals. In this connection I would like to particularly emphasize the importance of the qualitatively new training of teacher personnel. There are many problems here, and a special action program in this sphere is needed, evidently.

Toward National Consensus

Comrades! Among the urgent problems which have become exacerbated in the course of implementing perestroika, interethnic relations come to the fore. This sphere is today one of the most complex key issues in the life of society. We cannot live and work normally, build up the economy, and develop science, education, and culture when the bitter wormwood of mistrust and hostility is growing in our daily life and when people living here are being divided along national lines.

The reasons for the complication of interethnic relations cannot be explained merely by the intrigues of "enemies" and a variety of nationalists and chauvinists. The roots here are considerably deeper and more complex. They go back to Stalin's interpretation of the phenomenon of the nation, which reduced problems of national development merely to socioeconomic aspects. The obvious fact that national forms of social life function according to their own laws and must transform policy in the sphere of the economy and social and cultural development was ignored here.

And today, after many decades of deformations, falsification, and hypocrisy, it is necessary to understand the cherished hopes and the aspiration of the Moldavian people, as of others also, to their national revival. The language and distinctive culture of Moldavians have come to be in a difficult situation in our republic, the development of history has been interpreted in distorted manner and whole periods and many events have been wrested from their context. Traditions and customs of the people have passed into nonexistence and all hints at the community of the ethnic roots, culture, and language of Moldavians and Romanians have been cut short in the guise of internationalization. "After-dinner" internationalism and toasts to the "elder brother," whose situation was no better than that of other peoples, thrived.

We are emerging from this state agonizingly slowly, and part of the population is, as before, subject to the "seniority" mentality, which is also where the nostalgia for a "firm hand" comes from, but firmness here is interpreted at times in a primitive and one-sided fashion.

In this connection I would also like to touch on the following point, which, it seems to us, is of both psychological and simply practical significance for the normalization of interethnic relations. Thus the laws on the official nature of Moldavian and the restoration to it of the Latin script in the cities of Tiraspol, Bendery, and Rybnitsa and certain southern regions have essentially been suspended. A Supreme Soviet session made changes to the Moldavian SSR Constitution entitled, "The National Flag"—a negative attitude once again. Granted all the complexity of these problems, we believe that communists must be trailblazers and set an example in realization of the enacted laws.

The Central Committee Bureau recently expressed its attitude toward these facts. The Communists must in practice advocate a state based on the rule of law, in which an enacted law really is a law, which may be discussed, but should be complied with unswervingly. We are sure that the aspiration to assist the national revival of the Moldavian people will be perceived by them with gratitude and evaluated at its worth. Such an understanding would not be a "one-way street." And it is the party organizations and the communists, regardless of their national affiliation, who should, primarily, be heading this work.

I have one proposal in this connection—presenting on behalf of the congress the following initiative: Declaring 31 August, when Moldavian was proclaimed the official language, a celebration of the Moldavian language. (applause) We could on this day show the beauty and richness of our language and thereby attract to study it many interested persons. This celebration could rightly become a celebration of the unity and consolidation of all inhabitants of Moldavia. (applause)

We support national traditions, the utmost development of culture and the accessibility of cultural values to all members of society. We share the aspiration of the artistic unions to independence and diversity of creative methods and schools, styles, and forms, and the publication, exposition, demonstration, and performance of works without administrative interference and the pressure of the censor. This is in the channel of democratization and glasnost, unless, of course, it is connected with trends of racism, chauvinism, and nationalism hostile toward morality, national dignity, and humanity and the kindling of interethnic discord and violence.

We should with the same measure of concern and understanding approach the creation of all the necessary conditions for the development of the language and culture and preservation of the customs and traditions of the main national groups residing in the republic—

Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, and Jews. I would like to emphasize particularly that the Gagauz are in need of the most help. Moldavia is essentially the land where they could develop their language and culture to the greatest extent, and it is for this reason essential to assist them more objectively at the official level in the solution of these questions.

Proceeding from historical particularities, we should also think through and decide questions of the creation of cultural autonomy for the Ukrainians living in Moldavia and at the same time for Moldavians living in the Ukraine. It is a question of the opening of kindergarten, schools, technical schools, and theaters, a revival of traditions and provision of a press and of assistance in the development of the amateur arts, book publishing, and television and radio broadcasting in the national languages. It is necessary that the newly elected Central Committee, in conjunction with the republic government, establish close working contacts with the Ukrainian SSR to this end.

No less important is the question of cooperation with Romania. We have already spoken about our position. It proceeds from the affinity of culture and language and the many historical parallels of the Romanian and Moldavian peoples. On conditions of mutual arrangement, as a sovereign state, we will extensively develop relations in the sphere of the economy, science, culture, education, publishing, exchange of specialists, and so forth. I see no obstacles here, and relations between our two countries should develop in a multilevel and comprehensive manner on the basis of mutual observance of the realities of postwar Europe and the Helsinki accords.

The Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee has already evaluated the deformations on the nationality issue which occurred in Moldavia and has emphatically condemned them. The draft program for renewal of the Moldavian Communist Party for the 17th Congress outlines a set of practical measures on this plane. While espousing national revival, the Moldavian Communist Party rejects theories and views which make an absolute of national exclusiveness and lead to national egocentrism or chauvinism. We should understand the dangerous consequences of these two extreme viewpoints and convey to people's consciousness an understanding that peace and tranquillity in our home and the republic's well-being begin with the legal protection of each citizen. It is necessary to bring the whole pyramid of rights into line with international provisions, where pride of place is given human rights and the rights of the individual. These principles must be reflected in republic legislation also.

Our position is as follows: Following the congress' discussion and adoption of the platform of renewal, the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee intends to present a number of legislative initiatives, on national problems included. It is a question, specifically, of draft legislative enactments concerning the political and economic sovereignty of the Moldavian SSR, legal

guarantees of the national minorities, new treaties with the Union and the other republics which are members of the renewed Soviet Federation and so forth.

The gorkoms and raykoms and primary party organizations should take the initiative in the formulation of national problems, not delay in the discussion of urgent matters, and propose specific methods for their solution. It is very important that it be the communists who in each work outfit create an atmosphere of rejection of chauvinism, nationalism, and anti-Semitism and unite and rally people. This is particularly important when we are dealing with the most "combustible" material—the youth. We must not lose sight of the fact that it is in the youth environment that national estrangement and conflicts make themselves acutely felt. It is the youth which is predisposed toward rash impetuous actions, political bravado, and immoderate emotions.

Practice insistently advances the need for the creation of a flexible mechanism to control national building in the republic. We support the idea of the establishment of a Moldavian SSR state committee for nationality issues and the formation of special commissions in the local soviets. It would also make sense to revive structures of the national areas and rural soviets and create scientific subdivisions under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences and other of the republic's research centers. Questions of language, traditions and customs, the revival of culture, and the harmonization of interethnic relations should be within the sphere of their attention.

Mention should be made also of our attitude toward religion. It should correspond to the new level of political thinking. We adopt an understanding attitude toward the humane peace-making activity of the church and its aspiration to preserve moral values.

Working in the Name of Man

Comrades! The Moldavian Communist Party sees as its main task the consolidation and development of the political and social guarantees of the inhabitants of the republic and the constant growth of their well-being.

The firmness and certainty of this position is all the more necessary since our opponents are insinuating increasingly often the idea that the Communist Party should step aside from these problems. Yes, we reject the former approach to interference in the economy, but socioeconomic policy should be the core of the republic Communist Party's practical activity. Without this, without participation in the accomplishment of specific assignments affecting the people's life, the party cannot exist.

While emphatically desisting from substitution for the soviet and economic authorities, we are at the same time obliged to know the state of affairs in depth, to possess a system of views, and to arm the working people with a clear understanding of the current and long-term aims and tasks in this sphere.

We are today engaged in a torturous quest for ways to extricate the republic economy from stagnation, overcome the backwardness of the social sphere, and eradicate incompetence and lack of responsibility in the management of the national economy. The situation here is ambivalent and contradictory. On the one hand there have been improvements in individual areas of socioeconomic development, on the other, a sharp intensification, particularly in the past two years, of the imbalance in the economy and an exacerbation of old and the appearance of new problems.

There are many reasons for this stemming from the stagnation and administrative-command times. A number of them pertain to the present restructuring years also. What is the blind fulfillment of the decision "Measures To Overcome Drunkenness and Alcoholism" worth under the conditions of our republic! To be blunt, the results in the national economy have been influenced by both the strikes which occurred in the latter half of 1989 and the exacerbation of the social and political situation as a whole.

What do we see as the ways out of the current situation? The draft program for renewal of the Moldavian Communist Party reveals the main ones and emphasizes the need for the economy's reorientation toward man. The housing problem is seen as a priority. The Central Committee Bureau has this year studied the progress of its solution. The conclusions are, to be plain, disturbing. In the current five-year plan the list of those in need of improved housing conditions has grown by one-third and is in excess of 200,000 families. This is felt particularly keenly in Kishinev, where more than 70,000 are in need of accommodations, including 1,600 persons who have been on the list for over 20 years.

Numerous decisions on this most important question have been thwarted. But, as in the former bad times, no communist leader of the republic or sectoral ministries and departments has been punished for this. People are asking, why this lack of responsibility? It is essential to draw serious conclusions and declare on behalf of the congress that the solution of the housing problem must be the paramount concern of all soviet authorities and economic agencies and public organizations and be at the center of the attention of party personnel.

The population of the republic is worried also by the situation in the consumer market. On the one hand commodity turnover is growing rapidly, on the other, the population's unsatisfied demand, which is presently in excess of R1.5 billion, persists. A reason for the current situation is the inadequate use of the possibilities of the republic's industry for increasing the manufacture of consumer goods. Example, how do we explain the fact that, given more than 20 enterprises of an electrical engineering and instrument-making profile, inhabitants of Moldavia have for years been unable to acquire ordinary electrical home appliances? Many plants are not manufacturing consumer goods in short supply at all.

Cooperative activity is, it might have seemed, designed to serve man's interests. Given its correct organization, the population could obtain a tangible addition in consumer services and basic necessities and their selection and quality. The cooperative workers themselves would benefit also. We should support such a policy in every possible way. However, last year the population accounted for only 15 percent of the sum total of products and services of the co-operators totaling over R1 billion. Services to enterprises and organizations accounted for all the rest. We consider such a phenomenon abnormal. People are angered by the speculative excesses in the cooperative movement. At the same time no proper action is perceived here at republic government level. Nor are the local soviets adopting specific measures to bring order to bear here. The cooperative system should be operating primarily in the interests of man.

As you know, health care remains one of the republic's serious social problems. Despite the fact that in the current five-year plan expenditure on the needs of this sector has more than doubled, this is little cause for satisfaction. The morbidity and mortality of the adult population are high in Moldavia, as before. In order to change this situation we need to strengthen the physical plant of health care and build hospitals, maternity homes, outpatient clinics, and paramedic-midwifery centers. We need to change work and social conditions and people's way of life and their attitude toward their own health.

Allocations from the budget and enterprise funds for environmental protection needs have been increased by a factor of 1.5 for the purpose of protecting man's surroundings. However, the population's concern for the future of the republic is not abating. Particularly for the fate of precious Moldavian land, its sparse waters and its few forests. This concern is justified. It is the duty of the party, soviet, and economic authorities to address this problem. The more so in that the ecology is that abundant soil in which the seeds of the beneficial cooperation of people, regardless of nationality, and of all public movements and parties may bountifully grow.

Concern for the social strata and groups of the population which are in need of priority assistance: women and children, young families and also invalids and veterans of war and labor should be at the center of our Communist Party's socioeconomic policy. On the Central Committee's initiative the government has adopted measures to increase pensions for individual categories of citizens. We need to give thought to improving material provision for students.

Many questions could be tackled more assertively by the work outfits also, the majority of which have extensive financial and other possibilities. For example, it will be necessary to work soundly on a set of measures to alleviate women's work. Our republic has one of the highest proportions in the country of women working the second shift.

The last population census showed that not all is well as regards the demographic situation. There is a decline in the birthrate. Many of our fellow citizens have for various reasons been forced to move out of the republic. In the last four years the number of persons employed in the national economy has declined by 24,000. This will continue to be a developing trend. There continues here to be natural population increase the seriousness of the matter is increased by the seasonal nature of the work in agriculture, where, as before, considerable numbers of workers work only six or seven months of the year [sentence as published]. This is why on a number of urgent socioeconomic problems the new Central Committee and Communist leaders of the Supreme Soviet and the government of Moldavia have to take into consideration the question of employment of the population and control of its migration. We support the adoption as quickly as possible of a special republic program and law on employment of the population. It is important to embark on the realization of specific measures in this area.

A good example is being set here by enterprises of the "Moldlegprom" concern, which have opened 50 branches in the regions. It is planned to double or triple their number in the next few years. It is a question of the development of small enterprises for processing agricultural products and manufacturing foodstuffs and general amenity commodities and household articles. Our positions on this problem were set forth in a recent decision of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau.

For Priority Development of the Agrarian Sector

Comrades! The program of renewal of the Moldavian Communist Party reveals the main paths for a solution of the food problem. What may be said in this connection at the congress? We have every opportunity for the normal provision of the population with foodstuffs. However, all this is operating inefficiently.

Reflected in the slow development of the agro-industrial complex have been major miscalculations of past years such as administrative interference, disregard for agricultural science, economic and ecological laws, and local conditions, and the constant, at times simply contrived, reorganizations of managerial structures, and figure padding. As a result of such management huge resources were essentially invested fruitlessly in the construction of the Danube-Yalpug-Tarakliya water complex, and R30 million were swallowed up by the drip-irrigation system, which has essentially failed to justify itself. There has been a shortfall in this five-year plan alone in the assimilation of R150 million in the expansion and modernization of the production facilities of the processing industry. As a result, per capita production in the republic has in the last decade grown only five percent.

We should all help the communists working in the agro-industrial complex change the situation decisively

and afford scope for wide-ranging initiative and enterprise. Moldavia can and must be self-sufficient in food and fulfill contract commitments pertaining to food supplies outside of the republic. It is necessary also to channel toward the needs of the rural workers the activity of the 10 food and tractor and agricultural machine-building plants in our republic.

Particular mention should be made of the social development of the countryside, to which we are all greatly in arrears. It has now become fashionable to speak about this. But what is needed is practical action to eliminate the disproportion, compared with the city, which has been allowed to occur here. Only half the villages have cultural centers, two-thirds have service centers and many of them lack bathhouses. And provision with roads, water mains, and other municipal services? Congress delegates will surely agree that the time has come for us to have an official program for the social development of the countryside. The Moldavian Communist Party will seek its elaboration and implementation. The basis of this policy should be a new agrarian policy incorporating a reallocation of investments in favor of the countryside, a reexamination of purchase prices, the development of leasing and private farming, an improvement in the peasants' work conditions, and the granting to them of economic independence. It is necessary to solve not in words but in deeds the problem of preserving farm produce and its local processing. In short, the slogan "what's good for the peasant is good for the republic" needs to be invested with practical content.

The peasants need big support in all things. They need it particularly under the difficult conditions of the current year, when agriculture suffered losses totaling R550 million because of the spring frosts alone. In addition, a big harvest shortfall is expected owing to the drought which has set in and which has hit the republic's southern areas the hardest.

I would like to emphasize in this connection that lack of personal responsibility in the management of the agrarian economy and personnel of various levels dodging the solution of urgent problems—the nonintervention of some and the lack of responsibility of others—have come to be observed under the conditions of the growing production democracy and economic independence and the delineation of functions among party, soviet, and economic authorities, which represents a great danger to the realization of our plans.

For the Successful Implementation of Economic Reform

Among the most important tasks of the Moldavian Communist Party in the period immediately ahead is political influence on recovery of the economic situation in the republic.

A number of fundamental laws has been enacted in the country recently—on leasing, on land, on property, on local self-government and the local economy, and on economic relations between the center and the republics. Other legal documents, which will make it possible to

implement a whole set of measures pertaining to radicalization of the economic reform, are on the way.

Similar enactments are to be developed and adopted in the republic also. The Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers has published a concept of Moldavia's preparation for transition as of next 1 January to conditions of self-financing. However, it needs to be said plainly that things have not progressed beyond the concept—there is no clear-cut program of economic reform. An intensive, creative atmosphere is not perceived in the economic departments, and they are working in the channel of the old traditions. There are no bold ideas, proposals, or alternatives. Nothing new in principle has been contributed to the restructuring of the management of the national economy by the approval two years ago of a master plan, which was, incidentally, extensively publicized. Yes, the number of ministries and departments has declined. But has the administrative-managerial echelon diminished here? In many cases there has been a change of signs, a move from some premises to others, a renaming of structures and the emergence of so-called "snowdrops," when managers take refuge behind a working office. But essentially things have remained unchanged. The question arises: Who needs such arm-chair shuffles?

There has been much talk recently about the union enterprises. A thousands-strong detachment of the working class and engineering intelligentsia largely determining the republic's industrial character and its scientific and technological potential works here. We advocate the transfer of the majority of union enterprises to local jurisdiction, particularly those which manufacture consumer goods. Such proposals are still being drawn up. In places it may be necessary to open somewhat wider the doors to the conversion of production and give thought, together with the work outfits, to the reprofiling of a number of production bays. But it is important here not to be carried away by the formal aspect. It should be a question not simply of the jurisdiction of one enterprise or another to someone or other. This is the past. Each enterprise must be fully independent and connected primarily by economic levers with local, republic, and union authorities.

The economic reform demands a fundamental restructuring of the system of personnel training. The Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee condemns the current practice of bringing personnel up to strength by bringing in people from outside the republic. We see as the way out of this situation the formulation of a well-considered concept of the training of our own specialists for the national economy. This does not mean that we need to confine ourselves to our own framework. On the contrary, we need to move toward cooperation, send young people to be trained in other republics and overseas, and create, in conjunction with foreign companies and educational institutions, affiliates and centers here, locally.

Today in each area of the economy there should be people of the new thinking and high competence. There arises in this connection the question of the role of the higher school. This important problem requires special examination in the republic Supreme Soviet and the government.

The most important thing now is to include everyone in the realization of the new opportunities for management and enterprise which have been granted. Unfortunately, the work is developing impermissibly slowly. In industry, for example, only eight percent of enterprises have switched to leasehold. Of course, it is not a question of pushing doubters from the rear. Times change, as they say. But it is essential for economists to investigate why this is the case, as, equally, for them to formulate conditions of interaction profitable to the lessee and the state.

The strategy of perestroika and the economic reform are based on science. However, its potential is, as before, insufficiently oriented toward the economy and toward man. We cannot fail to be disturbed by the low level of introduction of the achievements of scientific and technological progress. Unfortunately, the forms of management which are in effect at the present time are not stimulating its development. One can easily see this in the example of our republic, where one out of every three workers in industry and one out of every two in construction are working manually, as they did dozens of years ago. The Communists and the party organizations of the research establishments and enterprises and organizations are called upon to change fundamentally their attitude toward these most important problems and find new, modern forms and methods of influencing the state of affairs.

We have to look further into many aspects of the economic reform. The path has proven far more difficult than was anticipated. A tremendous amount of work on restructuring property relations lies ahead. The preparations for transition to a controlled market economy are giving rise to an intense wave of arguments and debate about the economic reform. A specific government program on the transition to market relations will, evidently, be published in the very near future.

We must tell the people today, plainly and candidly, that the transition to the market will be a long and painful process. Nonetheless, all world experience has shown that there is no other way to a modern highly efficient economy receptive to scientific and technological progress and consumer-oriented.

At the same time, however, we believe that the introduction of market relations must necessarily be accompanied by the creation of a kind of social "armor"—a guaranteed right to labor, income indexing with regard for a change in prices and the obligatory assurance of a subsistence minimum. We advocate the creation of a mechanism for the social protection of the population, of its needy strata particularly. The Moldavian Communist

Party will seek the implementation of specific measures to ensure that the working people experience the transition to a controlled state market economy as painlessly as possible.

For the Republic's Sovereignty and the Independence of the Moldavian Communist Party

Comrades! We would not be mistaken were we to say that the whole population of the republic is seriously disturbed by the question: What future awaits Moldavia? There are at least two answers: either remaining within a renewed federation or becoming an independent state. Both answers are complex. We must take account of political realities not only here, in the Union, but in the world also. We must here on the difficult path to the sovereignty and independence of the republic and its Communist Party find a common language primarily within our own ranks, that is, a position excluding all suspicion and innuendo.

We are not as yet ready to offer the congress delegates a finished model of the republic's sovereignty. After all, we cannot speak about our independence without regard for the development of the situation in the Union or in our future European home either. But this does not mean that we need to occupy a wait-and-see position. We could formulate the draft status of our republic in a renewed federation or confederation. Waiting until other models are foisted upon us is too risky. Life's lesson, as they say. And here also the Central Committee should, to all appearances, display the initiative. It makes sense to create an organizing group of members of the new Central Committee and people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR and instruct them to draw up a concept of the republic's sovereignty.

What is our vision of economic sovereignty? Primarily it means the ownership of the land, its interior, mineral and raw material resources, forests, water, other natural resources, the basic means of production, transport, and financial-credit institutions. An important condition of sovereignty is the assured independence of the organs of state and economic administration in the formulation and adoption of decisions, and the independence of the enterprises and organizations in their economic activity and the establishment of direct economic relations at the republic, interrepublic, and international levels.

Sovereignty as a political and economic phenomenon requires in-depth comprehension. The more so in that we should not en route to independence abandon common sense and economic realism. The Moldavian SSR has particular territorial, natural, and geographical features. It is rich in labor, but extremely poor in raw material resources and cannot for this reason manage without the help of the other republics. For example, we annually consume approximately 6 million tons of coal, 4.5 million tons of petroleum products and over 4 billion cubic meters of natural gas. The cost of these fuel resources in union prices is approximately R600 million. In world prices these same resources would cost \$1.2

billion annually. For exports of products and services in 1989 the republic obtained R17 million in freely convertible currency, incidentally. No comment necessary, I believe.

But the dynamics of the changes in the Union need to be taken into consideration also. A new system of economic relations in accordance with the example of, let us say, the Western "Common Market" will be created therein—an "eastern market" could be formed here. And this being so, we would, were we to become a part of this structure, have benefits in prices and tariffs, but whoever was outside of this market would have to pay world prices. One does not have to be a top economist to fail to see who would be the loser, and who, the winner.

In addition, owing to its geographical location, Moldavia could acquire the place of broker in East-West economic relations to support its political and economic well-being. In other words, we could be the gateway to a modern integrated Europe.

As yet, alas, our contribution to the international division and cooperation of labor is highly modest. The annual volume of our exports currently does not exceed [figure illegible] percent of the gross product. In addition, raw material, intermediate products, and consumer goods account for the bulk of them. But where is what determines the character and serious approaches of any highly developed state—engineering products? In the opinion of managers of enterprises of this sector, almost their entire product corresponds to the world engineering standard. Less than three percent, however, is sold overseas, of which only one-tenth is sold for freely convertible currency. To this should be added the lack of the necessary personnel and experience.

In a word, we need today a policy of in-depth analysis, serious calculations and long-term forecasts, for which the most eye-catching slogans and hasty decisions cannot substitute. Premature anticipation, outside models, and haste will not help us.

A matter for the immediate future is the renewal of the entire system of treaty relations in the Union. It would be appropriate, I believe, for the congress delegates to express their vision of a future treaty between Moldavia and the Union. We evidently need a state arrangement which permits our people to decide their fate themselves and build their relations with other republics and other peoples on the principles of equality, mutual respect, and mutual trust.

I would like to notify the congress delegates that at a meeting 10 days ago with USSR President M.S. Gorbachev I put to him the question of the republic's sovereignty and the formulation of its special status within a renewed federation. Our proposals met with full support, and we could in the very near future be going to Moscow for consultations with the center. However, it should be said that there has as yet only been lengthy discussion of sovereignty, in practice, on the other hand, the republic's leading authorities are not ready for this.

We propose the immediate formation, under the aegis of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet, of a competent commission to formulate proposals for their examination in conjunction with the union authorities. The successful realization of efforts in this direction could change the atmosphere in the republic appreciably for the better and extricate it from the state of crisis.

In the course of the reports and elections many party members linked questions of the republic's sovereignty with the future status of the Moldavian Communist Party. And this is, in our view, entirely fair and logical. Real state sovereignty cannot exist without an independent Communist Party.

We are also hearing more radical proposals, the sense of which amounts to the following: Since we have declared that we will build real democratic, humane socialism, the party should be called a democratic socialist party. This does not mean, in the opinion of some, a departure from the communist idea, which they have evaluated more as utopian, although I do not consider it, this idea, excluded forever from the intellectual arsenal of mankind.

Of course, comrades, these opinions are not indisputable, and they should not be accepted or rejected all at once. Nor should we be in a hurry to reach conclusions, we should take this debate in the party to be a normal occurrence. Some of us would prefer to see the party's renewal merely as a light, essentially cosmetic renovation of the facade and to change nothing in the functions and methods of the activity of the party. But it is this which is utopia. Decisive political actions and an abrupt change in ideology and policy are needed en route to the party's renewal if we wish to remain an active force in a society in which the material and spiritual prerequisites both for the self-expression of the entire Moldavian nation and for realization of the rights of the national minorities are created.

We understand the achievement of the independence of the Moldavian Communist Party and the sovereignty of the republic as a process whose content, pace, and scale may not here coincide with similar processes in the Union and the CPSU. Some changes may not satisfy us. It is obvious also that some opinions pertaining to an interpretation of sovereignty will not coincide with the interests of some inhabitants of the republic. Such a contradiction is today perfectly objective. But only by having resolved it in a spirit of concord and mutual understanding will we progress.

Following the conclusion of a new treaty on the republic's sovereignty, it will most likely be legitimate to raise the question of the sovereignty of the Moldavian Communist Party.

We believe that for the present stage it is more realistic and effective to speak about an independent Moldavian Communist Party on the common ideological basis of the CPSU and on a common platform with it of humane, democratic socialism. The CPSU Central Committee should here, in our view, adopt decisions affecting the

whole party, provided that the majority of the communist parties of the union republics votes for this. We propose that the section "Communist Parties of the Union Republics" of the draft CPSU Rules record that CPSU decisions in respect of a union republic Communist Party must not be contrary to the constitution of the given republic.

And one further consideration in this connection. In our opinion, the establishment of direct contacts between the Moldavian Communist Party and the communist and social democratic parties of other countries is becoming urgent. I would ask the congress to speak on all these questions of importance. Following the adoption of the CPSU Rules at the upcoming 28th CPSU Congress, the communist parties of the union republics could adopt their own rules reflecting the initiative and salient features of a given republic. Of course, all these questions are in need of additional study and discussion. The delegates will, obviously, have their say on these issues also.

We have to accustom ourselves to living under the conditions of the genuine pluralism of opinions and views. To living together with people with whom we have disagreements, being tolerant of another's opinion and not renouncing dialogue and a search for points of contact and reasonable compromise. It is first of all necessary for us communists to change ourselves, to cardinal change our attitude toward what is happening in the republic: to see the realities and seek to better them.

Let us think and decide together in the way that the times today demand of us. Having come through the pre-congress debate and having enriched itself with the diversity of the opinions of the delegates to the 17th Congress, the Moldavian Communist Party is capable of reaching decisions and a level of understanding of current problems which ensure that it is up to the tremendous transformations which the Communists and the people expect.

We are firmly confident of the achievement of these goals—noble goals geared to the renewal of the party and serving the working man, the man of the new renewed society. This is worth living and fighting for, establishing by deeds and by deeds alone in people's hearts the ideals of goodness and justice and strengthening social optimism, which is so necessary for all of us today. (applause)

Central Asia

List of Kazakh Council of Ministers Published

LD1006151890 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 19 May 90 pl

[Decision by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet approving the composition of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers]

[Text] The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet decides:

To approve the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers with the following composition:

Chairman of the Council of Ministers	Karamanov, Uzakbay
First Deputy Chairmen	Gukasov, Erik Khristoforovich
	Abdullayev Kalyk
	Tursumbayev Baltash
	Moidabayevich
Deputy Chairmen	Zheltikov, Oktyabyr Ivanovich
	Makiyevskiy, Nikolay Mikhaylovich
	Omerbayena Kumuszhn
	Sagyndykovna
	Turysov Karatay
Minister of Internal Affairs	Bersenev, Mikhail Terentyevich
Minister of Health	Amanbayev, Aksultan Amanbayevich
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Arystanbekova, Akmaral Khaydarovna
Minister of Light Industry	Dzhomartov, Abdrazak Chaushe-novich
Minister of Land Improvement and Water Resources	Goncharov, Viktor Aleksandrovich
Minister of Installation and Special Construction Work	Zhovog, Aleksey Nikolayevich
Minister of Public Education	Shayakhmetov Shaysultan
Minister of Communications	Ulyanov, Igor Vadimovich
Minister of Finance	Abdikadirov Tuleubek
Minister of Breadgrain Products	Ostapenko, Yuriy Ivanovich
Minister of Power Engineering and Electrification	Nurzhanov, Bulat Gazisovich
Minister of Justice	Yerzhanov, Galikhan Nurmukhanbetovich
Minister of Roads	Bekbulatov, Shamil Khayrulloevich
Minister of Consumer Services	Beysenov, Sayat Dyusenbayevich
Minister of Housing and Communal Services	Khalykov Gaziz
Minister of Local Industry	Yedil, Bayev Ibragim Bayanur-atovich
Minister of the Construction Materials Industry	Minibayev, Aleksandr Kasimovich
Minister of Social Security	Kadyrova, Zauze Zhusupovna
Minister of Transport	Tomashets, Aleksandr Konstantinovich
Chairman of State Planning Committee	Abdullayev Kalyk
Chairman of State Agro-Industrial Committee	Tursumbayev, Baltash Moldabayevich
Chairman of State Security Committee	Vdovin, Nikolay Anatolyevich
Chairman of State Committee for Culture	Saudabayev, Kanat Bekmurza-yevich

Chairman of State Committee for Material and Technical Supply	Bektemisov, Amangeldy Imanakyshevich
Chairman of State Committee for Supervision of Safe Working Practices in Industry and for Mine supervision	Mulkibayev Orynbasar
Chairman of State Committee for the Press	Zakiryanov Kalit
Chairman of State Committee for Statistics	Zhumasultanov, Tuleubay Zhumasultanovich
Chairman of State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting	Ashimbayev Sagat
Chairman of State Committee for Physical Culture and Sport	Akpayev, Amancha Seysenovich
Chairman of State Committee for Prices	Derbisov, Yerkeshbay Shaylaubayevich
Chairman of State Construction Committee	Galimov, Farit Khabibrakhmanovich
Chairman of State Committee for Foreign Economic Ties	Abishev, Syzdyk Zhumatayevich
Chairman of State Committee for the Supply of Gasoline Products	Denisov, Viktor Vladimirovich
Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers Charge d'affaires	Selivanov, Dmitriy Iosifovich
Chief of the Main Territorial Directorate at the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers for Construction in Alma-Ata city and Alma-Ata Oblast, Kazakh SSR Minister	Yermegiyayev, Amangeidy Dinovich

[Signed] Ye. Asanbayev, chairman of Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet

[Dated] Alma-Ata, 17 May 1990.

Floods in Agricultural Areas of Tajikistan Noted

LD1705192290 Moscow TASS in English 1749 GMT
17 May 90

[Text] Dushanbe May 17 TASS—Several agricultural areas have been flooded in the Soviet Asian Republic of Tajikistan following unusually heavy rains in the past few days.

In Murgabskiy region, floods washed away four bridges, damaged a power line and disrupted communications, according to Tajikistan Civil Defence Headquarters Chief Major General F. Niyazov.

Seventy families had to be evacuated from the Hostav village in the mountains, on the bank of the Pyandzha River.

Things went from bad to worse when a mud slide following an earthquake with an epicentre in neighbouring Afghanistan dammed the river.

Tents, fuel, food and drugs were being delivered to the evacuated families.

Authorities are assessing the damage from floods.

Timely reports from civil defence surveillance units prevented human deaths, Niyazov said.